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ABSTRACT 
 
This research is constructed to provide a comprehensive analysis of key factors that 
influence fund performance, and the methods of evaluating such performance. Our 
examination is from both the managerial and the investor perspectives in the 
context of the UK fund industry.  
 
We begin by analysing the managerial response. We examine the effectiveness of 
the internal monitoring and control system in UK funds, focusing on the relation 
between top manager turnover and the performance of UK unit trusts and OEICs. 
We apply a series of methods, including performance evaluation based on the factor 
models, percentile ranking, and sample matching tests. Funds that have experienced 
replacement of top managers are examined for their performance in the pre and 
post-replacement periods. A variety of methods are applied to measure factors that 
affect the probability of replacement in the pre-replacement period. Bootstrapping 
simulations are implemented to further examine whether UK fund companies can 
distinguish between poorly skilled managers and unlucky ones. It is found that 
many fund companies are not captivated by the ‘lucky’ managers’ extreme 
performance and are willing to give ‘unlucky’ managers another chance. Moreover, 
underperforming managers are more likely to be replaced when fund inflows are 
declining than are outperforming managers. Managers' adjustment of portfolio 
compositions exerts mixed influences on the probability of replacement.   
 
Next, we apply tournament analysis to the UK fund market. We find supportive 
iii 
 
evidence of significant risk shifting in the family tournament; i.e. interim winning 
managers tend to increase their levels of risk exposure more than the losing 
managers do. Our results also show that the risk-adjusted returns of the winners 
outperform those of the losers following the risk taking. As such, risk altering can 
be regarded as an indication of managers’ superior ability. However, the 
tournament behaviour can still be a costly strategy for investors, since in this case 
winners would be seen as beating the losers in terms of the observed returns due to 
deterioration in the performance of their major portfolio holdings. 
 
Finally, the thesis further examines the cross-fund learning among investors.  A 
linear hierarchical model is constructed to consider cross-learning of the funds 
within a fund family in performance evaluation. We apply a full Bayesian treatment 
of all factors of the pricing model and allow both the fund family and individual 
managers to have dependent prior information regarding the funds’ alphas. The 
simulation results suggest that returns from peer funds within the family 
significantly affect investors’ updating on fund alphas, since the posterior 
distribution on fund alphas exhibits a faster shrinkage than is reported in the 
previous literature. The model is also simulated with various prior beliefs on 
different factors of the pricing model, i.e. fund alphas, betas and factor loadings of 
each pricing benchmark, to better address the learning process.     
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
 
 
DECLARATION 
 
No part of this thesis has been submitted elsewhere for any other degree 
or qualification in this or any other university. It is all my own work 
unless referenced to the contrary in the text. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Contents 
CHAPTER ONE .................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 The objective of the thesis .................................................................................... 1 
1.2 An overview of the UK fund industry .................................................................. 5 
1.3 Fund performance evaluation ............................................................................... 8 
1.4 Performance shifting .......................................................................................... 11 
1.4.1 Risk taking and performance shifting....................................................... 11 
1.4.2 Fund family and performance shifting ..................................................... 13 
1.4.3 Managers’ characteristics and performance shifting ................................ 15 
1.4.4 Manager replacement and performance shifting ...................................... 16 
1.4.5 Organisation form and performance shifting ........................................... 18 
1.5 Organisation of the thesis ................................................................................... 19 
1.5.1 Managers’ turnover ................................................................................... 19 
1.5.2 Family tournament, risk taking and performance consequences.............. 22 
1.5.3 Investor learning ....................................................................................... 23 
1.6 Main findings...................................................................................................... 25 
1.6.1 Managers’ turnover ................................................................................... 25 
1.6.2 Family tournament, risk taking and performance consequences.............. 26 
1.6.3 Bayesian learning and fund performance ................................................. 27 
CHAPTER TWO ................................................................................................. 29 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 29 
2.2 Methodology ...................................................................................................... 35 
2.2.1 Performance evaluation ............................................................................ 35 
2.2.2 Determinants of the replacement .............................................................. 37 
2.3 Data .................................................................................................................... 43 
2.3.1 Sample description ................................................................................... 43 
2.3.2 The survivorship bias issue ...................................................................... 45 
vi 
 
2.4 Empirical results ................................................................................................. 48 
2.4.1 Performance changes around replacement ............................................... 48 
2.4.2 Determinants of managerial replacement ................................................. 56 
2.5 Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 73 
CHAPTER THREE ............................................................................................. 75 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 75 
3.2 Related literature ................................................................................................ 82 
3.3 Methodology ...................................................................................................... 87 
3.4 Data .................................................................................................................... 91 
3.5 Empirical results ................................................................................................. 93 
3.5.1 Risk taking in the segment and family tournaments ................................ 93 
3.5.2 Risk characteristics in segment and family tournaments ....................... 104 
3.5.3 Rank transition analysis .......................................................................... 110 
3.5.4 Performance comparison in family tournaments .................................... 117 
3.6 Conclusions ...................................................................................................... 136 
CHAPTER FOUR ............................................................................................. 138 
4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 138 
4.2 Related literature .............................................................................................. 142 
4.2.1 Bayesian fund performance evaluation .................................................. 143 
4.2.2 Learning across funds ............................................................................. 145 
4.2.3 Covariance separation strategy ............................................................... 146 
4.2.4 Persistence in fund performance ............................................................ 148 
4.3 The performance evaluation model .................................................................. 151 
4.3.1 The general learning model .................................................................... 151 
4.3.2 The non-learning and partial learning models ........................................ 160 
4.3.3 Prior beliefs ............................................................................................ 163 
4.4 Simulation analysis ........................................................................................... 167 
4.4.1 Simulation with returns of hypothetical fund family ............................. 167 
vii 
 
4.4.2 Simulation with returns of hypothetical funds universe ......................... 176 
4.4.3 Simulation with the universe of real funds ............................................. 185 
4.5 Conclusions ...................................................................................................... 196 
CHAPTER FIVE ............................................................................................... 200 
5.1 Research overview and implications ................................................................ 200 
5.1.1 Managers’ turnover ................................................................................. 200 
5.1.2 Risk taking in fund family tournament ................................................... 201 
5.1.3 Bayesian learning and fund performance ............................................... 202 
5.2 Limitations and future research ........................................................................ 205 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................. 208 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
Tables 
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics .................................................................................. 46 
Table 2.2 Analytics of Top Management Turnover ................................................. 50 
Table 2.3 Rating Analysis of Management Turnover .............................................. 55 
Table 2.4 Proportion of Funds with Genuine Stock Selection Skills ...................... 60 
Table 2.5 Managerial Replacement and Flow Relation ........................................... 67 
Table 2.6 Replacement-Portfolio Holdings Relationship ........................................ 72 
 
Table 3.1 Summary statistics ................................................................................... 92 
Table 3.2 Family and segment tournaments (Raw Returns) .................................... 97 
Table 3.3 Family and segment tournaments (4 Factor Model Alpha) ..................... 99 
Table 3.4 Employment and compensation driven risk taking ............................... 101 
Table 3.5 Whole family tournaments .................................................................... 103 
Table 3.6 Family and segment tournaments (Market Beta) .................................. 106 
Table 3.7 Family and segment tournaments (Idiosyncratic Risk) ......................... 107 
Table 3.8 Family and segment tournaments (Family Beta) ................................... 108 
Table 3.9 Family and segment tournaments (Family Idiosyncratic Risk) ............. 109 
Table 3.10 Segment rank transition matrix ............................................................. 111 
Table 3.11 Family rank transition matrix ............................................................... 113 
Table 3.12 Risk shifting and post-ranking performance transition ........................ 116 
Table 3.13 Post fund ranking performance (6-6) ................................................... 121 
Table 3.14 Post fund ranking performance (7-5) ................................................... 123 
Table 3.15 Post family ranking performance ........................................................ 125 
Table 3.16 Post-ranking risk characteristics .......................................................... 128 
Table 3.17 Aggregate family ranks analysis .......................................................... 132 
Table 3.18 Cross-fund subsidisation ...................................................................... 135 
 
ix 
 
Table 4.1 Simulation of learning within fund family ............................................ 170 
Table 4.2 Simulation of learning across funds universe ........................................ 178 
Table 4.3 Simulation of learning across funds with non-equal prior .................... 183 
Table 4.4 Posterior correlation coefficients ........................................................... 184 
Table 4.5 Simulation of learning within fund family ............................................ 190 
Table 4.6 Simulation of learning on all pricing factors ......................................... 194 
Table 4.7 Posterior correlation coefficients ........................................................... 195 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
Figures 
Figure 1.1 Cash Flow and Major Entities in UK Unit Trusts Industry ................... 7 
 
Figure 2.1 Histogram of Actual Alphas against Matching Bootstrapped Alphas 
around Replacement Time ..................................................................................... 57 
Figure 2.2 Histogram of Actual Alphas’ t-ratio against Matching Bootstrapped 
Alphas’ t-ratio around Replacement Time ............................................................. 58 
Figure 2.3 Kernel Density Estimation of Abnormal Performance in 
Pre-Replacement Period ........................................................................................ 62 
Figure 2.4 Kernel Density Estimation of Abnormal Performance in 
Post-Replacement Period....................................................................................... 63 
 
Figure 4.1 Prior distribution on  for  ............................. 165 
Figure 4.2 Prior distribution on  for  and   
 ........................................................................................... 166 
Figure 4.3 Boxplot of Posterior Draws of CAPM  .......................................... 172 
Figure 4.4 Boxplot of Posterior Draws of 3-factor model  .............................. 173 
Figure 4.5 Boxplot of Posterior Draws of 4-factor model  .............................. 174 
Figure 4.6 Boxplot of Posterior Draws of CAPM  ................................. 175 
Figure 4.7 Density of the posterior draws of CAPM  ...................................... 179 
xi 
 
  
CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The objective of the thesis 
This research aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of key factors that 
influence the mutual fund performance, and the technique for performance 
evaluation. Our examination is from both the managerial and the investor 
perspectives in the context of the UK fund industry. We begin by examining the 
effectiveness of the internal monitoring and control system which affect funds’ 
risk-adjusted performance. Then we apply the tournament analysis to provide 
insight into the interplay between fund managers’ risk shifting and performance 
changing. Finally, the research is further extended to construct performance 
evaluation method which consider the cross-learning of the information given by 
funds within a fund family. The specific objectives of each chapter are addressed 
by the following points. 
 
In Chapter 2 where the effectiveness of the internal monitoring and control system 
in the UK fund industry is discussed, our research aims to, 
1.  Shed critical light on the effectiveness of the internal monitoring and 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
control system by analysing the relation between top manager turnover 
and the performance of UK unit trusts.  
 
2. To provide further insight into the performance contribution of the fund 
managers around replacement, a simulation procedure is implemented to 
test whether, in their managerial dismissal and appointment, UK fund 
companies can distinguish between managers with genuine skills and 
those who are lucky, or between poorly skilled managers and those who 
are unlucky. 
 
3. In order to comprehend the trading and investment behaviour from both 
the investors and the managers around the replacement, this chapter also 
provides additional test regarding the changes of capital inflow and 
portfolio characteristics. We compare funds’ top holdings, equity holdings 
and industry concentration before and after the top management turnover 
while the flow changes is examined by the size shifting around the 
replacement. 
 
In Chapter 3 where mangers’ risk taking and performance consequences is 
examined,      
1. To analyse the distinct risk taking behaviour between interim winning and 
losing managers, we construct empirical models in the context of the 
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segment and family tournament in which managers within the same 
segment (family) might compete with each other by increasing the 
portfolio risk to improve future performance.  
 
2. To reveal the connection between the risk taking and managers’ career 
concern, we further examine managers’ risk taking behaviour under 
different market condition, namely, how mid-year winners (losers) adjust 
their risk level during the bull market when compensation overwhelms 
employment concern or vice versa in the bear market.   
 
3. We conduct the performance consequence analysis for both the interim 
winners and losers to examine the costs and gains for the risk shifting. We 
compute the difference of raw returns as well as the risk adjusted returns 
with respect to funds’ changes in total risks. We also look into the risk 
shifting issue from the overall family perspective by comparing the 
aggregated performance shifting between the dog family (family consists 
of funds whose performance is extremely poor) and star family (family 
consists super star funds). Our analysis therefore shed the additional light 
on managers’ motivations and families’ view regarding the risk taking. 
 
In Chapter 4, the objectives of the chapter can be stated as following,  
1. To incorporate the return information given by peer funds within the same 
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fund family, we construct a linear hierarchical model to provide alternative 
performance evaluation results. The dependent nature of the variability of 
funds’ alphas can be modelled in a hierarchical setting in which a 
dependent prior is designated on the cross-sectional mean. The alpha of a 
fund can be drawn from a common population distribution which is 
defined to describe the general belief on the cross-sectional performance. 
A prior can then be assigned to represent the investors’ opinion on the 
mean of the distribution, since its posterior mean is the weighted average 
of the information from both the prior and the data.  
 
2. In order to utilize the return information from the other pricing factors 
given by the peer funds, we apply a separation strategy suggested by 
several statistical studies to decompose the covariance matrix into the 
production of the diagonal matrix with variance of each factor, and the 
correlation matrix of all the factors in the pricing model. By deploying the 
separation strategy we can define the prior information on each of the 
pricing factors as well as the between-factor correlation. The full Bayesian 
treatment on each of the variable considered in the pricing model in 
addition to the alpha, i.e. the systematic risk; the factor loadings on the 
size, book to market and the momentum portfolio can better address the 
learning behaviour. By including information given by all pricing factors 
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we manage to find out that from the investors’ perspective how beliefs on 
other issue from the pricing model affect the updating of individual fund 
alpha. Moreover, we place no restriction on the correlation matrix of 
different pricing factors in the pricing model. That is to say we also 
include prior information to allow cross-factor learning which is often 
impossible in the conventional OLS estimated alphas.   
 
 
1.2 An overview of the UK fund industry 
The rapid expansion of the UK fund industry in recent years has pushed it from 
fifth place in the world league table of asset value ranks (Gremillion, 2005) to 
become the world’s second largest after the US in terms of asset management 
activity. By the end of 2011, the UK’s Unit Trusts and Open-end Investment 
Companies (OEICs hereafter),1 which are mainly retail vehicles, were managing 
£575 billion worth of assets. Despite the fallout of the ‘Dot-com’ crash and the 
recent global financial crisis, during the period 2001 to 2011 the UK fund industry 
grew by almost 143% in asset value.2 
 
Among all the types of assets under management by the UK fund industry, 
1 Unit trusts and OEICs are UK equivalents of US mutual funds. The key difference between unit trusts and 
OEICs is dual pricing, i.e. unit trusts have offer and bid prices while OEICs are singly priced at Net Asset Value 
(NAV). 
2 Data source: The Investment Management Association Annual Survey 2012. 
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equities account for the largest proportion. With £333 billion of equities under 
their management by 2011, over one quarter of the UK funds construct their 
portfolios primarily in equities, and over 50% of the investments are focused on 
UK stocks. According to the Investment Management Association (IMA), the UK 
All Companies and UK Equity Income are the two leading sectors of all fund 
sectors by asset value. The three purely UK-focused sectors, i.e. UK All 
Companies, UK Equity Income and UK Smaller Companies, contribute to an 
aggregate of £157 million in terms of assets under management, which is 47% of 
the overall asset value of all the equity sectors.3 As such, the data sample built by 
the UK domicile equity funds is sufficiently representative of major 
characteristics of the UK equity funds.   
           
A typical UK fund includes the trustees, the investment advisers, unit holders and 
management companies. Figure 1.1 depicts the cash flow and major entities of the 
UK unit trusts industry. The investors provide the trusts with money when they 
purchase their shares. The trusts then use the money to construct portfolios in 
accordance with their investment objective. Investors receive money when they 
redeem shares from the trusts. The trustees are empowered with the overall 
control of the underlying assets and devote efforts to protect unit holders’ interests. 
The management companies take responsibility for fund administration. They fire 
3 Other IMA equity sectors may also contain some UK-focused funds, but usually only in small numbers; for 
example, there may be Europe and UK specialist funds in Technology and Telecommunications, etc.  
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or hire fund managers according to the decision of trustees based on financial 
advisers’ advice on managerial replacement. Assuming this mechanism is efficient, 
performance of a fund manager is negatively associated with the probability of 
dismissal.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Cash Flow and Major Entities in the UK Unit Trusts Industry 
 
The role of fund directors (or the trustees of unit trusts) is different from that of 
the board of directors, since the latter’s major responsibility is internal monitoring. 
In the fund industry, fund directors are the fiduciaries that should act in the best 
interests of the fund holders. However, their powers in that respect are diluted, 
since fund companies have developed a close connection with the fund directors.   
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1.3 Fund performance evaluation  
Existing research analyses evaluation of fund performance on the basis of two 
criteria: the observed returns and the risk-adjusted returns. The observed returns 
show a fund’s delivered performance instantly. They are normally computed by 
the difference of the funds’ NAV within a certain data frequency. Given the 
simplicity of this criterion, the observed returns are widely used by most of the 
ranking agencies, e.g. Morningstar and Trustnet. In academic research, Chevalier 
and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) for example examine changes of 
cash flow in response to observed returns. While Brown, Harlow and Starks 
(1996), Kempf and Ruenzi (2008), and Schwarz (2012) analyse the changes of 
risk with respect to the average of half-year observed returns, Patel, Zeckhauser 
and Hendricks (1994) argue that investors might value observed returns more than 
the risk-adjusted returns. 
 
The risk-adjusted returns, also known as the Jensen alpha, are widely used as the 
criterion for judging managers’ stock selection ability. Jensen (1968) divides the 
economic contents of portfolio performance into two components, the ability of 
the portfolio manager and the ability to minimize the insurable risk. Based on this 
division he proposes a measurement to evaluate the performance of the portfolio, 
the difference between the actual and normal risk premium based on capital asset 
pricing model, and it is known as the Jensen alpha. In Fama and French (1993) 
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and Carhart (1997), Jensen’s basic framework is extended to include portfolio size, 
book-to-market ratio and momentum effects in mimicking the investment 
strategies. Subsequently, the effectiveness of alpha as the criterion for judging 
managers’ stock selection skills has been widely reviewed, and a variety of 
methodologies has been adopted in the estimation of alpha (Lehman and Modest, 
1987; Grinblatt and Titman, 1989, 1993; Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 1994; Malkiel, 
1995, and Wermers, 2000). Meanwhile, several studies have considered precise 
estimation of alphas, for example the seemingly unrelated model by Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2002), the liquidity model by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and the 
time varying model by Ferson and Schadt (1996).  
 
Despite the considerable efforts made in the previous research to construct an 
appropriate pricing model in order to gain more precise evaluation results, few 
studies have realised that the risk-adjusted returns are also hampered by the 
magnificent randomness in the market (Pastor and Veronesi, 2009). Alphas given 
by the frequentist estimation cannot address the randomness issue, while a 
Bayesian updating may instead rationalise the investors’ beliefs after receiving 
new information, and better address the uncertainty in financial data.  
 
The Bayesian process can be regarded as a combined estimation of both prior 
beliefs and the observed data. The prior belief about an uncertain parameter is 
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elicited before seeing the actual data used to estimate that parameter. For instance, 
from the fund investors’ perspective, the frequentist approach is to compute the 
fund alpha directly by using the observed returns within a certain pricing model. 
However, in the Bayesian approach, investors also receive additional information 
related to the alpha they aim to compute, i.e. the opinion on the manager’s ability 
based on past experience, and the historical returns which can be used to price the 
market benchmark in a certain pricing model. Investors can incorporate the prior 
beliefs in the estimation to generate the posterior distribution. The posterior mean 
can also be used as new prior information in future updating.  
 
Given the interest in such a rational updating process, some researchers have 
chosen to conduct the evaluation process using the Bayesian approach. Kandel, 
McCulloch and Stambaugh (1995), and Pastor and Stambaugh (2000) discuss this 
from the portfolio selection perspective. Baks et al. (2001) consider various 
elicitations of investors’ prior beliefs in asset allocation. Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2002), and Busse and Irvine (2006) manage to incorporate information given by 
the non-included benchmark portfolio in the pricing model to compute the funds’ 
alphas, in which a seemingly unrelated model is constructed in a Bayesian 
framework.  
 
Past research related to the Bayesian evaluation of funds’ performance is mainly 
10 
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constructed with independent prior beliefs which ignore the dependent nature of 
the cross-sectional variability in fund alphas, as if the stock selection ability of the 
manager could only be identified through a certain sample of his past observed 
returns. Thus, the randomness in the historical returns might hamper the 
conventional method from addressing the manager’s true ability. Jones and 
Shanken (2005) therefore consider a dependent prior belief to incorporate the 
cross-sectional mean and standard deviation of fund alphas in the Bayesian 
updating. They find that investors with high scepticism of cross-sectional 
managers’ skills are more convinced of the inferior ability of the funds they hold. 
They argue that this outcome is due to cross-fund learning at the investors’ end. 
Consequently, dependent prior belief facilitates Bayesian updating to include 
additional information given by related parties, to better address the uncertainty of 
parameters in financial markets.             
 
 
1.4 Performance shifting  
1.4.1 Risk taking and performance shifting 
Performance shifting is another popular area to which previous research devotes 
much attention. Changes in funds’ performance may be due to a variety of factors, 
but all can be grouped into two categories: managerial issues and investment 
strategy related issues. Of these, risk taking proves to be a major channel for the 
11 
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performance changes, since it can exert a considerable effect on portfolio 
management. 
 
Mutual funds change their risk exposure over time (Brown, Harlow and Starks, 
1996; Kempf and Ruenzi, 2008; Huang, Sialm and Zhang, 2011). Many studies 
argue that this is primarily related to the agency problem. Previous literature finds 
a convex shaped relation between fund performance and changes in cash inflows 
(Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Huang, Wei and Yan, 2007). 
Given this disproportionate flow-performance connection, underperforming 
managers may be tempted to increase risk exposure to bet on performance 
improvement, since the manager’s compensation scheme is based on a fixed 
percentage rate over the underlying assets.  
 
Studies such as Koski and Pontiff (1999), Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003), Qiu 
(2003) and Hu, Kale, Pagani and Subramanian (2011) find that risk altering is 
closely related to managers’ implicit compensation. Underperforming funds may 
also alter levels of their portfolio risk before the reporting date to manipulate their 
performance record or to increase holdings of the equities with recent good 
performance to window dress the investments (Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler and 
Vishny, 1991; Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel and Welch, 2007). However, risk 
shifting is not necessarily accompanied by performance improvement. Using 
12 
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datasets based on portfolio holdings, Huang et al. (2011) suggest that funds with 
high levels of risk cannot outperform those with a stable level of risk. They claim 
that risk taking is merely an indication of managers’ inferior skill, or is initialised 
by the agency issue.      
 
1.4.2 Fund family and performance shifting 
Several studies relate the performance of individual funds to the fund families to 
which they belong. Fund families play an important role in funds’ operation, since 
it is the fund family that decides managers’ promotion or demotion, and which 
funds to market (Jain and Wu, 2000). Gervais, Lynch and Musto (2005) find that 
fund companies might better convey the information on managers’ skills to the 
investors. Khorana and Servaes (1999) document that large fund families are more 
likely to open new funds. Baks (2003) uses a Cobb-Douglas production function 
to identify the performance attribution of the fund family in individual funds’ 
alphas.  
 
Strategies adopted by fund companies can also affect the performance of 
individual funds. Massa (2003) finds that the fund family can adopt various 
strategies to attract investors, such as allowing investors to switch between funds 
within the same fund family or increasing product differentiation within the 
family, which in turn has an impact on individual fund performance. Gaspar, 
13 
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Massa and Matos (2006) document a cross-fund subsidisation strategy used by 
fund families to promote funds with high past performance through allocating 
new IPO shares. Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004) suggest that fund families with 
star funds, i.e. funds with top ranking performance relative to peer funds that 
adopt the same investment style, attract considerably more new cash inflows than 
other type families. The growing cash inflows can bring new capital not only to 
the star funds but also to other funds within the same family, which brings about 
the spill-over effect. They also find evidence that star families tend to increase the 
volatility of cross-sectional returns in order to increase the odds of creating star 
funds.   
 
Existing literature also discusses risk taking in the context of fund families. By 
referring to the traditional corporate tournament studies (for example Leonard, 
1990; Gibbs, 1993), scholars have found that funds with distinct previous 
performance in the same family alter their risk exposure differently to compete for 
the benefits provided by the fund family (Kempf and Ruenzi, 2008), and such 
behaviour also occurs in funds with the same investment objectives (Brown et al. 
1996; Busse, 2001; Schwarz, 2012). This type of competition, also known as the 
family tournament, is consistent with fund families’ profit maximisation, taking 
into consideration the spill-over effect and the star funds phenomenon.    
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1.4.3 Managers’ characteristics and performance shifting 
The explanatory power of manager characteristics, including the manager’s age, 
educational qualifications, tenure and level of risk taken, has been frequently 
visited in the prior literature. Analysing the cross-sectional fund returns, 
researchers have found that factors such as age and education level have a positive 
impact on fund performance.  
 
In a seminal paper, Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) find evidence indicating that 
MBA managers outperform their non-MBA counterparts in fund performance. 
They also find that managers’ age has a negative relationship with funds’ 
performance, and explain this in terms of career concerns, whereby younger 
managers may work harder than older ones because they have a longer career life 
ahead of them and are more afraid of being fired for poor performance. This result 
confirms that of Chevalier and Ellison (1999a). With regard to their findings that 
the most robust performance difference can be found in managers’ SAT scores, 
they explain that higher SAT institutions provide their graduates with indirect 
benefits in terms of social community, which means that they can obtain financial 
information from better sources. In addition, in their research to identify the 
relationship between risk holding and managers’ characteristics, they suggest that 
a manager with an MBA or a high SAT score would possibly take more systematic 
risk; this is consistent with the research by Golec (1996). Their research also 
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suggests that MBA managers are more likely to purchase low book-to-market 
ratio stocks and that older managers would have a greater tendency to use 
momentum strategies, but that age has a negative impact on fund performance.  
 
Taking another perspective, Chevalier and Ellison (1999a) construct a research on 
mutual fund managers and their career concerns. Following the work by Fama 
(1980) and Lazear and Rosen (1981), they document that young managers are 
more likely to avoid high unsystematic risk, which is consistent with the finding 
by Chevalier and Ellison (1999b).  
 
In addition to managers’ characteristics, previous literature has established other 
factors that contribute to fund performance. Since such information is accessible 
to fund investors, it becomes part of the supplementary selection criteria for 
formulating fund investment decisions. However, existing research does not go 
deep enough to classify and analyse these factors at different levels. It remains 
unclear whether a better understanding of such factors would add value to actively 
managed funds. 
 
1.4.4 Manager replacement and performance shifting 
Given the influence exerted by managers’ career concerns, it is also worth 
examining the effect of changing the fund managers on fund performance. As has 
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been described above, actively managed funds come with managerial cost; hence, 
investors tend to select funds according to the managers’ performance, and the 
selection by investors would have a feedback effect on managerial reshuffle 
through fund companies’ administrative procedures. Given the influence both 
internally and externally, much attention has been paid to this area. 
 
In an early research by Khorana (1996), significant evidence was found to support 
the hypothesis of presence of an inverse relationship between fund 
pre-replacement performance and the probability of managers’ replacement. The 
author examined 339 US funds, which had all experienced management 
replacement during the sample period of 1979 to 1992; the result indicates that 
those funds had experienced two years’ underperformance before the replacement 
month. In a subsequent research, Khorana (2001) goes further to analyse the 
post-replacement performance, based on the investigation into CEO turnover 
impacts by Denis and Denis (1995). After dividing the sample into two 
sub-groups according to their pre-replacement performance, Khorana (2001) 
documents that in the negative performance sample, alphas decrease in the 
pre-replacement period and recover after the replacement, while in the positive 
performance sample the return exhibits deterioration during the post-replacement 
period. This outcome implies that the market is effective in penalising 
underperforming managers under the extreme competition in the fund industry. 
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However, Khorana’s work does not discuss the reason behind the deterioration in 
the positive performance sample during the post-replacement period.  
 
More recently, Scherbina and Jin (2005) consider the influence of manager 
replacement on fund performance from the angle of portfolio holdings. Their 
result demonstrates that the disposition effect (the tendency to hold poor 
performing stocks for too long) exists in mutual fund managers’ behaviour. Such 
an effect would reduce the fund performance, making appropriate replacement 
necessary. They find that new managers are more likely to change their inherited 
portfolio, and will sell a larger proportion of poor performing stocks than better 
stocks, which suggests the advisability of regular replacement of fund 
management. Furthermore, as changes to management may also be due to 
promotion and demotion, Evans (2009) suggests that manager’s alpha should be 
seriously considered in the decision making process. 
  
1.4.5 Organisation form and performance shifting 
Fund management may take different organisational forms. Some fund companies, 
for example, do not appoint key individual managers, but instead set up a team to 
assume responsibility for fund governance. Researchers have attempted to study 
possible performance differences between these two forms. Prather and Middleton 
(2002), Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik (2004) and Baer, Kempf and Ruenzi (2005) 
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compare the performance of sole-managed and team-managed funds. Prather and 
Middleton (2002) find that, consistent with the classical decision making 
perspective, there is no difference in the performance of the two. Chen at al. (2004) 
and Baer et al. (2005) find evidence of underperformance in team-managed funds. 
 
 
1.5 Organisation of the thesis 
Tremendous efforts have been made in the existing literature to determine the 
factors that drive fund performance. Studies have also been initiated to devise 
methods of performance evaluation. This research intends to advance our 
knowledge in this field by focusing on three critical aspects of fund performance 
and methods of evaluation thereof: managers’ turnover, fund family tournament 
and the investors’ Bayesian learning.  
 
1.5.1 Managers’ turnover 
The high liquidity of the fund industry and the competitive market for fund 
managers make it possible to test the effectiveness of the internal monitoring 
mechanism for unit trusts through a comparative analysis of fund performance 
around managers’ replacement. Since open-end trusts allow unit holders to redeem 
their investment on demand, the consequence of poor fund performance will 
become visible when unit holders vote with their feet (Khorana, 1996). Such 
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redemption could reduce the enhanced agency costs caused by failure of internal 
monitoring. In addition, evidence shows that there exists a significant positive 
relation between a fund’s net cash flows and its performance (Ippolito, 1992; Sirri 
and Tufano, 1998; Berk and Green, 2004). This is because fund management 
companies benefit from managerial fees, which are proportional to the value of 
the fund’s underlying assets. While investors face a variety of investment 
opportunities, fund companies are under pressure to appoint managers who can 
satisfy the fund companies’ best interest. Thus, managers’ dismissal based on 
historical underperformance becomes a reflection of effective managerial 
operation of fund companies. Given that skilful managers are more likely to be 
appointed by fund companies to improve fund performance, analysis of shifting 
performance around top managers’ turnover offers a promising path to unearth 
evidence of effectiveness of the internal monitoring mechanism in the fund 
industry.  
 
Whereas it has been demonstrated in the previous literature that poor fund 
performance will increase the probability of managerial replacement and that new 
managers tend to outperform old ones, studies to date are inconclusive about the 
efficiency of the administrative procedures in the UK fund industry. Specifically, 
many questions remain to be answered about whether the manager who is 
replaced really deserves demotion or dismissal, or whether it is due simply to the 
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bad luck of a good manager before the reporting day. In the latter case, 
replacement may incur real losses. Moreover, as mentioned above, the new 
managers might be lucky enough to obtain superior returns, but this might not 
persist.  
 
Against this backdrop, Chapter 2 of this research aims to improve our 
understanding of the corporate governance in the fund industry by examining the 
effectiveness of the internal monitoring and control system in the UK fund 
industry. First, we analyse the relation between top manager turnover and the 
performance of UK funds. We use a series of methods, including performance 
evaluation based on the factor models, percentile ranking, and sample matching 
tests. We divide funds that have experienced replacement of top managers into 
two time intervals or subsamples, namely the pre and post-replacement periods. A 
variety of methods are then applied to measure factors that affect the probability 
of replacement in the pre-replacement period. Second, we implement simulations 
to further examine whether UK fund companies can distinguish between 
managers with genuine skills and those who are lucky, or between poorly skilled 
managers and those who are unlucky. We conduct the bootstrapping simulation 
employed by Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers and White (2006) and 
Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and O’Sullivan (2008) to determine whether fund 
companies can distinguish between poorly skilled managers and unlucky ones 
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when deciding on managerial replacement. By comparing the actual estimation of 
abnormal performance with the ‘luck’ distribution given by bootstrapping 
simulations, we are able to distinguish the managers with ‘real’ stock-picking 
skills from those who are simply lucky. Hence, this method could provide 
additional evidence on the effectiveness of internal and external controls in the 
fund industry.  
 
1.5.2 Family tournament, risk taking and performance consequences  
Chapter 3 focuses on the tournament of funds within the fund family. Mutual 
funds alter their risk exposure frequently for various reasons. For example, funds 
may use risk shifting to indicate active trading or superior stock selection ability. 
In the context of the tournament theory, fund families allocate resources and 
information to the fund that can outperform peer funds within the same family. 
Hence, to a great extent it is the fund family that decides on which managers 
should be promoted or demoted based on the tournament outcome. As a result, 
managers should change their risk exposure only to improve the fund performance, 
rather than increase the overall uncertainty of the family.  
 
While there is a large body of research that examines the characteristics of risk 
taking among funds, scant attention is paid to risk altering and its performance 
consequences. This motivates the discussions in Chapter 3. We first examine both 
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the segment and family tournament phenomena in 3 IMA sectors of 
UK-domiciled equity funds from 2001 to 2010. The tournament analysis is 
conducted on the basis of both the raw returns and the risk-adjusted returns, to see 
how funds with distinct previous performance alter their future risk exposure. 
Then, we examine the performance consequences of such risk altering. Funds are 
ranked based on their performance and we compute the transition probability for 
each of the ranking groups. We also analyse the performance differences between 
funds with various levels of risk.  
 
Research on risk taking from the perspective of fund families is sparse in the 
literature. We therefore deploy an empirical model to find out how the aggregated 
changes of fund ranks within the same family can be affected by the individual 
fund risk taking, as well as the cross-sectional family level of risk. In addition, we 
examine the characteristics of risk taking in the family tournament. Specifically, 
we discuss changes in both systematic and idiosyncratic risks, in order to shed 
light on managers’ altering the portfolio holdings during the tournament.  
 
1.5.3 Investor learning 
Information from the fund family can provide critical insights on evaluating the 
performance of its component funds. The combination of fund family and the 
managers of its member funds contributes to yield the returns of a certain fund. 
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However, no adequate attempt has been made in the existing literature to take 
account of the information flowing from other peer funds as well as the family 
itself in the performance evaluation process.   
 
In Chapter 4, we propose an evaluation process in a Bayesian framework to 
incorporate additional information provided by other members of the fund family 
in estimating their alphas using the factor model. We achieve this by adding 
another level to the conventional pricing model. Lindley and Smith (1972) derive 
a general solution to the two level linear model in a Bayesian system. However, 
the major problem lies in adding the proper prior information onto the covariance 
matrix of all the factors in the model. The conventional method applies a very 
restrictive prior belief to represent all the additional information. We relax this 
assumption by applying a separation strategy to decompose the covariance matrix 
into a diagonal matrix with variance of each factor, and a correlation matrix of all 
the factors in the pricing model (see for example Barnard, McCulloch and Meng, 
2000; O’Malley and Zaslavsky, 2008). By so doing, we manage to incorporate the 
prior information given by the peer members of the family on each of the pricing 
factors, as well as the between-factor correlation in the estimation of fund alpha.   
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1.6 Main findings  
1.6.1 Managers’ turnover 
Results from the analysis of managers’ turnover and performance shifting in 
Chapter 2 suggest that managers’ replacement can be predicted by historical poor 
performance. We also find that in the post-replacement period the previously 
inferior performance will be improved by the new managers. Results from the 
bootstrapping simulations suggest that managers with inferior previous 
performance driven by sample variation (‘bad luck’) are less likely to be replaced 
than are those with ‘luck’ driven superior performance. However, fund companies 
seem to be very generous towards those ‘unlucky’ managers in terms of 
managerial replacement. Furthermore, while most of the funds in the lower 
ranking group have replaced their ‘lucky’ or ‘poorly skilled’ managers with 
managers with genuine skills, the proportion decreases for funds with higher 
rankings. 
 
With regard to the characteristics of portfolio holdings and to risk taking around 
the replacement, our results show that changes in the fund flows are negatively 
correlated with the probability of replacement. Meanwhile, superior managers 
tend to maintain their top holdings. Inferior managers, on the other hand, seem to 
lose confidence in their major holdings when, under the pressure of career 
concerns, they increase holdings of stocks other than the top ten assets in their 
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portfolio.  
 
1.6.2 Family tournament, risk taking and performance consequences 
In Chapter 3, where we discuss risk taking behaviour and the performance 
consequences, our results show that high ranked funds are more likely to increase 
their risk exposure in the second half of the calendar year. Similar results are 
reported when funds are ranked by risk-adjusted returns. However, the risk 
seeking behaviour does not occur at the fund family level.  
 
The findings are consistent with those of Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995). 
Specifically, the winning funds in a small fund group are more likely to engage in 
a tournament with strategic interactions. Our results also imply the effects of 
employment concerns on fund risk taking. Although taking more risk can increase 
the probability of better performance, it can also come at the cost of performing 
even worse. Underperforming managers might value their employment more than 
do the top performing ones. 
 
In terms of the performance consequence of risk shifting, our results suggest that 
the winning funds can outperform the losers by keeping a more stable risk level. 
This outcome persists when various performance evaluation models are employed. 
However, our results also suggest that winning funds deliver significantly higher 
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alphas obtained from the conventional CAPM, the 3-factor and 4-factor models by 
taking more risk. We argue that the deterioration in the observed returns from 
increased holdings of the index-linked stocks could destroy the leading position 
held by the winning funds. The increased exposure of the winning funds to 
systematic risk shown in our results supports this finding. Moreover, in terms of 
the risk-adjusted returns, through taking more risk the winning managers achieve 
their goal of sending a signal to the fund company about their superior stock 
selection ability. In general our results agree with Huang et al. (2011), in that 
better performance comes with taking a more stable level of risk. However, we 
argue that risk taking might not necessarily be an indication of inferior 
performance, but can be regarded as the managers’ intention to win the 
tournament at the cost of investors’ benefits. Since managers’ skills act as a 
crucial criterion for the fund family to decide which fund to advertise or to favour 
with extra resources, it stands to reason that winner funds would actively consider 
shifting risk exposure to retain their leading positions.  
 
1.6.3 Bayesian learning and fund performance 
In Chapter 4 we propose a general learning model to incorporate the information 
given by other funds within the same family. The results from the simulations 
suggest that the proposed evaluation method can better capture the learning 
process. We find that the posterior mean of fund alpha shrinks faster than reported 
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by Jones and Shanken (2005), indicating that the evaluation results are more 
likely to be influenced by information given by the peer funds of the fund family. 
Another fascinating feature is that our method applies a full Bayesian treatment of 
all the pricing factors to grasp the prior information specific to each pricing factor. 
Our simulation shows that if the prior beliefs are reasonably accurate, this can 
improve the level of shrinkage to offer more precise evaluation results. Finally, 
since we decompose the individual fund alpha into the combination of the family 
mean and the idiosyncratic contribution from the manager, our empirical results 
also show that the fund manager contributes positively to the overall fund 
performance when non-informative prior beliefs are applied.  
 
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows: In Chapter 2, we test the efficiency 
of the internal monitoring in the UK fund industry by examining whether 
managers possess genuine stock selection ability. In Chapter 3 we focus on 
managers’ risk taking behaviour and the performance consequence in the fund 
family tournament. In Chapter 4 we propose a performance evaluation method in 
a Bayesian framework to incorporate additional information given by peer funds 
within the same fund family in estimating the funds’ alphas. Conclusions and 
implications of this research are summarised in the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
MANAGERS’ STOCK SELECTION 
SKILLS AND MANAGERIAL 
REPLACEMENT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Mutual fund managers are appointed on their perceived specialist knowledge and 
information advantage (Gremillion, 2005). As they are usually not the major 
risk-bearers of the fund under their management, agency problems arise whereby 
without an effective control system, these managers may deviate from the 
interests of residual claimants or fund investors. The cost thus incurred by the 
funds could be considerable. To control such agency problems in the decision 
making process, Fama and Jensen (1983) show that it is essential to have an 
effective corporate governance system in which the internal monitoring 
mechanism plays a critical role. In the context of mutual funds, the internal 
monitoring mechanism involves measuring the performance of fund managers and 
implementing rewards and punishment, including dismissal. This internal 
monitoring, in tandem with the pressure exerted by the external managerial labour 
market through investors’ hunting for better performing managers, drives the 
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managers to satisfy the interests of the investors.  
 
The extant literature has devoted great attention to evaluating the performance of 
mutual funds, using various assessment methods. Major research in this area 
includes Jensen (1968), Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997), Grinblatt and 
Titman (1989, 1993), Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), Wermers (2000) and 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2002). In addition, past research has attempted to analyse 
the effectiveness of corporate governance in the fund industry. Several of them 
constructed the theoretical underpinning by connecting fund performance, optimal 
fund size, fund flows and portfolio characteristics with internal control in the fund 
industry, (e.g. Berk and Green (2004), Dangl et al. (2008)) and extensive 
empirical research devote much effort providing evidence to support such 
connection. (e.g. Chevalier and Ellison, 1999a; Khorana, 1996; Hu et al., 2000; 
Baks et al., 2007; Jin and Scherbina, 2005; Tonks, 2005; Shinozawa, 2007). These 
studies examine the efficacy of the fund industry’s internal and external controls, 
with an overwhelming focus on the potential relation between performance of 
actively managed funds and the fate of their managers (Baks et al., 2007).  
 
However, existing research is mainly concerned with the conventional notion of 
managers’ performance, and overlooks the linkage between the managers’ genuine 
skills and fund companies’ decisions over appointments. This tends to bias 
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analysis of the efficiency of fund industry governance. Moreover, conventional 
methods do not distinguish between performance that is related to genuine skills 
(good/bad), and mere sample variation. Hence, the previous literature seems 
hardly able to identify whether managers’ performance is driven by luck or by 
their level of skill, nor whether managers should be rewarded or penalised 
accordingly. This shortcoming blurs the analysis of the efficiency of corporate 
governance in the fund industry. 
 
Another under-researched area in the existing literature concerns the analysis of 
the relation between managerial replacement and portfolio characteristics such as 
exposure to idiosyncratic risk, portfolio holdings and portfolio leverage. Previous 
research argues that fund managers are likely to manipulate their risk profile by 
betting on the market to improve performance. It is suggested that risk shifting 
might be a signal of managers’ opportunistic action or of their exceptional talent. 
Other research documents that the level of industry concentration in portfolios 
plays a crucial role in improving fund performance (Kacperczyk et al., 2005; 
Huang et al., 2011). Therefore, it is also crucial to examine managers’ trading 
strategies under a given career concern. For example, will the manager increase 
his stock holding of a particular industrial sector, or will the fund increase 
leverage to satisfy investors’ redemption needs?  
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The current research aims to improve our understanding of the corporate 
governance in the fund industry by shedding critical light on the effectiveness of 
the internal monitoring and control system in the UK equivalent of equity mutual 
funds, the UK equity unit trusts. First, we analyse the relation between top 
manager turnover and the performance of UK unit trusts. Focusing on the 
interaction between managerial replacement and fund performance, our research 
deploys a sample that covers the period from 1990 to 2009. Second, a simulation 
procedure is implemented to further test whether, in their managerial dismissal 
and appointment, UK fund companies can distinguish between managers with 
genuine skills and those who are lucky, or between poorly skilled managers and 
those who are unlucky. 
 
To analyse top manager replacement we use a series of methods, including 
performance evaluation based on the factor models, percentile ranking, and 
sample matching tests. We divide funds that have experienced replacement of top 
managers into two time intervals or subsamples, namely the pre and 
post-replacement periods. A variety of methods are then applied to measure 
factors that affect the probability of replacement in the pre-replacement period.  
 
To determine whether fund companies can distinguish between poorly skilled 
managers and unlucky ones when deciding on managerial replacement we 
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conduct the bootstrapping simulation, as employed by Kosowski et al. (2006) and 
Cuthbertson et al. (2008). Research by Bickel and Freedman (1981) and Hall 
(1986) demonstrates that bootstrapping can improve approximation of the true 
distribution of funds’ abnormal returns by recognising the thick tails among 
individual funds. By comparing the actual estimation of abnormal performance 
with the ‘luck’ distribution given by bootstrapping simulations, we are able to 
distinguish the managers with ‘real’ stock-picking skills from those who are 
simply lucky. Hence, this method could provide additional evidence on the 
effectiveness of internal and external controls in the fund industry.  
 
Our results suggest that there exists a close relation between fund performance 
and top management turnover. We uncover evidence that managers’ replacement 
can be predicted by historical poor performance. Also, results from the matching 
sample analysis indicate that the magnitude of decrease in the performance of the 
peer funds without replacement is considerably less than that of the funds in the 
replacement group. Fund companies will then try to improve the situation through 
managerial action. We find that in the post-replacement period the previously 
inferior performance will be improved by the newly installed management. 
Results from the bootstrapping simulation suggests that managers with inferior 
previous performance driven by sample variation (‘bad luck’) are less likely to be 
replaced than are those with ‘luck’ driven superior performance. However, fund 
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companies seem to pay limited attention to managers with genuinely poor skills 
when making decisions in relation to managerial turnover. In the post-replacement 
period, most of the funds in the lower ranking group have replaced their ‘lucky’ or 
‘poorly skilled’ managers with managers with genuine skills; however, the 
proportion shrinks for funds in the higher ranking groups. 
 
In analysing managers’ trading behaviour around replacement, our results show 
that there is significant difference in the influence of managers’ risk taking, fund 
flow changes and portfolio composition of funds with different performance one 
year before the replacement. While flow changes are negatively correlated with 
the probability of managerial replacement, managers, the replacement probability 
for managers with inferior performance in the previous year is less sensitive to 
changes in fund flows. Superior managers tend to reduce their stock holdings of 
certain industrial sectors to lower the probability of being replaced. Meanwhile, 
increasing the holdings of the top ten assets in their portfolios reduces the funds’ 
exposure to idiosyncratic risk but increases the replacement probability. As such, 
superior managers tend to maintain those among their top holdings that are in line 
with the fund’s original investment objective. Inferior managers, on the other hand, 
seem to lose confidence in their major holdings when, under the pressure of career 
concerns, they increase holdings of stocks other than the top ten assets in their 
portfolio.  
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The remainder of this chapter is constructed as follows. The next two sections 
describe the methodology and data used in the research, respectively. Section 2.4 
is mainly concerned with interpreting the results of the empirical investigation. 
The final section presents the conclusion. 
 
 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Performance evaluation 
2.2.1.1 Objective adjusted returns 
The objective adjusted returns (OAR) approach essentially analyses a firm’s 
performance against a selected benchmark (Morck et al., 1990). This is calculated 
by taking the difference between annual holding returns of an individual fund and 
the benchmark. Formally, OAR is computed as follows: 
                  (2.1) 
where  denotes the annual holding returns of an individual fund and  is 
the annual holding returns on the benchmark. We define  as the weighted 
average returns of all funds with the same investment objective for the 
corresponding year. 
 
The OAR evaluates managers’ performance against others in their peer group 
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(Khorana, 2001). Based on the signs of the OAR results, we sort the funds into a 
positive group (PG) and a negative group (NG), so that we can single out those 
funds that are ranked upper median among their peers. 
 
2.2.1.2 Risk-adjusted returns 
The risk-adjusted returns are based on factor models, including the single factor 
model and the Fama-French (1993) three factor model. The econometrical 
formulation of the latter is: 
       (2.2) 
where  is the Jensen alpha measuring the risk-adjusted returns of fund , 
 is the excess market return;  is the return from the book to 
market portfolio;  stands for the return from the size portfolio. 
 
2.2.1.3 Percentile ranking 
To develop a full perspective on the performance of individual funds as against 
the whole fund industry during the replacement period, we report and analyse the 
changes in percentile ranking based on the risk-adjusted returns around the top 
management turnover for every fund within its peer group. We additionally 
incorporate the ranking data from the Morningstar UK database, which give 
supplementary information on performance evaluation by independent financial 
media.   
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2.2.1.4 Matching sample analysis 
Given that cross-sectional performance may experience mean reversion in a long 
time interval and that superior performance may not persist, we follow Denis and 
Denis (1995) and Khorana (2001) to adopt a matching sample analysis. This will 
enable us to identify whether the improvement or deterioration of performance in 
the post-replacement period is due to managerial efforts of the new managers, or 
is the result of mean reversion of securities’ returns.     
 
The matching sample analysis is based on the risk-adjusted returns of those funds 
that do not experience management turnover during the sample period. We first 
construct a sample of funds whose OAR (PG or NG) is similar with those funds in 
the turnover sample in the replacement period. Next, we calculate the 36-month 
abnormal performance in the pre-replacement period and 24-month performance 
in the post-replacement period for the funds in the matching sample. A particular 
fund will be used to match the manager-replaced fund only once. In other words, 
funds that have the same replacement date will share the same matching sample.  
 
2.2.2 Determinants of the replacement  
We examine determination of the management replacement by analysing the 
factors that are likely to be related to it. The replacement determinants may 
include genuine stock-picking skills, fund flow changes, risk shifting and portfolio 
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holdings. Different from the performance shifting analysis, we follow the research 
by Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) to consider the managerial replacement on a 
calendar year basis. 
 
2.2.2.1 Genuine stock-picking skills  
Using conventional econometrical methods to evaluate abnormal returns of US 
and UK funds, most previous research finds no positive abnormal performance 
(alpha), even for the best funds. This raises the question of the very existence of 
skilled fund managers (Carhart, 1997), hence putting into doubt whether one can 
identify managers with genuine stock-picking skills. Furthermore, in previous 
management turnover analysis, no conclusive evidence has been found as to 
whether the abnormal performance is a factor in fund companies’ decisions over 
replacement.  
 
Recent research proposes that bootstrapping analysis may address this problem by 
separating managers with ‘real’ stock-picking skills from those who obtain 
superior performance only by chance. Therefore, we employ the bootstrapping 
method to examine the replacement decision in order to find out whether or not 
fund companies are able to dismiss non-skilled managers and appoint skilled ones. 
 
Following the procedure of Kosowski et al. (2006) and Cuthbertson et al. (2008), 
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we estimate the following three factor model, which is chosen as the basic model 
for our bootstrapping analysis: 
          (2.3) 
We divide all the funds with replacement into two groups: pre-replacement and 
post-replacement. For both groups, we estimate their abnormal returns , the 
factor loadings and the residuals for each fund i through OLS regression. In the 
estimation, the residual term is given by , where  and 
 are the beginning and end dates, respectively, of the returns of fund , and N 
is the sample size. These estimations are then saved for the later bootstrapping 
analysis.  
 
In the bootstrapping simulation, we first construct a new sample of size N, i.e. 
 through re-sampling the saved residuals, where b stands for the times of 
re-sampling. Next, we create a time series of monthly returns for each fund  by 
setting the null hypothesis that , meaning that the manager of fund  has 
no stock-picking skills. The functional form of the analysis is: 
           (2.4) 
where  is the artificial returns of fund  with the true abnormal returns being 
equal to zero.  
 
We regress  on all the factors in the right-hand side of Equation (2.4) to 
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estimate the bootstrapped alphas and the corresponding t-statistics. This procedure 
is applied to all the funds in the sample, including those without replacement. 
Thus, we can obtain the one-time bootstrapped alphas and the t-statistics for all 
funds. Repeating the above steps 1000 times, we then draw the distribution of 
bootstrapped alphas for each fund . This distribution indicates the abnormal 
performance that is only due to sample variation. 
 
To analyse the outgoing/incoming managers’ genuine skills, we first estimate the 
conventional alphas and the t-statistics for each fund, with the estimation time 
being restricted to the fund’s pre- and post-replacement periods. Then we rank the 
alphas and t-statistics of each replaced fund within its matching sample; for 
example the alpha of fund  is placed in the  percentile of its matching 
sample in terms of the sample’s alpha. As we have already bootstrapped the alpha 
and t-statistic for each matching sample, we can draw the ‘luck distribution’ of 
fund  by using the alphas at the  percentile among all bootstrapped alphas in 
its matching sample.  
 
Next we compare the fund’s real alpha with the bootstrapped alpha/t-ratio 
distribution. If we find that the real alpha lies in the area greater than the 5% upper 
tail point of such bootstrapped alpha distribution, we reject the null that the 
abnormal performance is due to sample variation and conclude that the manager 
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of this fund has genuine stock selection skills.  
 
2.2.2.2 Fund flow changes 
As a major indicator of managers’ performance, changes in fund flow are closely 
monitored by fund companies. Dangl et al. (2008) suggest that manager 
replacement tends to be preceded by fund outflows and followed by fund inflows. 
This proposition concurs with Khorana’s (2001) empirical finding. However, the 
extant literature generally documents a convex relation between fund performance 
and fund flow changes. Evidence shows that investors react asymmetrically to 
fund performance in that outperforming managers receive significant fund inflows 
while underperforming managers are not penalised equally with outflows (Sirri 
and Tufano, 1998). Therefore, replacement is not necessarily a direct result of 
changes in fund flow. Other factors, such as managers’ genuine stock-picking 
skills and the age of the fund, may also have an impact on the convexity of the 
flow-performance relation and might influence fund companies’ replacement 
decisions. Therefore, we include the managers’ (funds’) characteristics as 
interactive terms along with fund flow changes.     
 
The estimation of fund flow is based on Huang et al. (2010), which is formulated 
as: 
                         (2.5) 
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where  is the total net assets for fund  at time  and  is the fund’s 
raw returns at time t. 
 
2.2.2.3 Portfolio Holdings 
Fund managers often switch their strategies, which leads to reallocation of their 
portfolio composition. We examine the changes in portfolio holdings focusing on 
the following aspects. First, we calculate the industrial concentration index (ICI 
hereafter) proposed by Kacperczyk and Sialm (2005). Empirical results show that 
underperforming managers tend to increase their holdings in small sized stocks 
while outperforming managers are likely to construct more concentrated 
portfolios within certain industries. By including the evaluation of ICI in the 
management replacement analysis, we can further examine the implications of 
such holding adjustment behaviour for management replacement.  
 
Calculation of the industrial concentration index (ICI) is as follows: 
                                       (2.6) 
where  is the weight of the value of each of the 12 industries held by fund  
and  is the value weight of the certain industry in the entire stock market.  
 
Second, we extend Equation (2.6) to measure allocation shifts between equity and 
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cash in the fund’s portfolio. Berk and Green (2004) argue that, given decreasing 
returns to scale on the actively managed portfolio, fund managers may switch 
their holdings between actively and passively managed portfolios in the fund’s 
holdings to satisfy certain investment objectives. However, in the context of 
management replacement, certain trade-offs may exist in managers’ decisions over 
portfolio composition. Underperforming managers may choose to keep betting on 
the market by increasing their holdings of equity, but they cannot escape the 
pressure arising from the need to hold cash for investors’ potential redemption. 
Therefore, we also include the funds’ debt to capital ratio to reflect managers’ 
cash/equity allocation around the replacement. 
 
 
2.3 Data 
2.3.1 Sample description 
We start our sample construction with the data of replacement series, which are 
collected from the Morningstar UK database using information of the specific day 
on which the current fund managers first took over operation of the funds. In 
analysing managers’ stock-picking skills, we focus on the performance of UK 
domiciled equity unit trusts and open-ended investment companies (OEICs) 
which conduct their investment business primarily in the UK equity market. These 
funds differ from closed-ended funds in that they can only be traded between the 
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trust companies and investors.  
 
Funds with anonymous managers and management groups have been screened out 
from the sample, since we consider the stock-picking skills of specific managers 
or a solo manager. By the same reasoning, we also exclude index tracking funds. 
As a result, we find in the Morningstar database 386 funds which have 
experienced top manager replacement.  
 
From these 386 funds, we then select funds that have at least 5 years’ performance 
history. Specifically, the sample includes funds with at least 3 years’ performance 
history preceding the replacement month and 2 years’ data after the replacement. 
This has the advantage of avoiding small sample bias. The replacement sample 
that meets our data screening criteria comprises 218 funds from four sectors. The 
IMA categorises UK equity unit trusts and OEICs into four sectors, which we 
follow. Specifically, our sample includes 120 funds from the UK All Companies 
sector, 54 funds from UK Equity Income, and 5 funds from the UK Equity Income 
and Growth. The remaining funds are from UK Small Companies. 
 
The returns data for analysing performance of individual funds are also collected 
from Morningstar. Monthly returns of all funds are calculated by dividing changes 
in monthly net asset value, returns from reinvesting all income, and capital gain 
distributions, by the starting NAV of the month. They are not adjusted by sales 
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charges in the total returns. However, the management and administrative fees are 
deducted from the total returns, so that the performance evaluation can provide 
evidence on whether the funds are profitable for investors. 
 
To evaluate funds’ abnormal returns we follow standard factor models, for 
example the Fama and French (1993) three factor model and the Carhart (1997) 
four factor model. The market benchmark used is the FTSE all share index. The 
value factor, also known as HML, is derived by deducting monthly returns on the 
UK value index compiled by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) from 
the returns of the MSCI growth index. The size factor is the difference between 
monthly returns of the Hoare Govett Small Companies (HGSC) index and the 
returns on the FTSE 100 index. The mimicking portfolio for the Carhart (1997) 
momentum effect, or the UMD factor, is constructed by using the total return 
index data for all UK listed equities. It is given by monthly average returns of a 
weighted portfolio measured by taking the difference between the returns of the 
top and bottom 30% of stocks. Finally, the market excess returns are calculated on 
the basis of monthly data of the 3-month UK Treasury Bill. 
 
2.3.2 The survivorship bias issue 
To investigate possible survivorship bias in our sample of 218 funds, we carry out 
a preliminary test. Table 2.1 displays the results.  
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics  
Replacement Time (Pre) Number of Funds Alpha               (3 Factor)  
Alpha 
 (4 Factor) 
Panel A obs≥1 obs≥36 obs≥1 obs≥36 obs≥1 obs≥36 
All Investment Objectives       
~1998 6 6 -0.6385 -0.6385 -0.6306 -0.6306 
1999~2002 75 73 -0.4645 -0.4485 -0.464 -0.4598 
2003~2006 146 144 0.7530 0.7559 0.7650 0.7789 
2007~2009 115 107 0.2890 0.2749 0.2770 0.2790 
UK All Companies       
~1998 1 1 -0.6114 -0.6114 -0.6348 -0.6348 
1999~2002 37 35 -0.1817 -0.1811 -0.1970 -0.1867 
2003~2006 81 81 -0.0593 -0.0593 -0.0593 -0.0593 
2007~2009 85 77 -0.0974 -0.092 -0.091 -0.0904 
UK Equity Income       
~1998 - - - - - - 
1999~2002 13 13 0.2840 0.2840 0.2735 0.2735 
2003~2006 41 41 -0.2219 -0.2219 -0.2110 -0.2110 
2007~2009 21 21 -0.1324 -0.1324 -0.1301 -0.1301 
UK Equity Income & 
Growth       
~1998 - - - - - - 
1999~2002 6 6 -0.1285 -0.1285 -0.1307 -0.1307 
2003~2006 5 3 -0.0593 -0.0699 -0.0603 -0.0612 
2007~2009 - - - - - - 
UK Smaller Companies       
~1998 5 5 -0.2247 -0.2247 -0.2529 -0.2529 
1999~2002 19 19 -0.0963 -0.0963 0.0899 0.0899 
2003~2006 19 19 0.1014 0.1014 0.0784 0.0784 
2007~2009 9 9 0.2245 0.2245 0.2587 0.2587 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics (Continued) 
Replacement Date (Post) Number of Funds Alpha               (3 Factor)  
Alpha 
 (4 Factor) 
Panel B obs≥1 obs≥24 obs≥1 obs≥24 obs≥1 obs≥24 
All Investment Objectives       ~1998 6 6 -0.6104 -0.6104 -0.6065 -0.6065 
1999~2002 75 75 -0.4507 -0.4507 -0.4101 -0.4101 
2003~2006 146 146 0.7530 0.7530 0.7015 0.7015 
2007~2009 115 27 0.3190 0.2977 0.3010 0.2649 
UK All Companies       
~1998 1 1 -0.5872 -0.5872 -0.4793 -0.4793 
1999~2002 37 37 -0.1817 -0.1817 -0.198 -0.198 
2003~2006 81 81 -0.0478 -0.0478 -0.0359 -0.0359 
2007~2009 85 25 -0.0743 -0.0635 -0.0847 -0.0727 
UK Equity Income       
~1998 - - - - - - 
1999~2002 13 13 0.2721 0.2721 0.3045 0.3045 
2003~2006 41 41 -0.2107 -0.2107 -0.2344 -0.2344 
2007~2009 21 2 -0.1104 -0.1012 -0.1621 -0.1453 
UK Equity Income & 
Growth       
~1998 - - - - - - 
1999~2002 6 6 -0.1024 -0.1024 -0.1185 -0.1185 
2003~2006 5 5 -0.0364 -0.0364 -0.0292 -0.0292 
2007~2009 - - - - - - 
UK Smaller Companies       
~1998 5 5 -0.2187 -0.2187 -0.2798 -0.2798 
1999~2002 19 19 -0.0765 -0.0765 0.0569 0.0569 
2003~2006 19 19 0.0978 0.0978 0.0876 0.0876 
2007~2009 9 - 0.0345 - 0.0467 - 
Notes: Funds in the table are classified according to their investment objectives defined as IMA. 
They are also sorted into two groups, i.e. all the funds that have experienced managerial 
replacement (obs≥1), and the funds that are included in our sample (obs≥36/24). The table also 
provides the number of observations of the replacement in five time periods. Estimated alphas 
using the three factor and four factor models are reported for each type of fund. 
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From Table 2.1, it can be seen that the difference between all funds that have 
replacement experience and the sample funds is moderate, particularly in terms of 
the number of observations. Columns 1 and 6 report the number of funds that 
have experienced manager replacement for all investment objectives in the pre- 
and post-replacement periods. During 2007-2009, the difference in numbers 
between all funds and the sample funds is relatively large. However, as Columns 2 
and 7 suggest, this is because some of the funds from the UK All Companies 
category replaced their managers in late 2007, which means that they have less 
than 2-years’ return data and so are disqualified from our sample.  
 
Table 2.1 also provides the comparison of abnormal performance based on the 
three and four factor models. It can be seen that, for all investment objectives 
across the board, the alphas estimated for funds with obs≥1 and with obs≥36/24 
do not differ significantly. This confirms that the sample does not suffer from 
survivorship bias.  
 
 
2.4 Empirical results 
2.4.1 Performance changes around replacement  
One central concern of the literature of top manager turnover in the fund industry 
is performance changes before and after the replacement. To investigate this 
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matter, we deploy the methodology discussed above to collect return data of the 
funds three years before and two years after the replacement. Four evaluation 
methods, i.e. the factor model, the total returns measure, the percentile rankings 
measure and the matched sample performance measure, are then applied to these 
data. The ensuing estimation results are classified into a positive group (PG) and a 
negative group (NG), based on the signs of individual funds’ objective-adjusted 
returns in the pre-replacement period. The results indicate that while NG funds 
experience a significant performance decline before the replacement, their 
performance tends to recover post-replacement. 
 
As shown in Panel A of Table 2.2, estimates from the factor models provide more 
pronounced results than those of the other models. It comes as no surprise that, 
based on the outcome of the three factor model, NG funds’ abnormal returns drop 
by an average of 33 basis points in the year [-3,-2], with a further 1 basis point 
drop in the year [-2,-1]. In the post-replacement period, results from the three 
factor model suggest a sizeable improvement of 60 basis points for the year [0, +1] 
and a cumulative improvement of 72 basis points for the year [0, +2].   
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Table 2.2 Analytics of Top Management Turnover 
Panel A 
3 Factor Model 4 Factor Model Total Returns Ranking Matched Sample 
PG NG PG NG PG NG PG NG PG NG 
year-3 
0.0018  0.0011  0.0239 0.1166 0.0082  0.0076  0.5121  0.4937  0.0025  -0.0014  
(0.0013)  (0.0006)  (-0.0029) (-0.0065) (0.0079)  (0.0086)  (0.5020)  (0.4100)  (0.0026)  (-0.0014)  
year-2 0.0016  -0.0021  0.0096 -0.0116 0.0036  0.0036  0.5472  0.3843  0.0022  -0.0020  (0.0012)  (-0.0010)  (0.0067) (-0.0072) (0.0074)  (0.0114)  (0.5740)  (0.3130)  (0.0018)  (-0.0018)  
year-1 0.0026  -0.0022  0.0063 -0.1026 0.0061  0.0077  0.6164  0.4148  0.0019  -0.0022  (0.0026)  (-0.0006)  (-0.0128) (-0.016) (0.0119)  (0.0126)  (0.7300)  (0.4950)  (0.0017)  (-0.0019)  
year0 0.0012  -0.0037  0.045 -0.0504 0.0041  0.0012  0.6170  0.4240  0.0017  -0.0023  (0.0013)  (-0.0026) (-0.0019) (-0.0379) (0.0142)  (0.0031)  (0.7289)  (0.4137)  (0.0015)  (-0.0018)  
year+1 0.0023  0.0022  -0.0503 -0.0354 0.0073  0.0055  0.6175  0.6068  0.0009  0.0001  (0.0022)  (0.0013)  (-0.0373) (-0.0171) (0.0102)  (0.0059)  (0.6610)  (0.6800)  (0.0007)  (-0.0010)  
year+2 
0.0022  0.0035  -0.0529 -0.0137 0.0032  -0.0068  0.6056  0.5347  0.0010  0.0013  
(0.0013)  (0.0039)  (-0.0181) (-0.0336) (0.0086)  (-0.0089)  (0.7070)  (0.6170)  (0.0004)  (0.0013) 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 2.2 Analytics of Top Management Turnover (Continued) 
Panel B  3 Factor Model 4 Factor Model Total Return Ranking Matched Sample 
100% PG NG  PG  NG PG NG PG NG PG NG 
-3 to -2 
-0.1268  -2.9436**  -0.5983  1.0995**  -0.5669  -0.5244  0.0685  -0.2216** -0.1560  -0.3902  
(-0.0917)  (-2.7370)  (3.3103)  (-0.1077)  (-0.0684)  (0.3347)  (0.1434)  (-0.2366)  (-0.3221)  (-0.3312)  
-3 to -1 0.4165  -2.9501**  -0.7364  1.8799**  -0.2554  0.0094  0.2036**  -0.1598  -0.2450* -0.5024  (0.9389)  (-2.0240)  (-3.4138)  (-1.4615)  (0.5104)  (0.4663)  (0.4542)  (0.2073)  (-0.3487)  (-0.4003)  
-3 to +1 0.2411  0.9653  -3.1046**  1.3036**  -0.1134  -0.2785  0.2058**  0.2291**  -0.6378**  1.0990**  (0.6674)  (1.2542)  (-11.8621)  (-1.6308)  (0.2905)  (-0.3114)  (0.3167)  (0.6585)  (-0.7225)  (0.2551)  
-2 to +1 0.4212  2.0111**  -6.2396**  2.0517**  1.0469  0.5169  0.1285*  0.5789**  -0.5708**  1.0712**  (0.8357)  (2.2978)  (-6.5672)  (-1.3750)  (0.3853)  (-0.4841)  (0.1516)  (1.1725)  (-0.5906)  (0.4404)  
-1 to +1 -0.1238  2.0078**  -8.9841**  0.6550  0.1907  -0.2853  0.0018  0.4628**  -0.5202**  1.0659**  (-0.1400)  (3.2014)  (-1.9141)  (-0.0688)  (-0.1456)  (-0.5304)  (-0.0945)  (0.3737)  (-0.5739)  (0.4680)  
+1 to +2 
-0.0257  0.5920*  -0.0517  0.6130  -0.5616  -2.2364  -0.0193  -0.1189*  0.0760  7.7497*  
(-0.4282)  (2.0232)  (0.5147)  (-0.9649)  (-0.1569)  (-2.5085)  (0.0696)  (-0.0926)  (-0.4296)  (2.2851)  
Obs. 127 91 127 91 127 91 127 91 127 91 
Notes: Reported are the means of the performance of a sample of 218 unit trusts and OEICs in terms of abnormal returns. Medians are in brackets. The results 
are based on the three factor model, the four factor model, the measure of total returns, percentile rankings and matched sample performance measurement. PG 
stands for the positive returns group and NG for the group with negative returns. The grouping is dependent on individual funds’ objective-adjusted returns in 
the three years before the replacement. Panel A reports the level of the index in the sample period and Panel B provides its percentage changes across each 
event window around a replacement date. ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1% and 5% levels respectively, based on paired T tests.
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However, for the PG group, Panel A indicates only a moderate increase in 
abnormal returns in the interval of years [-3, -1]. Despite a sharp drop in the 
replacement month, performance returns swiftly to the level attained by the 
previous management in the pre-replacement period. For example, in the year [0, 
+1] the abnormal returns increase from 0.0012 (year 0) to 0.0023 (year +1) and 
remain almost unchanged in year +2. A possible reason for this lies in the fact that 
the PG funds had a good performance record before the replacement and so the 
incoming managers may find it unnecessary to change the composition of the 
original portfolios. Results from the four factor model show a similar outcome for 
the NG group, but indicate a rapid decline in the PG group’s performance 
throughout the sample period. Moreover, almost all abnormal returns calculated 
under the four factor model are consistently and statistically insignificant, which 
is consistent with the results in previous research on the selection of models on 
mutual funds. Blake and Timmermann (1998), Quigley and Sinquefield (2000), 
Tonks (2005) and Cuthbertson et al. (2008) suggest that the momentum variable is 
not prevalent in the UK fund industry. Bearing this in mind, in what follows we 
will be mainly concerned with the three factor model.  
 
The post-replacement improvement is also reflected in the percentile rankings of 
funds’ abnormal returns (from lowest to highest), as shown in Panel A. It is not 
surprising to see that the NG group experiences a significant increase in 
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cross-sectional ranking during year [-1, +1], since the ranking is based on 
abnormal returns estimated by the three factor model. However, given the results 
in the year [+1, +2], the growth will not persist. 
 
Turning to the measure of total returns, the outcome becomes more fluctuant. This 
implies that total returns may not be a major concern in fund companies’ decisions 
on managers’ replacement. Assuming that in general efficient internal controls are 
in place in the UK fund operations, our results do not concur with the proposal in 
favour of evaluating fund performance in terms of their total returns. 
 
The matched sample performance measure in Panel A sheds additional light on the 
value-added feature of manager replacement. The trend of performance changes 
of the matched sample in the NG group in the pre- and post-replacement periods 
closely matches that of the changes in abnormal returns. This suggests that further 
analysis of those matched samples would provide additional evidence for whether 
or not the replacement is a value-added activity. Since no replacement has taken 
place in the matched sample, if the performance change generated by replacement 
is less than the performance improvement in the matched sample, we cannot 
regard such replacement as adding value.   
 
Panel B of Table 2.2 compares the changes in level of performance in terms of the 
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four different measurements. The levels of change for the NG replacement group 
are 201.11% and 200.78% during the intervals [-2, +1] and [-1, +1], respectively. 
In comparison, the NG matched sample shows corresponding changes of 107.12% 
and 106.59%. Hence the turnover generated by top manager replacement seems to 
add more value than in those funds that have the same pattern of OAR but choose 
not to replace their managers. Moreover, there is a marginal decline in the 
decreasing rate of abnormal returns in the post-replacement period for both groups, 
especially the NG group. This outcome is robust when checking with the four 
factor model. One possible explanation for this effect is the influence of 
window-dressing. Managers may construct a more risky portfolio to 
window-dress the performance record before the reporting date, leading to a 
marginal decrease in each of the measures before the replacement.  
 
Further evidence of performance switching can be found from the rating data. 
Table 2.3 summarises the historical rating from Morningstar for the unit trusts and 
OEICs in our sample. With the exception of UK Equity Income funds, both NG 
and PG funds receive upgrading of their ratings after the managers are replaced. 
In comparison, in Table 2.1, we find that only the NG group shows enhanced 
performance, as the new managers tend to change the composition of portfolios 
constructed by the former management, while the PG group shows no such 
improvement, since the new managers may retain the inherited portfolio structure.     
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Table 2.3 Rating Analysis of Management Turnover 
Rating Whole Sample UK All Companies UK Equity Income UK Equity Income & Growth 
UK Smaller 
Companies 
Year PG NG PG NG PG NG PG NG PG NG 
-3 to 0 3.1979  2.8734  3.0511  2.8204  3.4572  3.3676  2.4444  2.4444  3.2087  2.6520  (3.0909)  (2.9231)  (3.0000)  (2.9009)  (3.5000)  (3.3676)  (2.8333)  (2.4444)  (3.2087)  (2.6520)  
0 to +2 3.4820  2.9147  3.5721  2.9974  3.3493  2.6246  3.7668  3.0564  3.4041  2.6689  (3.4194)  (2.8534)  (3.6250)  (2.9463)  (3.4231)  (2.6246)  (3.8760)  (2.2800)  (3.4041)  (2.6489)  
Notes: Reported are the mean ratings of UK unit trusts and OEICs. Medians are in brackets. The data are sourced from the Morningstar, 
and cover the pre and post- managerial replacement periods. The funds are sorted according to IMA investment objectives. PG stands for 
the positive returns group and NG for the group with negative returns. The division of the groups is dependent on individual funds’ 
objective-adjusted returns in the three years before the replacement. The Morningstar ratings for funds go from 1 (minimum) to 5 
(maximum). 
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2.4.2 Determinants of managerial replacement 
2.4.2.1 Genuine stock selection skill  
We apply the bootstrapping procedure to verify managers’ genuine stock selection 
skill. Bootstrapping can simulate abnormal performance that is solely due to 
sample variation, or ‘luck distribution’. With this method, underperforming 
managers whose performance has been classified as due to genuinely poor skills 
should expect a higher probability of managerial replacement; however, for 
‘unlucky’ managers, the probability of their replacement should not be as high.     
 
As an example of bootstrapping simulation, Figure 2.1 shows the comparison 
between the funds’ actual alphas plus t ratios and their corresponding bootstrapped 
ones. Panel C2 of Figure 2.1 plots the performance due to luck, since actual 
alphas of these funds lie within the 95% percentile of the ‘luck distribution’. After 
the replacement, however, the rank of the funds experiences a remarkable advance 
as the incoming managers are more capable of selecting stocks (see Panel A1 of 
Figure 2.1). In such cases the replacement decision signals effective internal 
controls within the fund company. Figure 2.2 displays the comparison between 
actual t ratios of the sample alphas and the bootstrapped ones. Panel C2 of Figure 
2.2 presents the case where the performance of the funds is driven by sample 
variation rather than by the genuine skills. The outcome of Panel C2 is consistent 
with that of C2 of Figure 2.1. 
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Panel B1: Top one Panel A1: Top one Panel B2: Bottom 0.4% Panel A2: Bottom 0.3% 
Panel C1: Bottom 40.9% Panel C2: Top 65.5% 
Figure 2.1 Histogram of Actual Alphas against Matching Bootstrapped Alphas around Replacement Time 
Notes: Figure 2.1 shows the histogram of the funds’ actual alphas against their matching bootstrapped alphas around the replacement time. The vertical line gives 
the actual alphas obtained from estimation of the three factor model on funds with negative ORA. The selection of the funds to form bootstrapped alphas is based 
on their matching counterparts in the replacement group.  
Panel D1: Bottom 25.4% Panel D2: Top 70.1% 
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Panel A1: Top one Panel A2: Bottom 0.3% Panel B1: Top one 
Panel C1: Bottom 40.9% 
Panel B2: Bottom 0.4% 
Panel C2: Top 65.5% Panel D1: Bottom 25.4% Panel D2: Top 70.1% 
Figure 2.2 Histogram of Actual Alphas’ t-ratio against Matching Bootstrapped Alphas’ t-ratio around Replacement Time 
Notes: Figure 2.2 shows the histogram of the funds’ actual t-ratios against their matching bootstrapped ones around the replacement period. The vertical line gives the actual 
t-ratios obtained from estimation of the three factor model on funds with negative ORA. The funds selected to form the bootstrapped t-ratios are based on the matching 
sample of each fund in the replacement group.  
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Table 2.4 reports the general results from bootstrapping simulation of funds’ 
abnormal performance. We rank the whole sample into ten percentile groups 
according to their abnormal performance. The ranking is listed from the worst to 
the best performers. The first row shows the probability of replacement for funds 
with different performance status, i.e. driven by ‘luck’ or by genuine skills. In the 
group of funds whose managers are judged to have genuine stock-picking skills, 
less than 20% of the funds located in the lower 30% of the percentile ranking have 
experienced managerial replacement. For funds with higher ranking, above 80% 
in the percentile ranking, the proportion grows to almost 25%. The results for 
funds in the sample variation group show a similarly low proportion for funds 
with lower ranking. Particularly, none of the managers ranked below 10% have 
been replaced by the management companies. But almost 35% of the ‘lucky’ 
managers have been replaced, despite their delivering higher-ranked abnormal 
returns. This result indicates that many fund companies are not captivated by the 
‘lucky’ managers’ extreme performance, and over 85% of the companies would 
choose to give ‘unlucky’ managers another chance. However, the corresponding 
proportion of the skilled managers’ group is not significantly different within each 
percentile ranking group, which suggests that fund companies pay less attention to 
previous year ranking when making the replacement decision if the managers’ 
performance is attributed to genuine skills.   
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Table 2.4 Proportion of Funds with Genuine Stock Selection Skills 
Notes: The table reports the bootstrapping results for all the funds whose managers were replaced. Funds have been sorted into 10 groups by their performance before 
replacement, e.g. the group below 10% includes funds that lie in the lowest 10% of the performance ranking in that calendar year. The first row reports the proportions of 
genuinely skilful (lucky) managers being replaced in the entire fund sample, where Yes (No) stands for managers that can be classified as genuinely skilful (lucky). The 2nd 
and 3rd rows report the consequences of managerial replacement, i.e. the proportion of genuinely non-skilful/unlucky managers replaced with genuinely skilful ones and the 
last row reports the total number of funds which have experienced replacement in each group.   
 
Genuine 
skills 
Percentile Ranking  (Low to high) 
Below 10% <20% <30% <40% <50% <60% <70% <80% <90% <100% 
Probability of 
replacement 
Yes 
No 
0.0574 
0.0000 
0.0588 
0.1064 
0.0575 
0.0256 
0.0466 
0.1250 
0.1226 
0.0917 
0.0722 
0.0881 
0.0774 
0.0816 
0.0956 
0.2727 
0.0826 
0.0000 
0.0967 
0.0781 
Genuinely unskilful to 
genuinely Skilful - 0.6667 0.7500 0.6923 0.7857 0.6154 0.5000 0.3214 0.0000 0.0952 0.2222 
‘Lucky’ to genuinely 
skilful - - 0.8000 1 1 0.6667 0.5263 0.0000 0.0000 - 0.0000 
            
Total replaced fund - 234 251 265 375 438 490 488 452 383 333 
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We further apply the bootstrapping technique to simulate the ‘luck distribution’ 
for the funds in the post-replacement period. The results reported in the second 
and third rows of Table 2.4 document the proportion of funds that have improved 
their performance after the unskilful/lucky managers have been replaced by 
managers who are genuinely skilled. The results show that over 65% of the funds 
have successfully replaced their unskilful managers with better ones. For the 
group of ‘unlucky’ managers this proportion increases to over 80%. However, 
funds in higher ranks have been subject to only a limited number of replacements 
and good succeeding managers, particularly when the abnormal performance 
during pre-replacement was regarded as luck driven.  
 
A possible explanation for this difference is the difficulty that the incoming 
managers may run into when trying to keep the funds’ returns at the original high 
level, particularly for managers in the ‘lucky’ group. In our sample, 27% of the 
funds with ‘lucky’ managers experienced replacement, but none of them found 
skilful substitutions. Alternatively, the management companies may be capable of 
recognising extreme performance resulting from sample variation and of initiating 
managerial replacement, but the new managers may adjust the portfolio 
composition only marginally. This provides additional support for changing the 
‘lucky’ managers. 
 
An alternative approach to explaining the bootstrapping simulation is to compare 
the true and bootstrapped alphas of the entire replacement group. In Figures 2.3 
and 2.4 we apply the kernel density estimation to find how many manager 
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replaced funds are able to achieve superior performance through managers’ 
genuine stock-picking skills. Figure 2.3 compares the distribution of true (the 
solid line) and simulated alphas (the dashed line) in the pre-replacement period. 
The entire performance distribution shown in Figure 2.3 is right-skewed from the 
origin. Only a limited section of the solid line matches the dashed line in the left 
tail. In most cases the solid line fluctuates around the dashed line in both tails, 
suggesting that for most of the replaced managers their inferior performance can 
be attributed not to ‘bad luck’ but to their poor skills. Moreover, in the 
post-replacement period (Figure 2.3), the dashed line largely deviates from the 
solid one in both tails, especially in the right tail of the distribution, meaning that 
many of the incoming managers achieve their outperformance through genuine 
stock-picking skills. Such findings are consistent with the results given in Table 
2.4. 
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Figure 2.3 Kernel Density Estimation of Abnormal Performance in 
Pre-Replacement Period 
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Figure 2.4 Kernel Density Estimation of Abnormal Performance in 
Post-Replacement Period 
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The bootstrapping simulations generally indicate that fund management 
companies are able to identify managers whose performance is the consequence of 
sample variation. They would replace the managers with higher ranking since 
such ‘lucky’ over- performance might suffer from future fluctuations of the returns. 
Meanwhile, the ‘unlucky’ managers will be retained for a ‘second chance’. 
However, fund companies seem to pay less attention to these poorly skilled 
managers. We will look into this further by combining the analyses of flow 
changes and portfolio holding.  In addition, our results show that although a 
better successor would improve the fund’s performance, replacement can still be 
regarded as a ‘costly firing’, particularly for funds with higher rankings.    
 
2.4.2.2 Managerial replacement-flow relationship 
To analyse determinants of managerial replacement, we set up a series of 
evaluation models based on the Probit framework. The main mission is to evaluate 
the interaction between the probability of managerial replacement and 
performance or strategy-related factors, such as fund inflow, risk taking and 
portfolio holding. We also sort the funds into three groups based on their 
risk-adjusted performance to examine how funds within different ranking groups 
respond to such interaction. The analysis is constructed on a calendar year basis, 
so that the probability of managerial replacement in year t-1 is equal to one if the 
manager leaves the fund in year t and no longer appears in our sample.  
 
We first consider the relation between changes in fund inflow and managerial 
replacement. The estimation model is formulated as follows: 
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                 (2.7) 
where  is the probability of managers being replaced, Flow represents the 
change of the capital inflow of fund , it is calculated by Equation 2.5. 
 is calculated by dividing each fund’s long-term debt by its total 
capitalization and is a measure of the fund’s financial leverage, and  is 
the age of the fund. 
 
Table 2.5 reports estimation results of Equation (2.7). In general, the results in 
Panel A of the table indicate that the probability of managerial replacement is 
negatively correlated to the change in fund inflow, and older funds are more likely 
to dismiss their top managers. Panel A also reports the results based on 
performance ranking. It is shown that the replacement probability of the funds 
with higher previous ranking is more sensitive to fund flow changes than is the 
replacement probability of those with lower ranking. One reason for this may be 
the asymmetric convex relation between performance and flow changes. Previous 
research has shown that investors in underperforming funds are ‘dead’; in other 
words, poor performing managers are not penalised accordingly. Moreover, 
although in general the debt/capital ratio has no explanatory power, in the lower 
ranking groups the coefficient on this variable is 0.0009 and statistically 
significant. This indicates that poor performing funds tend to issue more debt to 
gather more capital for investment.  
 
In Panel B, we include two interactive terms to examine the flow-replacement 
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relation conditional on the debt/capital ratio and fund age, respectively. The 
estimated coefficients on flow changes are close to the corresponding values in 
Panel A, but while the flow*dc term is not statistically significant, in Panel A the 
debt/capital ratio is, indicating that managers’ issuing more debt is not conditional 
on flow changes. In other words, the need to satisfy investors’ potential 
redemption is not necessarily a major motive for poor performing managers to 
issue debt. Rather, they are likely to seek to increase investment to improve 
performance by betting on the market. The other interaction term, flow*age, 
however, is generally statistically significant. In particular, the coefficient on this 
interaction term is negative for the low ranking group, suggesting that the 
managerial replacement is more sensitive to flow changes of older funds.   
 
We extend our estimation by including managers’ genuine skill status. The results 
are reported in Panel C. The coefficient on the flow*skill term is negative and 
statistically significant for the whole sample, which implies that managers with 
genuine skills are more sensitive to the interaction between flow changes and 
managerial replacement, particularly in the group of funds with previous higher 
rankings. The estimated coefficient is -0.5069, while for the similar group in Panel 
A it is -0.3512. For the funds in the lower ranking group the coefficient is not 
significant, indicating that fund managers with opposite performance are not 
penalised equally by flow changes.  
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Table 2.5 Managerial Replacement and Flow Relation 
Dependent Variables All Performance Ranking High Median Low 
Panel A 
Flow 
 
dc 
 
Age 
 
-0.2485*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0019 
(0.2185) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0014) 
 
-0.3512*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0012 
(0.5824) 
-0.0006 
(0.7778) 
 
-0.4899*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0009 
(0.8091) 
0.0054 
(0.2155) 
 
-0.1722 
(0.1338) 
0.0057** 
(0.0179) 
0.0100*** 
(0.0001) 
Panel B 
Flow 
 
Flow*dc 
 
Flow*age 
 
 
-0.1602* 
(0.0836) 
-0.0014 
(0.6977) 
-0.0086** 
(0.0124) 
 
-0.3017** 
(0.0250) 
-0.0059 
(0.2640) 
0.0003 
(0.9588) 
 
-0.5821*** 
(0.0037) 
0.0029 
(0.6150) 
0.0033 
(0.6901) 
 
0.2141 
(0.1200) 
0.0119 
(0.1316) 
-0.0242*** 
(0.0000) 
Panel C 
Flow*skill 
 
dc*skill 
 
age*skill 
 
 
-0.1967** 
(0.0111) 
-0.0012 
(0.7511) 
0.0032 
(0.2200) 
 
-0.5069*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0052 
(0.1431) 
-0.0009 
(0.7725) 
 
-0.0953 
(0.4756) 
-0.0003 
(0.9041) 
0.0013 
(0.7559) 
 
0.0117 
(0.9272) 
-0.0046* 
(0.0922) 
0.0068* 
(0.0621) 
Observations 5488 1829 1830 1829 
Notes: This table reports the estimation from equation (2.7) which can be stated as follows: 
  
We sort all the replaced funds into three groups according to performance ranking in the previous 
year. Panel A reports the results based on the above model. The results including the effects 
conditional on flow changes, fund age and managers’ genuine skill are reported in Panels B and C, 
respectively.       
 
 
2.4.2.3 Managerial replacement-trading strategy relationship 
In examining the relation between managers’ trading behaviour and managerial 
replacement, we focus on the influence of portfolio components and the funds’ 
risk exposure on the probability of managerial replacement. We include in the 
replacement-portfolio holdings analysis the industry concentration index, the 
proportion of funds’ top 10 holdings, the cash to equity ratio and funds’ 
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idiosyncratic risk exposure. The baseline model is formulated as: 
       (2.8) 
where ICI stands for the industrial concentration index, CE stands for funds’ cash 
to equity holding ratio,  is the variation of the portfolios’ idiosyncratic risk 
and Topholdings is the value of funds’ top 10 holding stocks as a proportion of 
entire value.    
 
Table 2.6 reports the results. In Panel A, the coefficients on the variable ICI show 
a mixed influence on managerial replacement. Its effect is not statistically 
significant in general, but for the funds with previous high ranking the coefficient 
on ICI is a positive and significant 3.6262, while for funds in the low ranking 
group the value is -1.9843. It is likely that, taking advantage of specialist 
knowledge about the market, some fund managers have concentrated their 
holdings on a certain industrial sector to improve performance, which is also 
reported in the previous literature (Kacperczyk et al. 2005). It is therefore 
straightforward to find such a negative relation in the lower ranking group. For the 
positive coefficient in the higher ranking group, it is likely that managers try to 
maintain the ‘winning’ story by manipulating their portfolios to take a higher level 
of idiosyncratic risk. However, since such superior performance is not a result of 
genuine stock selection skills, over performing funds with high ICI could also 
face potential employment risk.  
 
We also examine, via an interaction term, the influence of ICI on managerial 
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replacement conditional on the changes in the funds’ top holdings. The results in 
Panel A indicate that an increase in the funds’ top holdings will reduce the 
negative effect of ICI, particularly for the lower ranking funds. In other words, the 
investment strategies chosen by the underperforming managers to improve 
performance would highly deviate from the funds’ original objectives, since the 
coefficient on the interactive term of ICI and Topholdings is positive and 
statistically significant. Managers tend to decrease their capital in the top 10 
equity holdings.  
 
The results for the influence of  are generally not significantly different from 
zero, but for the funds in the high ranking group, the coefficient on this variable is 
-28.5221. Since  can be considered as an indicator of managers’ stock-picking 
skills, the results suggest that managers with superior performance tend to 
demonstrate such skills to minimise the employment risk. But the ability to 
choose the idiosyncratic risk level cannot be considered as a determinant of 
managerial replacement. Moreover, the effect of  on the replacement 
probability through top holding changes has explanatory power only for the high 
ranking group. There is a negative correlation between  and managerial 
replacement, indicating that increasing the portfolios’ top 10 holdings will reduce 
the funds’ exposure to idiosyncratic risk, but increase the probability of managers 
being replaced.   
 
Panel A in this table also reports estimates of the coefficient on the cash/equity 
ratio and its influence conditional on top holdings. In general, we find that the 
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managers’ allocation between cash and equity is negatively related to managerial 
replacement; i.e. each unit increase in managers’ holding of equity will decrease 
the replacement probability by 2.6913. Such an effect is more significant for funds 
in the low ranking group since underperforming managers are more likely to 
increase their investment in equity to bet on the market.  
 
In Panel B of Table 2.6, we include two interactive terms for the examination of 
the replacement-holding relation conditional on the fund age. For 
underperforming funds, managers from younger funds are more likely than are 
managers of older funds to concentrate their holdings on certain sectors. We find a 
similar outcome in the group of median ranking funds. For the coefficient on , 
the probability of managerial replacement is less sensitive to the idiosyncratic 
volatility as funds grow old, especially for underperforming funds, which provides 
managers with an incentive to enlarge their exposure to idiosyncratic risk.     
 
Panel C presents the estimation outcome in relation to the managers’ skill status. 
In general, the coefficients on the cash/equity ratio and idiosyncratic risk are 
consistent with the estimates reported in Panel 1. It is worth noting that the 
industry concentration ratio is positively related to the probability of managerial 
replacement, especially for the managers with genuine stock-picking skills. 
Although previous literature documents that ICI would act as the indicator of 
superior performance, the over performance may not persist over time. As shown 
in Panel C of Table 2.5, skilful managers are not penalised equally in terms of 
flow changes. Since funds with a high level of ICI are more likely to suffer from 
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market fluctuations, a small amount of capital outflow could trigger managerial 
replacement. Therefore, it is not recommended for managers in the high ranking 
fund group to overly concentrate on certain sectors when constructing their 
portfolios. 
 
In the last two rows of Panel C, we report the interaction between changes in top 
holding and ICI and . Although the signs of the coefficients are the same as in 
Panel A, it is still worth noting the magnitude of the interplay between  and 
changes in top holding. Our results suggest that skilful managers would choose to 
increase the holdings of certain stocks, leading to possible deviations from the 
funds’ original investment objectives, e.g. stocks with lower idiosyncratic risk or 
in a particular industrial sector.     
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Table 2.6 Replacement-Portfolio Holdings Relationship 
Dependent Variables All Performance Ranking High Median Low 
Panel A 
ici 
 
ce 
 
ri 
 
ici*topholding % 
 
ri*topholding % 
 
 
-0.2977 
(0.3862) 
-2.6913*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.5576 
(0.8621) 
3.3293*** 
(0.0001) 
-7.4174 
(0.5322) 
 
3.6262*** 
(0.0000) 
-1.9876*** 
(0.0242) 
-28.5221*** 
(0.0003) 
-2.3974* 
(0.0777) 
73.7193*** 
(0.0009) 
 
-0.8165 
(0.1933) 
-2.9786 
(0.1383) 
2.3621 
(0.7013) 
3.8257*** 
(0.0011) 
-15.7599 
(0.5214) 
 
-1.9843*** 
(0.0014) 
-3.6087* 
(0.0854) 
-0.8542 
(0.8945) 
4.7681*** 
(0.0004) 
-15.4525 
(0.4711) 
Panel B 
ici 
 
ce 
 
ri 
 
ici*topholding % 
 
ri*topholding  
 
ici*age 
 
ri*age 
 
-0.5745 
(0.1078) 
-2.7136*** 
(0.0046) 
3.1802 
(0.3732) 
2.7414*** 
(0.0001) 
-3.0758 
(0.7974) 
0.0484*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.5374*** 
(0.0023) 
 
3.8187*** 
(0.0000) 
-1.9103** 
(0.0287) 
-33.6390*** 
(0.0012) 
-2.5174* 
(0.0721) 
76.2266*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0067 
(0.6943) 
0.4000 
(0.1766) 
 
-1.1593* 
(0.0784) 
-3.0793 
(0.1300) 
9.8314 
(0.1281) 
3.6222*** 
(0.0017) 
-12.6925 
(0.5885) 
0.0300* 
(0.0646) 
-0.7169** 
(0.0279) 
 
-2.2686*** 
(0.0012) 
-3.6424 
(0.1142) 
4.1688 
(0.5890) 
3.7876*** 
(0.0002) 
-14.0734 
(0.5401) 
0.1017*** 
(0.0000) 
-1.0101*** 
(0.0065) 
Panel C 
ici*skill 
 
ce*skill 
 
ri*skill 
 
ici*topholding*skill 
 
ri*topholding*skill 
 
 
0.9474*** 
(0.0253) 
-2.5222*** 
(0.0284) 
-12.1357*** 
(0.0212) 
0.4700 
(0.6329) 
15.6585 
(0.3727) 
 
3.3472*** 
(0.0001) 
-2.2223** 
(0.0487) 
-35.2744*** 
(0.0000) 
-5.2667*** 
(0.0000) 
106.7968*** 
(0.0003) 
 
-0.0012 
(0.9987) 
-2.6323 
(0.2628) 
-7.6999 
(0.4632) 
2.4300 
(0.2467) 
-0.3353 
(0.9928) 
 
-0.7721 
(0.3322) 
-2.2755 
(0.3676) 
7.4669 
(0.4074) 
4.8073*** 
(0.0052) 
-64.4758** 
(0.0366) 
Observations 5488 1829 1830 1829 
Notes: This table reports the results from model (2.8). We sort all the replaced funds into three groups 
according to performance ranking in the previous year. Panel A reports the results based on the above 
model while Panel B and C report results including the effects conditional on funds’ top holding and 
managers’ genuine skill, respectively.    
 
 
72 
 
Chapter 2 Managers’ stock selection skills and managerial replacement 
2.5 Conclusions 
We analyse the interplay among fund performance, managerial replacement and 
portfolio characteristics based on evidence from the UK unit trust market. The 
study compares the performance shift, risk shift, changes in fund flow and portfolio 
holdings between the pre- and post-replacement periods. To further test the 
efficiency of governance mechanism in the UK fund industry, we apply the 
bootstrapping simulation to separate the managers whose performance is driven by 
sample variation ('luck') from those with genuine stock selection skills. 
 
Our results indicate that managers’ replacement can be predicted by managers’ 
underperformance. Moreover, after comparing managers’ actual performance with 
simulated ‘luck’-driven abnormal performance, we show that managers with 
superior performance that is due to sample variation are more likely to be dismissed 
by fund management companies in the UK market than are ‘unlucky’ managers 
whose inferior performance is generated by ‘bad luck’. It suggests that the internal 
monitor system is effective to identify ‘luck’ driven managers. However, the 
probability of substituting managers with genuinely poor skills is quite low 
compared with the proportion in the sample variation group which indicates that 
there other factors in addition to the previous year ranking might have more 
explanation power over the managerial replacement. Furthermore, our analysis of 
determinants of managers’ replacement supports the evidence that the probability 
of replacement of underperforming managers is less responsive to decreasing fund 
inflow than is the probability of replacement of outperforming managers. Our 
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results also indicate that changes to portfolios’ components, i.e. the adjustment of 
funds’ top holdings, would exert the negative influence on the probability of 
managers’ replacement in those funds with significant inferior previous year’s 
performance.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
FUND FAMILY TOURNAMENT AND 
PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Most mutual funds belong to a fund family. Several previous studies examine the 
characteristics of these fund families. Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2003), and Massa 
(2003) analyse how performance of the individual fund can be affected by its 
affiliated family. Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004) discuss the close relation 
between the growth of cash inflows of a certain fund and the superior performance 
of other peer funds within the same family. Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2006) 
study how a fund family allocates resources to promote the funds which have the 
potential to improve the profits of the entire fund family. However, previous 
research devotes little attention to the relation between the behaviour of individual 
funds and other peer funds within the same family. Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) (KR 
hereafter) are the first to examine such a connection. They consider the fund 
tournament phenomenon in the fund family, first reported in Brown, Harlow and 
Starks (1996). Despite their findings of differential levels of risk exposure for 
winners and losers, it remains debatable whether the risk taking behaviour 
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stimulated by the fund tournament benefits the fund performance and the overall 
profits of the fund family. One also wonders whether the risk taking behaviour is 
a consequence of the agency problem, or just an indication of managers’ inferior 
ability. 
 
Mutual funds alter their risk exposure frequently for various reasons. Chevalier 
and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) find a convex relation between the 
funds’ previous performance and changes of their cash inflows. Underperforming 
funds may therefore take more risks to bet on better performance given the 
disproportionate response from cash flows to previous fund performance. 
Underperforming funds may also alter the level of portfolio risk before the 
reporting date to manipulate their performance record (Goetzmann, Ingersoll, 
Spiegel and Welch, 2007; Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler and Vishny, 1991).  
 
On the other hand, the convex relation between cash flows and performance may 
not be applicable everywhere. Funds may use risk shifting to indicate active 
trading or superior stock selection ability, which may not necessarily indent 
investors’ benefits (Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng, 2005). Managers are also 
compelled to work for the interest of the whole family. In the context of a fund 
family, funds gain resources and information advantages from the family by 
winning the competition. Also, it is the fund family that decides which managers 
are to be promoted or demoted based on the tournament outcome. As a result, 
managers should change their risk exposure only to improve the fund performance, 
rather than increase the overall uncertainty of the family. However, to date there 
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has been little research on the relation between risk altering and performance 
shifting.   
 
Tournament is defined as the competition among a group for a fixed prize, and to 
be rewarded on their relative performance (Conyon, Simon and Sadler, 2001). The 
tournament phenomenon in fund family has both differences from and similarities 
to the corporate tournament. The major difference lies in the main concern of 
these two types of tournament. For most of the corporate tournament literature, it 
is the reward structure and various efforts made by participants to win the 
tournament that are of greatest concern (Leonard, 1990; Gibbs, 1993). Given the 
sound evidence on the compensation scheme, as well as the family strategies to 
promote top performing funds, the fund tournament literature concentrates more 
on the efforts made by the managers to win the competition, in which risk altering 
serves as the major channel.  
 
Another difference between the two types of tournament is the time frame. 
Corporate tournament can occur at any time with the appearance of the prize(s), or 
it can be long journey continuing over decades (Rees, 1992), whereas fund 
tournament literature suggests that fund managers mainly engage in tournament 
on an annual basis, since the end of year report summarises the managers’ 
averaged performance. Studies also find that risk altering is more popular on a 
mid-year basis from the managers’ perspective (Brown, Harlow and Starks, 
1996). 
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Moreover, traditional corporate tournament concerns competition for employment 
concerns, for example promotion from vice-president to CEO. The motivation 
behind such competition is often a rise in pay structure (Rosen, 1986; Bognanno, 
2001), since most wage changes are found between jobs rather than within jobs 
(Lazear, 1992). Fund managers also take employment issues into consideration 
during portfolio management. But since performance evaluation on managers 
might be based on a number of criteria, previous research finds that top 
management replacement is often accompanied by poor observed returns 
(Khorana, 2001), whereas the fund alphas are more closely related to managers’ 
promotion and demotion (Evans, 2009). Thus, there remains the possibility that 
top and bottom ranked managers could value the risk taking strategies differently; 
specifically, underperforming managers will be more concerned with the observed 
returns as a precaution against being replaced, while top performing ones aim to 
show their superior ability to pursue rewards.  
 
The common factor behind both types of tournament is the reduced cost of 
monitoring. Corporate tournament theory suggests that such self-enforcing reward 
systems are more desirable, compared with monitoring and supervision (Becker 
and Huselid, 1992). Fund family tournament also carries the characteristic of 
reducing monitoring cost, as the fund family can benefit from individual 
managers’ stellar performance; in addition, the competition reduces the agency 
cost, since winning the contest only comes because of performance improvement, 
which is in line with investors’ benefits. However, the existing studies lack 
empirical evidence to connect the performance consequences of risk taking to 
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family tournament, from both the families’ and the investors’ perspective. 
 
This research is the first to discuss performance shifting in relation to the risk 
taking in the family tournament. Using data from the UK unit trust industry, we 
first examine both the segment and family tournament phenomena in 3 IMA 
sectors of UK domicile equity funds in the sample period from 2001 to 2010. Our 
results show that funds with better previous performance actively participate in 
the family tournaments by increasing their risk exposure in the second half of the 
calendar year, while the opposite is true in the segment tournament. The results 
persist when funds are ranked by risk-adjusted performance. But no significant 
evidence is found to support the existence of the tournament phenomenon when 
the overall family level of risk is used; i.e., the overall risk exposure of the 
winning family does not increase in the second half of the year.  
 
We further examine managers’ risk taking behaviour under different market 
condition and our results document a positive relation between family ranks and 
future risk taking in bear market condition. Namely, mid-year winners increase 
their risk level higher than the losers since the losing managers are concerned 
more about their jobs.  
 
Our empirical analysis of the performance consequences show that the interim 
winners can outperform the losing ones in risk-adjusted returns by taking more 
risk, whereas the opposite is true when turning to the observed returns. The 
magnitude of performance differential is the largest when the risk shifting level is 
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low. The decreasing observed returns in the winning group is probably due to the 
return deteriorations from increased holdings of index-linked stocks. The 
increasing exposure to the systematic risk of the winning funds from our results 
supports this finding. Although it seems to be optimal for the mid-year winners to 
maintain a low level of risk shifting, we argue that winners might value the 
importance of employment concerns and family favouritism more seriously than 
the losers. Thus, they aim to signal the fund family of their superior ability by 
beating the other members with high fund alphas in order to gain more resource 
from the family. The results from our test of families’ cross-fund subsidisation 
support this view.  
 
We also conduct the performance consequence analysis from the fund family’s 
perspective. We compute the probability of funds being promoted in the segment 
ranks, which is regarded as the relative performance consequence given the level 
of risk taking. In general our analysis documents a positive relation between 
performance ranks of individual funds and their risk taking. The result also 
suggests that, for a fund family that consists of funds whose performance is 
extremely poor (dog family), its cross-sectional volatility is positively correlated 
with the probability of underlying funds being promoted. In other words, dog 
families are more likely to undertake family strategies by shifting performance or 
promoting risk taking behaviour across underlying members.  
 
While our findings about the family tournament differ with those in KR, they are 
consistent with those of Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995). Specifically, the 
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winning funds in a small fund group are more likely to engage in a tournament 
with strategic interactions. The cut-off points by KR to identify large and small 
families in the US fund industry are 16, 21, 31 and 36 funds, whereas in the UK 
the average family size is 4, and the largest family consists of only 11 funds. Thus, 
our entire sample of fund families can be classified as small families in the KR 
sense. Second, our results confirm the effects of employment concerns in relation 
to fund risk taking. Extant research suggests that, despite the compensation 
schemes that are based on asset values, fund managers are also exposed to 
employment risk, as they need to keep their jobs. Taking more risk provides a 
means for the losing managers to bet on better performance, though it may also 
raise the probability of performing even worse. Relative to the losing managers, 
the interim winners are under less employment pressure. Therefore, the 
underperforming managers tend to take less risk than good performers (Chevalier 
and Ellison, 1997; Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele, 2009). Third, and most important, 
our analysis of performance consequences shows that risk taking can serve as an 
indication of managers’ superior stock selection ability. It also acts as a crucial 
criterion for the fund family to decide which fund should be advertised or 
favoured with extra resources. Thus, it stands to reason that winner funds would 
actively consider shifting risk exposure to retain their leading positions. The 
current research unearths significant empirical evidence of changes in the risk 
taking behaviour in the family tournaments. Our results also support the 
conclusion that risk taking helps top performing managers win the competition.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section summarises the related 
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literature. Section 3.3 describes the empirical methods to be implemented in this 
research, while section 3.4 discusses the data and presents the descriptive statistics 
of the datasets. Section 3.5 reports the empirical findings from the tournament 
analysis, and the performance consequences due to tournament related risk taking. 
The results are then summarised in the final section.   
 
 
3.2 Related literature  
Our research relates to three strands of literature. First, we revisit the risk shifting 
phenomenon presented by many fund tournament studies. Brown, Harlow and 
Starks (1996) (BHS hereafter) are among the first to document the evidence that 
managers from half-year-losing funds have incentives to alter their risk exposure 
more significantly than those from the half-year-winning funds. In this seminal 
research, they report that half-year losers are more likely to increase their 
exposure to portfolio risk for the second half of the calendar year in an attempt to 
improve their future position against peer funds, while half-year winners tend to 
decrease risk exposure to retain their leading position. The motivation behind such 
tournament behaviour can be explained by the disproportionate amount of capital 
injected into top performing funds relative to the underperforming funds 
(Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998). However, bottom ranked 
funds might not be equally punished by capital outflows, which encourages the 
underperforming funds to bet on the market by increasing their risk exposure. 
Although there is a large body of research related to the tournament behaviour 
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(see for example Koski and Pontiff, 1999; Elton et al., 2003; Huang et al., 2011; 
Schwarz, 2012), the empirical results are mixed.  
 
Using monthly data and contingent tables, Jans and Otten (2008) find significant 
evidence that mid-year losers increase risk exposure more than mid-year winners 
in the first sub period, 1989-1996, of their sample using the UK unit trust data. 
But the risk shifting behaviour reverses in the rest of their sample period, 
1997-2003, as they argue that a strategic game is conducted by both the winners 
and the losers; i.e., both parties might alter their risk shifting based on the decision 
made by the opposite parties. Busse (2001) also finds evidence to support the 
tournament hypothesis; he discovers that fund managers may engage in half-year 
risk shifting to compete with others from the same investment style, also known 
as the segment tournament. However, contradictory evidence is found when daily 
data is applied. Specifically, top performing managers tend to increase their risk 
exposure more than the bottom performing ones. Similar results are found in 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997).  
 
In recent research, Kempf et al. (2009) and Schwarz (2011) apply the portfolio 
holding data in the tournament analysis. They argue that, compared with 
estimating the realised risk, deploying the portfolio holding data to estimate 
volatility better represents the managers’ intention to alter the exposure to 
portfolio risk. However, holding data might not be sufficient to address managers’ 
frequent risk shifting, since funds might only publish their holding data on a 
quarterly basis (or even on a half-year basis). 
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The second strand of literature relevant to our research is the fund family 
tournament literature. Fund families play an important role in funds operation. 
Since individual funds are usually affiliated to different fund complexes, it is the 
fund family that decides managers’ promotion or demotion, and which funds to 
market (Jain and Wu, 2000). Fund companies also conduct various types of 
strategies to enhance the performance of certain funds, such as undertaking 
cross-fund subsidisation to promote funds with high past performance through 
allocating new IPO shares (Gaspar et al., 2006). On the other hand, fund 
companies also have the motivation to support family tournament. Nanda et al. 
(2004) suggest that families with star funds, i.e. funds with top ranking 
performance against peer funds within the same investment style, attract 
significantly more new cash inflows than other families. The growing cash 
inflows can bring new capital not only to the star funds, but also to other funds 
within the same family, i.e. the spillover effect. They also find evidence that star 
families tend to increase the volatility of cross-sectional returns in order to 
increase the odds of creating star funds. In other words, risk taking in family 
tournament is a reasonable strategy, from which a fund company can benefit 
greatly.  
 
KR is the first to discuss the tournament behaviour in the context of fund families. 
They find that the bottom ranked managers in large families tend to increase risk 
more than top ranked ones, while the opposite occurs in small families. Following 
the theoretical work by Taylor (2003), KR suggests that there are no strategic 
interactions in large fund families. Fund managers cannot optimise their decision 
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when too many competitors are present. Therefore, mid-year winners simply 
choose to reduce risk exposure to retain their positions, without consideration of 
the strategies played by other mid-year losers. Meanwhile, given the convex 
reward scheme, bad performance cannot hurt the mid-year losers substantially if 
they increase their risk exposure.  
 
When the family is small, managers will be concerned about how other 
competitors behave. Taylor (2003) suggests that in a game with strategic 
interactions, the mid-year winner will increase their risk exposure to lock their 
positions, as they are aware of the risk-increasing strategy taken by the losers.  
With the help of large cash inflows and favouritism from the fund companies, the 
losers cannot beat the winners when they both undertake the risk-increasing 
strategy. As a consequence, losers will tend to increase their future risk exposure 
less than the winners, or maintain it at a more stable level. However, KR also 
shows a strategic tournament in the group of funds within the same segment, 
which contradicts the results from prior research, although they argue that the 
strategic tournament could be time sensitive.  
 
The third strand of literature to which our research is related is the growing field 
of funds’ risk taking. There are a large number of studies discussing the purposes 
of funds’ risk shifting. Most of the studies identify that risk shifting is a major 
channel for the managers to promote cash inflows. Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel 
and Welch (2007) maintain that fund managers can alter the funds’ risk exposure 
with a view to manipulating the performance record. They tend to purchase 
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well-performing stocks and ditch the poor ones immediately before the 
performance reporting date to attract new cash inflows, a practice known as 
end-year window dressing (Lakonishok et al., 1991; Musto, 1997). Chevalier and 
Ellison (1997), and Sirri and Tufano (1998) document a convex shaped relation 
between fund performance and the change of cash inflows, implying that fund 
managers can take extra risk for compensation concerns, since underperforming 
managers are not punished heavily by cash outflows.  
 
In addition to the agency problem, Kacperczyk et al. (2005) suggest that active 
trading can also be regarded as a sign of managers’ superior ability. Thus risk 
shifting might lead to performance improvement. While much of the research in 
this field concentrates on searching for the real purposes of funds’ risk shifting, 
some studies focus on whether risk shifting actually benefits the investors. Huang, 
Sialm and Zhang (2011) (HSZ hereafter) initiate the discussion on the 
performance consequences of risk shifting. Using portfolio holding data of the US 
mutual fund industry, they find that funds with stable risk levels provide better 
performance than funds significantly altering their risk levels. As it is costly for 
the fund investors to bear the loss of funds during risk shifting, they argue that 
such behaviour is merely an indication of inferior ability or due to compensation 
concerns. However, despite a large number of studies examining the tournament 
behaviour and the risk shifting in the fund industry, few studies have followed the 
HSZ model to conduct a complete analysis of the performance consequences of 
family tournament. Our research is therefore set to fill the gap from an empirical 
perspective. 
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3.3 Methodology 
To identify the risk taking behaviour in the family tournament, we adapt the 
empirical model suggested by KR, as follows: 
      (3.1) 
where  is the difference of funds’ volatility between the ranking period and 
the post-ranking period. We use different measures in examining the volatility 
shifting, including the total risk, the systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
Volatility difference of the entire family is also calculated, to analyse whether 
tournament behaviour might occur at the family level. A fund family’s overall risk 
level is based on the value weighted returns of all funds within the same family. 
Previous studies consider the tournament behaviour on an annual basis, in which 
the ranking period lasts from 6 to 8 months (e.g. BHS; Jans and Otten, 2008). KR 
consider only the 7-month ranking period. To fully address the time frame issue of 
the tournament behaviour, our investigation includes the cases with both the June 
(6-month ranking period) and July (7-month ranking period) cut-off points, while 
also considering the quarter-ranking period to further the analysis of managers’ 
risk shifting strategy. In equation (3.1),  and  are the family rank and 
segment rank, respectively. The segment rank is generated by arranging funds of 
the same segment in ascending order according to their performance in the 
ranking period. We classify all funds into three segments according to the IMA 
category of investment styles, i.e. UK All Companies, UK Equity Income and UK 
Smaller Companies.  
87 
 
Chapter 3 Fund family tournament and performance consequences 
For measuring the performance, BHS and KR use funds’ raw returns only, due to 
the fact that the raw returns are the major concern of investors. Given the recent 
concern that the close connection between risk and returns might bias the 
tournament analysis (Schwarz, 2012), we also include the Jensen alphas as a 
measure of the risk-adjusted performance. In order to make ranks from different 
investment styles comparable, we normalise the rank by using the function 
, where  is the segment rank of fund i and  is the size of 
the corresponding segment. We calculate the family rank by further ranking the 
normalised segment rank from funds within the same family in ascending order. 
Thus, the family rank measures the relative performance of each member in the 
family. We also normalise the family rank using the same method, with  being 
the size of the corresponding family. ( ) is the dummy variable that 
represents a large (small) fund family. We consider two criteria to classify fund 
family into large and small, namely, the aggregate value of the family and the 
family size. This is because some of the families may have only a limited number 
of members, but each member has a large size of underlying assets. The model 
also includes the funds’ volatility in the ranking period, , and the median 
difference of funds’ risk in each of the segments, , to capture the 
exogenous factors that lead to risk shifting. The model 3.1 is estimated by using 
the fixed effect panel regression, as following the results provided by the 
Hausman test, which compare results given by the fixed effect panel regression 
and those from the random effect model, supports the validity in using the fixed 
effect panel regression.  
 
88 
 
Chapter 3 Fund family tournament and performance consequences 
For the performance consequences of family tournament, we apply several 
analytical tools, including the transition matrix and performance differences, to 
examine the performance shifting of individual funds. An empirical model is then 
constructed to analyse how performance changes from the family perspective can 
be explained by changes in the risk taking behaviour. Given that funds participate 
in the tournament to win the competition, it is the relative performance rather than 
the absolute performance that matters to the managers. Thus, we can further link 
the risk taking behaviour to the rank changes of a certain fund. With the spillover 
effect and disproportionate relation between historical performance and cash 
inflows, fund families also have incentives to take on higher risk exposure in 
family tournament. We thus formulate the empirical model as follows: 
(3.2)               
where  is now the overall family rank of family i in the post-ranking 
period. The family rank is worked out by first taking the difference in the segment 
rank of each sampled fund between the ranking and post-ranking period. Then we 
further rank each of the fund families using the aggregate ranking ratio. For 
example, if family i has three funds, A, B and C the differences in normalised 
segment rank for each fund are . Here,  
means that fund A improves its ranking ratio by 0.1; fund C has been demoted by 
0.3 in the segment rank and fund B has no change in its rank. The aggregate 
ranking ratio for family i thus equals . All the families in 
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our sample are then ranked according to this ratio. A high  indicates that 
the funds within the family experience a positive performance shift with a smaller 
cost of funds being demoted.  measures the level of risk shifting in a certain 
family. A similar aggregate ranking ratio is generated for each family according to 
the changes in the level of risk exposure of the underlying funds. ,  and 
 measure the cross-sectional differences in the total risk, systematic risk and 
idiosyncratic risk, respectively.  is equal to 1(0), if the family that fund i is 
affiliated to is a star (dog) family. A star family contains at least one fund ranked 
in the top quartile of the segment (star fund) in the ranking period, while a dog 
family includes any bottom performing funds (dog fund).  denotes a 
family that has both star and dog funds in the ranking period. Both star and dog 
families may have motivation to promote family tournament; i.e. the dog family 
will seek to improve the performance of its dog fund by betting on the market, 
while the star family tends to retain the position of the star funds in its group. 
Further, fund families also have the ability to promote the tournament behaviour 
by resource reallocation, i.e. family favouritism and the spillover effect. Thus, by 
sorting families into star and dog types, we are able to explore which types of 
families are more likely to be involved in the tournament. Additionally, we may 
discover how performance of the peer funds in a star/dog family responds to the 
tournament behaviour.   
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3.4 Data 
The funds’ raw data are obtained from Morningstar. We collect daily total returns 
data for the UK unit trust industry during the period between 2001 and 2010. The 
funds selected into the sample are all UK domiciled, equity based unit trusts and 
OEICs. 4  We exclude funds targeting fixed income securities and mixed 
investments; the index linked funds are also taken out of the sample. The sampled 
funds belong to 3 IMA sectors: UK All Companies, UK Equity Income and UK 
Small Companies. We treat these 3 IMA sectors as the 3 largest segments in our 
tournament analysis. With regard to fund families, this research regards a fund 
family as being formed by the funds that are managed by the same fund company. 
For each of the families, we only keep the oldest fund in the same share class, 
since funds within the same share class deliver similar rates of returns.5  
 
Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics for the sample funds in this research. It 
shows a rapid growth of the UK fund industry, although the population of UK 
funds is still moderate in numbers compared to the US fund industry. Both the 
number of funds and the number of fund families increased dramatically in the 
sample period. There were only 159 UK domiciled equity funds in 2001, and this 
number had doubled to 324 by 2010. Columns 2 and 3 report the mean 
cross-sectional returns and standard deviations of the sample funds. In general, we 
see a weak association between higher levels of risk and higher observed returns 
4 Unit trusts and OEIC s are both open-ended investments with different bid/ask pricing, legal structures and 
up-front loads. However in practice, they can both be regarded as mutual fund equivalents.   
5 The oldest fund is normally the first fund established by the fund company in the share class. Other peer 
funds within the same share class can be created individually or by splitting from the oldest one, but they all 
share a management team and a similar portfolio composition. Morningstar provides additional information 
indicating the oldest fund from the same share class. 
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among the fund population, but exceptions occur in 2001/2002 and 2007/2008, 
when the market suffered from the dot-com bubble and the global financial crisis. 
 
Apart from the raw returns, we also estimate the Jensen alphas as a measure of the 
funds’ risk-adjusted performance. We employ three sets of benchmark returns to 
proxy the excessive market returns (MKT), the size effect (SMB), the book to 
market effect (HML) and the momentum effect (UMD). We choose the FTSE All 
Shares index as the basis for calculating market returns, and hence the MKT. Use 
of the MKT factor is motivated by the conventional CAPM model. The HML and 
SMB factors are adopted following the Fama-French 3-factor model, and 
computed by two pairs of market portfolios. SMB is generated by taking the 
difference between the FTSE 100 index and the FTSE small capital index; HML is 
calculated by taking the difference between the MSCI UK Growth index and MSCI 
Table 3.1 Summary statistics 
Year Mean return (%) Mean S.D. (%) No. of funds No. of fund families 
2001 -0.0474 1.1713 159 41 
2002 -0.1123 1.1756 172 41 
2003 0.0916 0.9087 189 44 
2004 0.0500 0.5743 210 50 
2005 0.0777 0.5857 225 52 
2006 0.0676 0.7063 250 56 
2007 -0.0032 0.9412 277 60 
2008 -0.1731 1.8427 294 62 
2009 0.1187 1.2443 302 63 
2010 0.0713 0.9379 324 65 
Notes: This table shows the summary statistics for the sample UK equity funds considered by 
this study. Columns 2 and 3 present the mean sum of total daily returns and mean sum of 
standard deviations of all sample funds, respectively. Column 4 presents the total number of 
funds in the sample. In Column 5, the number of fund families for each year in the sample is 
shown. 
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UK Value index suggested by Cuthbertson et al. (2008). Following the method 
presented in French’s website, the UMD factor in the Carhart 4-factor model is 
generated by extracting the returns of the 1-year low return portfolio from the 
returns of the 1-year high return portfolio. 
 
 
3.5 Empirical results 
3.5.1 Risk taking in the segment and family tournaments 
Table 3.2 reports the regression results fitting by model (3.1). In general, it shows 
significant evidence of funds engaging in both family and segment tournaments.  
In column 2 of Panel A, when the half-year ranking period is considered, the main 
indicator of family tournament, , has a significant and positive coefficient 
on the large-value-family dummy, although no significant tournament behaviour 
is found in small families. The segment tournament indicator, , has a 
significantly negative factor loading on either the large or the small family 
dummy variable. The positive coefficient on  indicates that top 
ranking funds in the large families take more risk than bottom ranked ones, which 
is consistent with the theoretical prediction of strategic tournament by Taylor 
(2003). This result is also consistent when the cut-off point of the ranking period 
turns to be 7 months in the second column of Panel A.  
 
The negative coefficient on  suggests a non-strategic segment tournament in 
which half-year underperforming funds are more likely to increase their risk 
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exposure in the second half of the year than are the top performing ones. The risk 
shifting behaviour in segment tournament is more sensitive in small families than 
in large ones by more than 50 basis points.  
 
Our findings regarding the family tournament are contrary to those reported in KR, 
which suggests that underperforming funds within a small family increase risk 
more than over-performing ones. Our results however do indicate that managers 
of the mid-year winners choose to increase their risk exposure than the mid-year 
losers. This is particularly true for those from the large sized families, since large 
sized funds have more capital to fund strategy shifting or are the market makers 
that enjoy some competitive edge over the small funds.  
 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) argue that top performing managers may increase 
their risk level to retain their leading positions. In the segment tournament, 
mid-year winners are less motivated to compete with peer funds within the same 
segments, as the only reward for the winner is the new cash inflows. Existing 
research however shows no supportive evidence of performance improvement 
over the peer losers after the risk shifting, implying that it actually becomes even 
harder to attract new cash inflows by increasing risk exposure (see for example 
HSZ).  
 
Mid-year winners are highly motivated in the family tournament since the winner 
of the tournament may be rewarded by the fund company through various forms 
of family favouritism. Even those mid-year winners who have already been 
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rewarded by the family may seek for continuation of such favouritism (Guedj and 
Papstaikoudi, 2003; Nanda et al., 2004 and Gaspar et al., 2006). Large sized 
families may also encourage their member funds, particularly the winning ones, to 
participate in the tournament, since the winner funds could spare their new capital 
to benefit the other peer funds in the family. Compared with large sized families, 
smaller ones have no competitive edge in shifting investment strategies. Columns 
4-6 of Panel A in Table 3.2 report the outcome of the research that is extended to 
include the tournament analysis on a quarterly basis. The family tournament 
behaviour is consistently significant throughout the quarterly analysis, while 
segment tournament behaviour disappears between the first and second quarter.  
 
In Panel B of Table 3.2, the fund families are classified into large or small 
according to the number of their underlying family members. We find that the 
results in general agree with those given in Panel A. Funds in small sized families 
are not actively involved in family tournament. An additional reason for this could 
be that funds in the families with fewer members are normally managed by the 
same manager or have a similar portfolio composition, which leads them to be 
even less motivated to engage in a family tournament.  
 
To further analyse family tournaments we re-rank the funds according to their 
risk-adjusted returns in the ranking period, since the previous literature suggests 
that a close relation between risk and returns could jeopardise the tournament 
analysis. The risk-adjusted returns can be estimated by using the Carhart 4 factor 
model, 
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where  is the Jensen alpha measuring the risk-adjusted returns of fund i, 
 is the excess market return;  is the return from the book to market 
portfolio;  stands for the return from the size portfolio and  is the 
return from the momentum portfolio. 
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Table 3.3 reports the results from model (3.1) based on using the Jensen alpha 
from the Carhart 4 factor model as the ranking criterion. We find similar 
tournament behaviour in the large sized families, where  is found to 
Table 3.2 Family and segment tournaments (Raw Returns) 
Panel A (6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4) 
      
 0.0050** 0.0049** 0.0040** 0.0045** 0.0065** 
 0.0033 0.0018*** 0.0020 -0.0019 0.0040 
 -0.0076*** -0.0068*** 0.0037 -0.0104*** -0.0076** 
 -0.0127*** -0.0074*** 0.00002 -0.0091*** -0.0111*** 
 -3.5697*** -2.9213*** -4.8218*** -4.0134*** -3.6620*** 
 13.6588*** 12.9068*** 7.0209*** 14.3347*** 11.8634*** 
       88.35% 89.12% 74.18% 86.61% 83.15% 
Panel B (6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4) 
      
 0.0054** 0.0034 0.0076*** 0.0031 0.0067** 
 0.0028 0.0033 0.0023 0.0003 0.0041 
 -0.0105*** -0.0061** -0.0007 -0.0091*** -0.0097*** 
 -0.0115*** -0.0098*** 0.0036 -0.0111*** -0.0095*** 
 -3.5662**** -2.9171*** -4.8229*** -4.0229*** -3.6757*** 
 13.6754*** 12.9184*** 7.0462*** 14.3398*** 11.8655*** 
       88.34% 89.13% 74.23% 86.58% 83.12% 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from the family tournament model (3.1).  and 
 are the family and segment ranks based on the funds’ daily total returns, respectively.  ( ) is 
the dummy variable which equals to 1(0) when fund i belongs to a large (small) fund family.  
indicates the risk level that fund i is exposed to in the ranking period and  is the median 
difference of the segment volatility. Funds’ daily returns from 3 UK IMA segments, i.e. UK All 
Companies, UK Equity Income and UK Small Companies, are examined for the sample years between 
2001 and 2010. Panel A reports the results when fund families are sorted by funds’ aggregate market 
size, while in Panel B results are sorted by the number of funds in a family. Column 1 presents the 
results when 6 months is taken as the ranking period and column 2 shows the results when the ranking 
period is 7 months and post-ranking period is 5 months. Columns 4-6 report the results when a quarterly 
tournament is considered. The model is estimated by the fixed effect panel regression in which year and 
entity effects are controlled by adding both year and fund entity dummies to the model. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
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have a significant and positive loading. Its parameter value as shown in Table 3.3 
is very close to that of the coefficients on  in Panel A of Table 3.2, 
with only an 8-basis-point difference. Funds within small sized families are not 
found to increase their risk exposure significantly. Therefore, our analysis 
indicates a pervasive phenomenon of family tournament among large sized fund 
families. However, evidence reported in Table 3.3 does not support the segment 
tournament in both large and small families, as none of the coefficients on  
are significantly different from 0.    
 
Employment concern is another incentive that can trigger managers’ risk altering. 
Kempf et al. (2009) find that managers change their risk level differently during 
distinct market condition. They argue that mid-year winners increase their risk 
exposure more than the mid-year losers in bear market since the losing managers 
are more concerned about their jobs (employment incentive dominant). Opposite 
situation occurs in bull market when compensation is the major concern among 
the managers (compensation incentive dominant). To further test the 
distinguishing risk shifting during these two types of market condition, we apply 
the empirical model suggested by Kempf et al. (2009). The model is described as 
following:  
                 (3.3)                                      
where , the fund’s family rank, is interacted with the dummy variable which 
classify the market condition into bear and bull.6 Table 3.4 reports the results. 
6 We adopt the method suggested by Kempf et al. (2009) to classify the sampled years into bear and bull 
ones. Thus, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2009 and 2010 is considered as bull years (compensation incentive dominant) 
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Table 3.3 Family and segment tournaments (4 Factor Model Alpha) 
Panel A (6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4) 
      
 0.0058** 0.0049** 0.0029 0.004* 0.0037 
 0.0022 0.002 0.0053*** -0.0013 0.0048** 
 0.0005 0.0028 -0.0017 0.0016 -0.0059** 
 -0.002 0.0026 -0.0069*** -0.0011 -0.0091*** 
 -3.5048*** -2.9170*** -4.8114*** -3.8839*** -3.6208*** 
 13.6334*** 12.8792*** 7.05774*** 14.2787*** 11.8891*** 
      
 88.32% 89.11% 74.22% 86.61% 83.28% 
Panel B (6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4) 
      
 0.0047** 0.0048** 0.0056** 0.0028 0.0056** 
 0.0034 0.0025 0.0028 -0.0001 0.0031 
 -0.0007 0.0026 -0.0053** 0.0002 -0.0073** 
 -0.0027 0.0017 -0.0038 -0.0014 -0.0084*** 
 -3.5000*** -2.9157*** -4.8138*** -3.8892*** -3.6295*** 
 13.6676*** 12.8787*** 6.9834*** 14.3356*** 11.8775*** 
       88.32% 83.71% 74.06% 86.55% 83.24% 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from the family tournament model (3.1).  and 
 are the family and segment ranks respectively based on funds’ alphas estimated by the Carhart 4 
factors model.  ( ) is the dummy variable which equals to 1(0) when fund i belongs to a large (small) 
fund family.  is the risk level that fund i is exposed to in the ranking period and  is the 
median difference of the segment volatility. Funds’ daily returns from 3 UK IMA segments, UK All 
Companies, UK Equity Income and UK Small Companies, are examined for the sample years between 
2001 and 2010. Panel A reports the results when the fund families are sorted by funds’ aggregate market 
size, while in Panel B results are sorted by the number of funds in the family. Column 1 presents the results 
for the 6-month ranking period and column 2 shows the results when the ranking period is 7 months and the 
post-ranking period is 5 months. Columns 4-6 report the results when a quarterly tournament is considered. 
The model is estimated by the fixed effect panel regression in which year and entity effects are 
controlled by adding both year and fund entity dummies to the model. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
 
Our results show significantly distinct risk shifting between the bear and bull 
market. Mid-year winners are more likely to increase their risk exposure than the 
while the rest of the sampled years are in bear condition (employment incentive dominant). 
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mid-year losers when the employment incentive is dominant in that year, whereas 
the opposite is true when the compensation incentive is dominant in the sampled 
year. For example, the coefficient is 6.79% for  and -4.92% for 
 when 6-month ranking period is considered. Also, it seemed that the 
employment incentive is more sensitive with the risk shifting than the 
compensation incentive given the coefficient of  is larger in absolute 
value. Column 3 of Table 3.4 reports similar results as those shown in the previous 
column. 
 
The findings in Table 3.4 further confirm our concerns regarding to the risk taking 
driven by employment incentive. Increasing risk exposure also adds more 
uncertainties to the holding portfolio, which may lead to even worse performance in 
the future. Since underperforming managers are under more employment pressures, 
they are more cautions with risk taking than the over performing ones. Meanwhile, 
the higher sensitivity between the risk shifting and employment concerns is also 
consistent with our overall finding on the relation between risk taking and fund 
previous performance in Table 3.2, where interim winners tend to increase their 
level of risk more than the loser for all sampled years. 
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We extend our analysis to look at the tournament behaviour on the family basis. 
Fund families are ranked according to their mean value weighted returns in the 
ranking period and we create dummy variables indicating a star (dog) family 
when it has at least one top performing (bottom performing) fund. The empirical 
model is formulated as follows: 
                 (3.4) 
where the risk shifting of the whole family is computed by taking the difference of  
volatility of families’ value weighted returns between the ranking and 
post-ranking periods.  
 
    
Table 3.4 Employment and compensation driven risk taking 
Risk taking (6, 6) (7, 5) 
   
 0.0679*** 0.0668*** 
(4.2426) (4.4548) 
 -0.0492*** -0.0577*** (-3.2526) (-4.0921) 
    61.11% 55.29% 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from the family tournament model 
(3.3).  is the family ranks based on funds’ observed mean returns.  
( ) is the dummy variable which equals to 1 when the sampled year is 
compensation (employment) incentive dominant. We classify the market into bull 
(bear) when the mid-year return of the FTSE All Share Index is positive (negative). 
Funds’ daily returns from 3 UK IMA segments, UK All Companies, UK Equity 
Income and UK Small Companies, are examined for the sample years between 2001 
and 2010. Column 2 presents the results for the 6-month ranking period and column 
3 shows the results when the ranking period is 7 months and the post-ranking period 
is 5 months. The model is estimated by the fixed effect panel regression in which 
year and entity effects are controlled by adding both year and fund entity dummies to 
the model. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
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Table 3.5 reports the regression results from model (3.4). The coefficients on 
 and  are not significant, indicating that fund families 
do not participate in the tournament by altering their overall risk level. Both Tables 
3.2 and 3.3 show a distinct difference in risk taking behaviour between winners and 
losers within the same family, which can offset the risk level taken by their 
affiliated family. For the small families, those with fewer members are normally 
under the management of the same team, and with similar investment strategies 
would be less active in participating in tournament. Furthermore, both  and 
 have significant coefficients in the (6, 6) interval of Panel A, with 13 and 
19 basis points, suggesting that funds within the star families tend to take more 
risks. This is consistent with our previous findings, in which top performing funds 
increase their risks more than bottom performing ones. Particularly, since star 
families contain funds ranked in the top 10% of the corresponding segment, the 
results given in Table 3.5 imply that the increase of the families’ overall risk is 
mainly attributable to the risk shifting undertaken by the star funds, while the other 
peer funds, especially the dog funds, maintain stable risk levels. This finding can 
also be explained as the direct consequence of family subsidisation, since fund 
companies can keep star funds informed with more valuable information in order to 
utilise the spillover effect. 
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Table 3.5 Whole family tournaments 
Panel A (6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4) 
       0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0010 -0.0015* 
 0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0005 0.0009 -0.0012 
 0.0013*** 0.0007 0.0011 0.0014** -0.0001 
 0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0014** -0.0003 
 0.0019*** 0.0014*** 0.0004 0.0015** -0.0002 
 -15.497*** -15.0568*** -7.8053*** -13.5333*** -10.3831*** 
       77.44% 65.35% 49.01% 53.19% 26.75% 
Panel B (6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4) 
      
 0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0013 -0.0011 
 0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0006 0.0007 -0.0016* 
 0.0013*** 0.0007 0.0011 0.0013* -0.0001 
 0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0013** -0.0004 
 0.0018*** 0.0013** 0.0003 0.0013** -0.0003 
 -15.468*** -15.0265*** -7.7978*** -13.4907*** -10.3292*** 
       77.48% 65.34% 49.00% 53.30% 26.96% 
Notes: This table presents the regression results on risk shifting in the family tournament.  
is the rank of the family return, which is calculated by using the value weighted return of funds 
within the same family.  ( ) is the dummy variable, which equals to 1(0) when family i is a 
large (small) fund family.  ( ) equals to 1(0) when family i is a star (dog) family. 
 is the risk of family i in the ranking period. Funds’ daily returns from 3 UK IMA segments, 
i.e. UK All Companies, UK Equity Income and UK Small Companies, are examined for the 
sample years between 2001 and 2010. Panel A reports the results when fund families are sorted by 
the funds’ aggregate market size, while in Panel B results are sorted by the number of funds in the 
family. Column 1 presents the results where 6 months is the cut-off point for a ranking period and 
column 2 shows the results when the ranking period is 7 months and the post-ranking period is 5 
months. Columns 4-6 report the results when a quarterly tournament is considered. The model is 
estimated by the fixed effect panel regression in which year and entity effects are controlled by 
adding both year and fund entity dummies to the model. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level.  
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3.5.2 Risk characteristics in segment and family tournaments 
We now extend our investigation to deploy alternative risk measures in analysing 
the tournament behaviour. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 report results when the market beta 
and the idiosyncratic risk are used to compute the level of risk shifting.  
 
In Tables 3.6 and 3.7, the statistical significance of coefficients on  in 
both the (6, 6) and (7, 5) intervals of Panel A suggests that leading managers of 
the family increase more of their systematic risk in the tournament than do the 
losing ones. This result is further enhanced in Panel B when families are sorted 
according to the number of their underlying funds, i.e. with a parameter value of 
6.23% and 7.88% respectively for the (6, 6) and (7, 5) intervals. The outcome 
implies that top performing managers increase their market beta by holding more 
equities in the benchmark index to time the market. While cross subsidisation can 
bring more resources to finance major strategy changes by the winning funds, it 
seems reasonable for the winning funds to decrease uncertainty resulting from 
holding small value equities, since previous evidence suggests that in general the 
index-linked funds outperform the actively managed funds. The results in Panels 
A and B of Table 3.7 also confirm this finding by showing no statistically 
significant evidence of family tournament when the idiosyncratic risk is 
considered.  
 
Compared with family tournaments, in Table 3.6 no evidence is found to support 
the shifts in risk taking behaviour in terms of systematic risk in the segment 
tournament. However, the losing funds are found to increase their idiosyncratic 
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risk exposure more than the winning funds in the second half of the calendar year, 
as shown in Table 3.6, where  has the coefficient of -6.1% and -8.4% in 
Panel A and Panel B, respectively. This result remains significant in the small 
family case. HSZ find similar results in their research. They hold that 
underperforming funds tend to take more idiosyncratic risks by increasing 
portfolio concentration or changing stock selection. But such an effort brings no 
positive feedback to performance consequences. Similar arguments can be found 
in Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang (2006), for example. Given disproportionate 
responses of the growing cash inflows, it comes as no surprise to see that losing 
funds choose to increase their exposure to uncertainty surrounding their portfolio 
with a view to improving performance in the segment tournament.  
 
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 present the regression results from model (3.3) when families’ 
overall systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk are used to compute the risk level. For 
most of the sample intervals, no significant evidence on risk taking is found 
regarding the family and segment tournaments. However, the last columns of 
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 suggest that low-ranked fund families take more overall 
systematic and idiosyncratic risks in the tournament during the final quarter of the 
calendar year. It is plausible that the results from the end-year window dressing 
behaviour when underperforming funds devote every effort to promoting their 
performance before the reporting date. 
 
 
 
105 
 
Chapter 3 Fund family tournament and performance consequences 
 
 
 
Table 3.6 Family and segment tournaments (Market Beta) 
Panel A (6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4) 
      
 0.0363* 0.0497*** 0.0484*** 0.0180 0.0408*** 
 0.0209 0.0448** 0.0156 -0.0049 0.0572*** 
 -0.0137 0.0035 -0.0524*** 0.0470** -0.0193 
 -0.0471** -0.0303 -0.0455** 0.0113 -0.0578*** 
 -2.3525*** -3.4309*** -0.2903*** -0.1070*** -0.3457*** 
 12.3390*** 11.8658*** 0.5272*** 0.8219*** 0.4662*** 
      
 44.12% 38.27% 65.64% 41.17% 59.19% 
Panel B (6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4) 
      
 0.0623*** 0.0788*** 0.0781*** 0.0338** 0.0782*** 
 -0.00236 0.0202 -0.0051 -0.0183 0.0243* 
 -0.0569** -0.0396* -0.0909*** 0.0127 -0.0704*** 
 -0.0136 0.0051 -0.0159 0.0381** -0.0053 
 -2.3124*** -3.4064*** -0.2902*** -0.1031*** -0.3456*** 
 12.3586*** 11.8913*** 0.5345*** 0.8244*** 0.4699*** 
        44.25% 38.31% 65.88% 41.01% 59.08% 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from model (3.1) where  is given by the 
difference of the market beta between the ranking and post-ranking periods. The market beta is 
estimated by the Carhart 4 factors model.  and  are the family and segment ranks based 
on funds’ daily returns.  ( ) is the dummy variable which equals to 1(0) when fund i belongs to a 
large (small) fund family.  is the market beta of fund i in the ranking period and  is the 
median difference of the segment beta. Funds’ daily returns in the sample period of 2001 to 2010 from 
3 UK IMA segments, i.e. UK All Companies, UK Equity Income and UK Small Companies, are used 
to estimate the market beta. Panel A reports the results when fund families are sorted by funds’ 
aggregate market size, while in Panel B results are sorted by the number of funds in the family.  
Column 1 presents the results where 6 months is taken as the cut-off point for the ranking period and 
column 2 shows the results when the ranking period is 7 months and the post-ranking period is 5 
months. Columns 4-6 report the results when a quarterly tournament is considered. The model is 
estimated by the fixed effect panel regression in which year and entity effects are controlled by adding 
both year and fund entity dummies to the model. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level.  
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Table 3.7 Family and segment tournaments (Idiosyncratic Risk) 
Panel A (6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4) 
      
 0.0035 0.0026 -0.0004 0.0036 0.0035 
 0.0024 0.0012 0.0004 0.0007 0.0050** 
 -0.0061*** -0.0036 0.0031 -0.0054** -0.0064** 
 -0.0089*** -0.0051** 0.0004 -0.0050** -0.0075*** 
 -3.5591*** -3.1808 -4.5610*** -3.9013*** -3.6651*** 
 12.5259*** 11.5825 5.1820*** 13.7519*** 10.4571*** 
      
 78.89% 79.10% 40.31% 72.76% 73.44% 
Panel B (6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4) 
      
 0.0036 0.0003 0.0008 0.0019 0.0035 
 0.0022 0.0031 -0.006 0.0022 0.0049** 
 -0.0084*** -0.0028 0.0015 -0.0051** -0.0049* 
 -0.0072*** -0.0067** 0.0012 -0.0053** -0.0095*** 
 -3.5715*** -3.1907*** -4.5775*** -3.9056*** -3.6625*** 
 12.5394*** 11.6465*** 5.1838*** 13.7525*** 10.4791*** 
       78.86% 79.12% 40.24% 72.74% 73.48% 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from model (3.1) where  is given by the 
difference of the idiosyncratic risk between the ranking and post-ranking periods. The idiosyncratic 
risk is proxied by the standard deviation of the error term from the Carhart 4 factors model.  
and  are the family and segment ranks based on funds’ daily returns.  ( ) is the 
dummy variable which equals to 1(0) when fund i belongs to a large (small) fund family.  is 
the market beta of fund i in the ranking period and  is the median difference of the segment 
beta. Funds’ daily returns in the sample period of 2001 to 2010 from 3 UK IMA segments, i.e. UK All 
Companies, UK Equity Income and UK Small Companies, are used to estimate the market beta. Panel 
A reports the results when fund families are sorted by funds’ aggregate market size, while in Panel B 
results are sorted by the number of funds in the family. Column 1 presents the results when the cut-off 
point for the ranking period is 6 months, and column 2 shows the results when the ranking period is 7 
months and the post-ranking period is 5 months. Columns 4-6 report the results when a quarterly 
tournament is present. The model is estimated by the fixed effect panel regression in which year and 
entity effects are controlled by adding both year and fund entity dummies to the model. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
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Table 3.8 Family and segment tournaments (Family Beta) 
Panel A (6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4) 
       -0.0005 -0.0110 -0.0095 -0.0234 -0.0418*** 
 -0.0012 -0.0119 -0.0059 -0.0183 -0.0420*** 
 -0.0129 -0.0084 0.0234 0.0065 0.0065 
 -0.0111 -0.0102 0.0132 0.0004 -0.0155 
 -0.0036 0.0079 0.0266* 0.0177 0.0182 
 -0.2860*** -0.3764*** -0.4786*** -0.3069*** -0.5037*** 
      
 11.86% 26.42% 38.84% 11.13% 48.89% 
Panel B (6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4) 
      
 -0.0078 -0.0111 -0.0173 -0.0435* -0.0363** 
 0.0060 -0.0119 0.0042 -0.0067 -0.0462** 
 -0.0118 -0.0084 0.0242 0.0109 0.0060 
 -0.0090 -0.0102 0.0167 0.0045 -0.0171 
 0.0002 0.0078 0.0322** 0.0273 0.0158 
 -0.2885*** -0.3764*** -0.4786*** -0.3091*** -0.5030*** 
      
 11.93% 26.42% 39.05% 14.01% 48.88% 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from model (3.4) where  is given by the difference of 
the family’s market beta between the ranking and post-ranking periods. The market beta is estimated by the 
Carhart 4 factors model.  is the returns rank of the entire fund family. The family returns are 
calculated by using the value weighted returns of the funds within the same family.  ( ) is the 
dummy variable which equals to 1(0) when family i is a large (small) fund family.  ( ) equals to 
1(0) when family i is a star (dog) family.  is the market beta of family i in the ranking period. Funds’ 
daily returns from 3 UK IMA segments, i.e. UK All Companies, UK Equity Income and UK Small 
Companies, are examined for the sample years between 2001 and 2010. Panel A reports the results when 
fund families are sorted by funds’ aggregate market size, while in Panel B results are sorted by the number 
of funds in the family. Column 1 presents the results when the cut-off point for the ranking period is 6 
months, and column 2 shows the results when the ranking period is 7 months and post-ranking period is 5 
months. Columns 4-6 report the results when a quarterly tournament is considered. The model is estimated 
by the fixed effect panel regression in which year and entity effects are controlled by adding both year and 
fund entity dummies to the model. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
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Table 3.9 Family and segment tournaments (Family Idiosyncratic Risk) 
Panel A (6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4) 
       0.0022 -0.0017 0.0002 0.0048* -0.0125*** 
 0.0024 0.0005 -0.0009 0.0019 -0.0092*** 
 -0.0006 0.0023 0.0002 -0.0020 -0.0004 
 -0.0001 0.0015 -0.0015 0.0005 -0.0018 
 0.0012 0.0043** 0.0019 0.0001 0.0011 
 -6.0783*** -5.3604*** -5.8952*** -6.0422*** -5.4827*** 
      
 13.78% 9.79% 24.82% 14.18% 9.29% 
Panel B (6, 6) (7, 5) (Q1,Q2) (Q2,Q3) (Q3,Q4) 
      
 0.0028 -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0055* -0.0103*** 
 0.0018 -0.0003 -0.0007 0.0017 -0.0118*** 
 -0.0007 0.0022 0.0002 -0.0022 -0.0004 
 -0.0003 0.0014 -0.0015 0.0003 -0.0024 
 0.0009 0.0039** 0.0019 -0.0004 0.0004 
 -6.0983*** -5.3162*** -5.9292*** -6.1744*** -5.5457*** 
      
 13.90% 9.77% 24.82% 14.28% 9.38% 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from the family tournament analysis model (3.4), where 
 is given by the difference of the family’s idiosyncratic risk estimated by the standard deviation of the 
error term from the Carhart 4 factors model between the ranking and post-ranking periods.  is the 
return rank of the entire fund family. The family returns are calculated by using the value weighted return of 
funds within the same family.  ( ) is a dummy variable which equals to 1(0) when family i is a 
large (small) fund family.  ( ) equals to 1(0) when family i is a star (dog) family.  is the 
idiosyncratic risk of family i in the ranking period. Funds’ daily returns from 3 UK IMA segments, i.e. UK 
All Companies, UK Equity Income and UK Small Companies, are examined for the sample years between 
2001 and 2010. Panel A reports the results when fund families are sorted by the funds’ aggregate market size, 
while in Panel B results are sorted by the number of funds in the family. Column 1 presents the results when 
6 months is considered as the ranking period and column 2 shows the results when the ranking period is 7 
months and the post-ranking period is 5 months. Columns 4-6 report the results when a quarterly tournament 
is considered. The model is estimated by the fixed effect panel regression in which year and entity effects are 
controlled by adding both year and fund entity dummies to the model. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
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3.5.3 Rank transition analysis  
We now move to examine performance consequences of both the segment and 
family tournaments. As a first step, in this section we analyse funds’ rank 
transitions. Table 3.10 reports the transition probability of funds’ segment ranks. 
In the first column, we sort all the funds into 10 deciles in ascending order 
according to their segment ranks. As such, the 1st decile includes bottom ranked 
funds while the 10th decile contains top ranked funds. The remaining columns 
present the probability of funds ranked in each of the deciles moving to the other 
deciles.  
 
We find that the performance of top ranked funds persists for the ranking period 
and the post-ranking period. The transition probability of staying in the 10th decile 
is the highest, with a probability of 28.69% of the funds remaining in the same 
decile in the second half of the year. The transition probability of remaining in the 
1st decile is the second highest value. Thus, the very best and worst-performing 
funds seem to show performance persistency throughout the sample period. It is 
also the case that the probability for top ranked funds to have extremely bad 
performance in the second half of the year increases, particularly when their ranks 
are higher in the first half of the year. That is, funds located in the 10th, 9th, 8th and 
7th deciles have a cumulative probability of being demoted to a decile lower than 
or equal to the 3rd decile of 21.54%, 26.34%, 23%, and 27.73%, respectively. Top 
performing managers, therefore, are capable of retaining their positions. On the 
other hand, bottom ranked funds seem to have more difficulty in being promoted 
to higher ranking groups.  
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Table 3.10 Segment rank transition matrix 
Panel A           
Current Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0.1930 0.1004 0.1471 0.0786 0.1085 0.0639 0.1239 0.0643 0.0497 0.0710 
2 0.1012 0.1513 0.1059 0.1329 0.0911 0.0856 0.0826 0.1078 0.0744 0.0678 
3 0.1342 0.1083 0.0764 0.1333 0.1152 0.1394 0.0982 0.0721 0.0712 0.0510 
4 0.0807 0.0863 0.1152 0.1275 0.1378 0.1137 0.1051 0.0957 0.0832 0.0547 
5 0.0834 0.1365 0.1219 0.1113 0.0727 0.1170 0.1200 0.0927 0.0660 0.0787 
6 0.0940 0.1115 0.0940 0.0782 0.1169 0.0971 0.1173 0.1257 0.0838 0.0814 
7 0.0673 0.0949 0.1151 0.0799 0.1339 0.0847 0.1099 0.1108 0.1151 0.0887 
8 0.0990 0.0528 0.0782 0.0961 0.0965 0.0864 0.0814 0.1158 0.1623 0.1313 
9 0.0999 0.0984 0.0651 0.0733 0.0948 0.1187 0.0736 0.1034 0.1370 0.1362 
10 0.1021 0.0566 0.0567 0.0746 0.0486 0.0670 0.0635 0.1027 0.1417 0.2869 
Panel B           
Current Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0.1806 0.1055 0.1415 0.0992 0.0831 0.1071 0.0874 0.0601 0.0646 0.0711 
2 0.1002 0.1512 0.0740 0.0941 0.1477 0.0991 0.0879 0.105 0.0859 0.0548 
3 0.1071 0.115 0.1571 0.0796 0.1138 0.0809 0.1096 0.0852 0.0686 0.0829 
4 0.0814 0.0952 0.0908 0.1684 0.0837 0.1543 0.1137 0.0729 0.0778 0.0618 
5 0.1030 0.1152 0.1339 0.1323 0.1083 0.0854 0.0786 0.1055 0.0845 0.0531 
6 0.1110 0.1262 0.1018 0.0745 0.1171 0.0724 0.1057 0.1047 0.1023 0.0844 
7 0.0753 0.0641 0.0718 0.1073 0.1259 0.0959 0.1231 0.1177 0.1216 0.0971 
8 0.1216 0.0970 0.0610 0.1109 0.0755 0.1111 0.0843 0.1204 0.0986 0.1196 
9 0.0843 0.0667 0.0592 0.0633 0.0814 0.1021 0.1115 0.1072 0.1261 0.1989 
10 0.0927 0.0617 0.0822 0.0544 0.0782 0.0638 0.0744 0.1112 0.1528 0.2289 
Notes: This table reports the transition probability of the return ranks between the ranking and post-ranking periods. Funds are 
ranked in ascending order into 10 deciles compared with the mean returns from other funds in the same segment during the ranking 
period. Columns 2 to 11 report the transition probability of rank shifting for funds in each decile from the ranking period to the 
post-ranking period. Panel A reports the transition probability on a mid-year basis while Panel B considers a 7-month ranking 
period. All the figures reported here are in percentage value.    
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We then switch our attention to the transition probability of the family ranks. A 
transition matrix similar to that in Table 3.10 is developed in Table 3.11. However, 
instead of using the segment ranks, in the first column of Table 3.11 we group all 
the sample funds into 5 percentiles according to their family ranks. For example, 
the 1st percentile group contains all funds that are ranked in the bottom 20% 
within their affiliated families, while funds within the 5th percentile group are 
ranked in the top 20% by their average returns. The results are found to be similar 
to those in the transition matrix of the segment ranks. Performance of the top and 
bottom ranked funds persists over time. Funds in the 1st percentile group have a 
32.04% probability of staying in the same group and 32.44% of the funds in the 
5th percentile group will keep performing at the high level. Panel B of Table 3.11 
confirms a similar outcome.    
 
As shown in Tables 3.10 and 3.11, we use the transition probability to provide a 
general picture of funds’ performance persistence over the sample interval. 
Evidence shows that both the leading funds and the losing funds have higher 
probability to retain their positions. However, the analytics in Tables 3.10 and 
3.11 take no consideration of managers’ possible risk shifting. HSZ argue that if 
risk taking brings no improvement to funds’ performance, the motivation left 
could be driven by either inferior ability or the agency problem. But, compared 
with the segment tournament, funds in family tournament can win the opportunity 
to gain benefits from family favouritism. Therefore, the motivation behind risk 
taking in family tournament is in line with investors’ interests. This prompts us to 
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further examine how funds’ performance responds to managers’ risk taking in 
family tournaments.  
 
Table 3.12 presents examination results of the transition probability of family ranks 
under various levels of risk shifting. In the first column we create 5 groups by 
ranking funds in ascending order according to their levels of risk shifting between 
the ranking and post-ranking periods. In the second column we further sort all funds 
by their performance into 3 percentile groups; i.e., funds in the 1st group have 
performance ranked within the bottom 33% percentile, and so on. For each risk 
shifting group Table 3.12 reports the transition probability of moving from one 
percentile to another. We use both the mean returns and the 4-factor model alphas 
  Table 3.11 Family rank transition matrix 
Panel A      
Current Percentile 1 2 3 4 5 
1 0.3204 0.2262 0.1792 0.1521 0.1223 
2 0.2117 0.2622 0.2615 0.1371 0.1277 
3 0.2078 0.1499 0.1793 0.1813 0.2820 
4 0.1602 0.2189 0.2349 0.2257 0.1602 
5 0.1327 0.1272 0.1271 0.2891 0.3244 
Panel B      
Current Percentile 1 2 3 4 5 
1 0.3319 0.2284 0.1277 0.136 0.1763 
2 0.2055 0.2352 0.2733 0.1778 0.1082 
3 0.1854 0.1873 0.2282 0.2342 0.1653 
4 0.1993 0.1889 0.1584 0.2184 0.2352 
5 0.115 0.1431 0.1947 0.222 0.3255 
Notes: This table reports the probability of return rank transition between the ranking and 
post-ranking periods. Fund families are ranked in ascending order into 5 deciles according to 
their value weighted family returns during the ranking period. Columns 2 to 6 report the 
transition probability of rank shifting in each decile from the ranking period to the 
post-ranking period. Panel A reports the transition probability on a middle year basis while in 
Panel B a 7 month period is considered for the ranking period. All values reported in the table 
are in percentage. 
113 
 
Chapter 3 Fund family tournament and performance consequences 
to evaluate funds’ performance. It comes as no surprise that, once again, relative 
performance of the top and bottom ranked funds in the same family persists over 
time.  
 
Moreover, Table 3.12 suggests that the transition probability of top ranked funds 
reduces with the increase in risk altering. Of the sample funds, 58.5% of the top 
funds stay in the same percentile group when the magnitude of changes in the risk 
taking level is low. This percentage value decreases to 50% when risk changes are 
more substantial. However, the opposite result is found when performance is 
estimated with the 4-factor model alpha. In the last column of Table 3.12 the 
transition probability in the 1st RS group increases from 48% to 58.7%, an increase 
of 10%. This gives some supportive evidence that risk shifting can lead to the 
promotion/demotion of family ranks.  
 
Taking Jensen alphas as indication of managers’ stock selection ability, the raw 
returns contain information about the performance that certain funds may deliver. 
Unlike the risk taking in segment tournaments, in family tournaments none of the 
performance measures show any improvement after altering the risk exposure. We 
believe that risk shifting could be an indication of managers’ superior ability. Since 
top managers may already be rewarded by the fund company after mid-year ranking, 
funds may therefore profitably utilise the information advantage to purchase more 
under-priced stocks or increase portfolio concentration.  
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Equities that may have helped funds gain a top ranking are normally funds’ major 
holdings, although they could experience mean reversion in their returns during the 
second half of the year. It is then expensive for the funds to ditch these holdings, 
and this is especially so for large funds, as they are more likely to engage in family 
tournaments. In addition, the agency problem could be another reason for funds to 
close those long positions. On the other hand, no clear trend is detected in our 
empirical investigation of bottom ranked funds improving their ranking by 
increasing the risk taking, consistent with our earlier analysis showing that 
mid-year losers are not actively involved in family tournaments.  
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Table 3.12 Risk shifting and post-ranking performance transition 
RS 
ranking 
Current 
percentile Raw returns 4-factor alphas 
  1 2 3 1 2 3 
1 1 0.4824 0.3978 0.1193 0.5779 0.3201 0.1021 
 2 0.2443 0.6279 0.1281 0.2668 0.6340 0.0999 
 3 0.1375 0.2763 0.5849 0.1634 0.3576 0.4800 
 
2 1 0.4021 0.4543 0.1444 0.4582 0.3754 0.1671 
 2 0.1855 0.6687 0.1442 0.1500 0.6957 0.1543 
 3 0.1500 0.3421 0.5079 0.1825 0.3459 0.4712 
 
3 1 0.4642 0.4113 0.1253 0.4453 0.4374 0.1182 
 2 0.1411 0.7214 0.1379 0.1258 0.7174 0.1561 
 3 0.1787 0.2737 0.5474 0.1467 0.2947 0.5579 
 
4 1 0.3821 0.4406 0.1762 0.3813 0.4432 0.1752 
 2 0.1342 0.6945 0.1713 0.1314 0.7121 0.1565 
 3 0.1834 0.3755 0.4400 0.1287 0.4048 0.4656 
 
5 1 0.4600 0.4442 0.0969 0.5086 0.3624 0.1292 
 2 0.1921 0.6637 0.1464 0.1553 0.6816 0.1628 
 3 0.1733 0.3268 0.5000 0.1382 0.2748 0.5873 
Notes: This table shows mean performance of the funds subsequent to risk shifting. In Column 1, all sample funds are ranked in 
ascending order in terms of the magnitude of risk shifting, leading to the formation of 5 groups. In Column 2, funds in each of the risk 
shifting groups are further ranked into 3 groups in ascending order based on their mean returns in the first half of the year. The 
subsequent family performance is then calculated for each of the risk shifting groups and for the corresponding return ranking groups. 
Columns 3 to 8 report the transition probability of each percentile’s rank shifting between the ranking period and the post-ranking 
period. The post-ranking performance is measured by funds’ mean returns and funds’ alphas estimated from the Carhart 4 factors model. 
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3.5.4 Performance comparison in family tournaments  
Despite the evidence of top funds’ performance persistence after risk shifting, it 
remains to be seen whether such funds can outperform their peers in the same 
family. To answer this question, in this section we compare the performance 
between the mid-year winners and losers under different levels of risk shifting. The 
results are reported in Tables 3.13 to 3.15. 
 
In the first column of Table 3.13, we sort funds into 5 groups (RS group) according 
to their levels of risk shifting. The funds are then classified into the winner and loser 
groups according to their mid-year performance. Performance of the funds is 
measured by the mean returns, the CAPM alphas, the 3-factor alphas and the 
4-factor alphas. In Panel A where the funds’ segment ranks are used to sort 
winner/loser groups, we find that the losing funds cannot outperform the winning 
ones for all evaluation measures when their risk taking is at a low level. The mean 
returns from the winning group exceed those of the losing group by 3.74%, 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Similar results can be drawn when the 
Jensen alpha measure is used. However, the winning funds cannot beat the losing 
ones when they take more risk, since the performance differences between the two 
groups are not statistically significant for the 5th RS group. Recalling the results in 
Table 2, where the mid-year losers tend to increase their risk exposure more than 
the winners in segment tournaments, the performance consequences of funds’ risk 
shifting, however, suggest that it does not make sense for the losing funds to take 
extra risks. Therefore, winner’s risk increasing cannot but be an indication of 
inferior ability or a sign of the agency problem (see similar argument in HSZ). 
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In Panel B of Table 3.13, family ranks are used to sort funds into winning and 
losing groups. We find similar results, that mid-year winners outperform the losers 
in the 1st RS group. However, at a higher level of risk shifting, Table 3.13 shows a 
mixed result between performance measures based on raw returns and Jensen 
alphas. Specifically, mid-year losers can beat the winners in terms of observed 
returns, but underperform them in Jensen alpha. The difference is -5.34% in returns 
and 3.59% in CAPM alpha; both are significant at the 1% level. Such differences 
become smaller when the 3-factor and 4-factor alphas are considered, but remain 
statistically significant. Certainly, winners’ underperformance could be due to 
mean revision in their main holdings’ returns. In Table 3.6, our results have already 
shown that increasing portfolios’ market beta can be a channel of risk shifting. Fund 
managers may deliberately select large-cap equities with good past performance, or 
keep the position of their original holdings to maintain their leading positions. But 
those equities might not perform persistently, which can lower the overall returns of 
the winners.  
 
On the other hand, the higher value of Jensen alphas delivered by the mid-year 
winners implies that those managers possess superior stock selection abilities so 
that they are able to re-construct their portfolios by picking up more under-priced 
stocks. Meanwhile, judging by the increasing magnitude of alphas obtained from 
the 3-factor model and the 4-factor model, it is plausible that managers’ superior 
ability is not attributable to increased holdings of the size and book to market 
portfolio, or the momentum portfolio.  
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In addition, Panel B shows that the mid-year losers tend to keep their risk at a stable 
level to mimic the performance of the winners, which may explain why the 
performance differences between the winner and loser groups are the smallest. HSZ 
find the similar result that funds with more stable risk levels exhibit the best 
performance. In a strategic tournament, mid-year winners show risk taking 
behaviour similar to that of the mid-year losers, since the winning funds now have 
more access to new capital to manipulate their portfolios. The performance 
improvement in terms of the Jensen alphas following changes in the risk taking 
indicates the superior stock selection ability of the winning managers. But when the 
magnitude of the risk shifting decreases, the winners lose their competitive edge; 
hence both winners and losers reduce to adopt a similar investment strategy, and so 
no performance consequence is shown here. However, in the 1st RS group, where 
the risk shifting is limited in magnitude or even changes to take on less rather than 
more risk exposure, mid-year losers still cannot outperform the winners, for the 
reason that the winners can liquidate some of their holdings to lock on the cash 
profits (see for example HSZ). 
 
Table 3.14 reports the results when the 7-5 interval is used for the tournament 
analysis. The results are similar to those of Table 3.13. In Panel A, the winning 
funds manage to outperform the losing ones in a segment tournament when 
changes in the level of risk exposure are extremely low. In Panel B, when funds’ 
performance is measured by the raw returns or estimates of the CAPM alphas, we 
find the same supportive results of performance improvements for the winner funds 
when extra risks are taken. But the performance differences become statistically 
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insignificant when using the Jensen alphas estimated from the 3-factor and 4-factor 
models. It follows that the winning funds may engage in portfolio reconstruction 
only immediately after the mid-year ranking is made as a response to the family 
tournament. In other words, the risk taking behaviour in a family tournament is 
more likely to take place on a mid-year basis.  
 
Table 3.15 further extends the investigation to examine the risk taking behaviour at 
the level of a fund family. We create one portfolio for each of the families by using 
value weighted returns of the funds within the same family. Then we estimate the 
portfolios’ alphas and the mean returns as measures of the families’ overall 
performance. Unlike the results found for individual funds, no significant 
improvement in the family performance can be identified. In the previous analysis 
of the whole family tournament, we find that families’ total risk taking is not 
closely related to their overall performance ranks. Results in Table 3.15 further 
confirm that the risk taking by a certain member of a family is not necessarily 
beneficial to the performance of the whole family, since the fund company might 
re-allocate resources from the losing fund to the leading funds that it favours.  
 
Our performance consequences analysis documents a mixed relation between the 
performance differences and risk taking. Mid-year winners outperform the losing 
ones by keeping their risk exposure in a low level. But the performance gap in fund 
alphas decreases and even reversed in observed returns if they take more risk in the 
second half of the year. 
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Table 3.13 Post fund ranking performance (6-6) 
Panel A Raw returns  CAPM alphas  FF alphas  Carhart alphas 
RS Winner Loser W-L  Winner Loser W-L  Winner Loser W-L  Winner Loser W-L 
1 0.0355 -0.0019 0.0374***  -0.0003 -0.0271 0.0267**  0.0183 -0.0002 0.0185***  0.0279 0.0025 0.0254*** 
   (0.0097)    (2.091)    (2.7140)    (3.4388) 
2 0.0231 0.0364 -0.0132  0.0005 0.0104 -0.0099  0.0383 0.0370 0.0013  0.0452 0.0419 0.0033 
   (-0.9775)    (-1.0527)    (0.2403)    (0.5689) 
3 0.0166 0.0351 -0.0185*  0.0001 0.0101 -0.0010*  0.0424 0.0405 0.0018  0.0486 0.0480 0.0006 
   (-1.4556)    (-1.2248)    (0.3282)    (0.1027) 
4 0.0370 0.0166 0.0203**  0.0080 0.0006 0.0074  0.0465 0.0459 0.0005  0.0526 0.0526 0.0000 
   (1.6038)    (0.4418)    (0.0924)    (0.0005) 
5 0.0230 0.0153 0.0076  0.0067 0.0006 0.0062  0.0478 0.0476 0.0002  0.0554 0.0547 0.0008 
   (0.5262)    (0.6118)    (0.0363)    (0.1092)                 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 3.13 Post fund ranking performance (6-6) (Continued) 
Panel B Raw returns  CAPM alphas  FF alphas  Carhart alphas 
RS Winner Loser W-L  Winner Loser W-L  Winner Loser W-L  Winner Loser W-L 
1 0.0601 -0.0108 0.0710***  0.0176 -0.0337 0.0513***  0.0202 0.0031 0.0171***  0.0305 0.0069 0.0236*** 
   (4.5187)    (4.0839)    (0.0062)    (3.1898) 
2 0.0378 0.0217 0.0161  0.0083 0.0024 0.0060  0.0366 0.0387 -0.0021  0.0424 0.0447 -0.0023 
   (1.1902)    (0.6350)    (-0.3899)    (-0.4055) 
3 0.0243 0.0277 -0.0034  0.0040 0.0065 -0.0025  0.0424 0.0406 0.0019  0.0486 0.0480 0.0006 
   (-0.2638)    (-0.3043)    (0.3348)    (0.1034) 
4 0.0278 0.0236 0.0042  0.0076 0.0088 -0.0012  0.0410 0.0508 -0.0098**  0.0457 0.0588 -0.0132** 
   (0.3287)    (-0.1716)    (-1.7245)    (-2.1958) 
5 -0.0120 0.0414 -0.0534***  0.0186 -0.0173 0.0359***  0.0527 0.0440 0.0086**  0.0601 0.0513 0.0088** 
   (-3.6902)    (3.5781)    (1.7025)    (1.6651)                 
Notes: This table presents funds’ mean performance subsequent to risk shifting on a half year basis. In Column 1, funds are ranked in ascending order to form 5 groups based on the 
magnitude of risk shifting. Funds are further sorted into the winner (loser) group if their half year performance is higher (lower) than the median performance. Panel A reports the 
results when a segment rank is considered, while family rank is considered in Panel B. The subsequent fund performance is calculated for each of the risk shifting groups and the 
corresponding winner and loser groups. The differences between the winner and loser groups are presented for each type of performance evaluation, with t statistics in brackets. All 
results reported are in percentage values. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Table 3.14 Post fund ranking performance (7-5) 
Panel A Raw returns  CAPM alphas  FF alphas  Carhart alphas 
RS Winner Loser W-L  Winner Loser W-L  Winner Loser W-L  Winner Loser W-L 
1 0.0384 -0.0101 0.0485***  0.0056 -0.0334 0.0390***  0.0202 0.0024 0.0178***  0.0258 0.0071 0.0187*** 
   (3.1484)    (3.0688)    (2.6831)    (2.5370) 
2 0.0343 0.0298 0.0045  0.0074 0.0072 0.0002  0.0420 0.0389 0.0031  0.0460 0.0454 0.0006 
   (0.3498)    (0.0187)    (0.5206)    (0.0897) 
3 0.0251 0.0347 -0.0096  0.0014 0.0123 -0.0109*  0.0460 0.0411 0.0049  0.0524 0.0459 0.0065 
   (-0.8053)    (-1.2877)    (0.8053)    (1.0068) 
4 0.0316 0.0307 0.0008  0.0138 0.0110 0.0028  0.0519 0.0525 -0.0006  0.0587 0.0577 0.0010 
   (0.0690)    (0.3625)    (-0.1036)    (0.1546) 
5 0.0240 0.0251 -0.0011  0.0106 0.0080 0.0026  0.0574 0.0493 0.0081*  0.0659 0.0556 0.0103* 
   (-0.0782)    (0.2466)    (1.2154)    (1.4723)                 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 3.14 Post fund ranking performance (7-5) (Continued) 
Panel B Raw returns  CAPM alphas  FF alphas  Carhart alphas 
RS Winner Loser W-L  Winner Loser W-L  Winner Loser W-L  Winner Loser W-L 
1 0.0642 -0.0208 0.0850***  0.0257 -0.0414 0.0672***  0.0233 0.0039 0.0193***  0.0297 0.0082 0.0215*** 
   (5.7264)    (5.4797)    (2.9594)    (2.9591) 
2 0.0401 0.0256 0.0145*  0.0111 0.0044 0.0067  0.0399 0.0408 -0.0008  0.0437 0.0473 -0.0036 
   (1.1271)    (0.7252)    (-0.1414)    (-0.5535) 
3 0.0292 0.0311 -0.0019  0.0035 0.0103 -0.0068  0.0422 0.0444 -0.0022  0.0481 0.0497 -0.0016 
   (-0.1574)    (-0.8003)    (-0.3573)    (-0.2448) 
4 0.0025 0.0371 -0.0121  0.0060 0.0184 -0.0124**  0.0506 0.0538 -0.0032  0.0551 0.0611 -0.0059 
   (-1.0123)    (-1.6070)    (-0.5457)    (-0.9408) 
5 -0.0075 0.0489 -0.0563***  0.0260 -0.0013 0.0390***  0.0558 0.0510 0.0047  0.0635 0.0581 0.0055 
   (-4.0016)    (3.7230)    (0.7045)    (0.7700)                 
Notes: This table presents the funds’ mean performance subsequent to risk shifting on a 7-5 month basis. In Column 1, funds are ranked in ascending order to form 5 groups on the 
basis of the magnitude of risk shifting. Funds are further sorted into the winner (loser) group if their 7-month mean performance is higher (lower) than the median performance. 
Panel A reports the results when a segment rank is considered, while family rank is considered in Panel B. The subsequent fund performance is calculated for each of the risk shifting 
groups and the corresponding winner and loser groups. The differences between the winner and loser groups are presented for each type of performance evaluation, with t statistics in 
brackets. All results reported are in percentage values.  ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Table 3.15 Post family ranking performance 
Panel A Raw returns  CAPM alphas  FF alphas  Carhart alphas 
RS Winner Loser W-L  Winner Loser W-L  Winner Loser W-L  Winner Loser W-L 
1 0.0239 0.0023 0.0013  -0.0013 0.0021 -0.0034  0.0247 0.0295 -0.0048  0.0237 0.0291 -0.0054 
   (0.0427)    (-0.1614)    (-0.4350)    (-0.4883) 
2 0.0272 0.0232 0.0040  0.0002 0.0040 -0.0038  0.0341 0.0308 0.0034  0.0345 0.0307 0.0038 
   (0.1489)    (-0.2205)    (0.3278)    (0.3697) 
3 0.0296 0.0237 0.0059  0.0051 0.0062 -0.0011  0.0357 0.0486 -0.0129*  0.0362 0.0468 -0.0106 
   (0.2177)    (-0.0709)    (-1.2868)    (-1.0145) 
4 0.0306 0.0151 0.0155  0.0110 -0.0023 0.0133  0.0445 0.0443 0.0002  0.0452 0.0437 0.0015 
   (0.5716)    (0.8253)    (0.0164)    (0.1289) 
5 0.0154 0.0151 0.0004  -0.0016 -0.0032 0.0016  0.0349 0.0045 -0.0102  0.0356 0.0456 -0.0010 
   (0.0113)    (0.0727)    (-0.6655)    (-0.6291)                 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 3.15 Post family ranking performance (Continued) 
Panel B Raw returns  CAPM alphas  FF alphas  Carhart alphas 
RS Winner Loser W-L  Winner Loser W-L  Winner Loser W-L  Winner Loser W-L 
1 0.0430 0.0006 0.0424**  0.0120 -0.0151 0.0271*  0.0255 0.0309 -0.0054  0.0219 0.0319 -0.0100 
   (1.5279)    (1.3100)    (-0.5015)    (-0.9193) 
2 0.0411 0.0218 0.0193  0.0087 0.0071 0.0017  0.0315 0.0428 -0.0113  0.0309 0.0418 -0.0109 
   (0.7714)    (0.0984)    (-0.9372)    (-0.8721) 
3 0.0243 0.0390 -0.0147  -0.0007 0.0137 -0.0144  0.0385 0.0449 -0.0064  0.0393 0.0422 -0.0030 
   (-0.5824)    (-0.8845)    (-0.6031)    (-0.2709) 
4 0.0287 0.0255 0.0032  0.0078 0.0078 0.0000  0.0477 0.0477 0.0000  0.0474 0.0475 -0.0001 
   (0.1305)    (-0.0007)    (-0.0041)    (-0.0080) 
5 0.0118 0.0387 -0.0269  0.0033 0.0108 -0.0075  0.0526 0.0460 0.0067  0.0539 0.0462 0.0077 
   (-0.8611)    (-0.3144)    (0.4180)    (0.4700)                 
Notes: This table presents the mean performance of fund families subsequent to risk shifting. In Column 1, families are ranked in ascending order to form 5 groups on the basis of 
the magnitude of risk shifting. Fund families are further sorted into the winner (loser) group if their half-year performance is higher (lower) than the median performance. Panel A 
reports the results when risk shifting is on a half year basis, while a 7-5 month risk shifting is considered in Panel B. The subsequent family performance is calculated for each of the 
risk shifting groups and the corresponding winner and loser groups. The differences between the winner and loser groups are presented for each type of performance evaluation, with 
t statistics in brackets. All results reported are in percentage values. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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We find strong negative correlation between performance consequences and the 
risk shifting in relation to the systematic risk. Table 3.16 reports the results. 
Rather than the mixed relation found in the previous table, Panels A and B of 
Table 3.16 indicate that the average fund performance decreases monotonically 
when taking more systematic risk. For example, the return difference between the 
winner and loser group is 3.88 basis points in the 1st RS group but decreases to 
-2.47 basis points in the 5th RS group. The performance difference in terms of the 
Carhart alphas also decreases from 2 to -0.93 basis points. Similar results can be 
found in Panel B. We therefore argue that the performance improvement found in 
the family tournament in the previous analysis cannot be attributed to the 
increased exposure to systematic risk, since a positive relation is documented in 
previous analysis, suggesting that winning funds tend to increase their market beta 
in the second half of the year. As mentioned before, an increase in the systematic 
risk is an indication of the enlargement of the holdings of stocks that have heavy 
weight in the market index. Despite the efforts of winning managers to shift 
portfolio composition to absorb more highly valued equities, mean revision of the 
returns of these stocks can demote winners’ leading positions. 
 
Results in Panels C and D do not show a clear pattern in the relation between 
performance consequences and the level of change in the idiosyncratic risks. This 
finding also confirms the previous results, whereby no significant changes in 
idiosyncratic risk take place in response to funds’ family ranks.  
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Table 3.16 Post-ranking risk characteristics 
Panel A Raw returns  Carhart alphas 
Beta RS Winner Loser W-L  Winner Loser W-L 
1 0.0531 0.0143 0.0388***  0.0587 0.0386 0.0200*** 
   (3.1879)    (3.1080) 
2 0.0328 0.0221 0.0107  0.0430 0.0433 -0.0003 
   (0.6057)    (-0.0326) 
3 0.0496 0.0096 0.0400***  0.0514 0.0412 0.0102* 
   (2.4643)    (1.4653) 
4 0.0177 0.0314 -0.0231  0.0442 0.0409 0.0033 
   (-0.8518)    (0.4735) 
5 0.0100 0.0348 -0.0247**  0.0373 0.0466 -0.0093* 
   (-1.9387)    (-1.6248) 
        
Panel B Raw returns  Carhart alphas 
Beta RS Winner Loser W-L  Winner Loser W-L 
1 0.0589 0.0183 0.0407***  0.0499 0.0490 0.0009 
   (3.3941)    (0.1275) 
2 0.0406 0.0124 0.0281***  0.0498 0.0384 0.0114* 
   (1.7062)    (1.4163) 
3 0.0265 0.0287 -0.0022  0.0463 0.0413 0.0050 
   (-0.1388)    (0.6551) 
4 0.0363 0.0249 0.0114  0.0052 0.0510 0.0006 
   (0.7625)    (0.0746) 
5 0.0112 0.0474 -0.0362***  0.0449 0.0414 0.0035 
   (-2.9690)    (0.5826) 
        
(Continued on next page) 
 
 
128 
 
Chapter 3 Fund family tournament and performance consequences 
 
Table 3.16 Post-ranking risk characteristics (Continued) 
Panel C Raw returns  Carhart alphas 
Idio RS Winner Loser W-L  Winner Loser W-L 
1 0.0210 0.0257 -0.0047  0.0428 0.0394 0.0035 
   (-0.3663)    (0.5746) 
2 0.0480 0.0130 0.0350**  0.0373 0.0472 -0.0010 
   (2.0467)    (-1.1615) 
3 0.0250 0.0267 -0.0017  0.0454 0.0412 0.0042 
   (-0.1045)    (0.6510) 
4 0.0251 0.0169 0.0082  0.0462 0.0363 0.0099* 
   (0.5124)    (1.4110) 
5 0.0287 0.0149 0.0138  0.0486 0.0437 0.0049 
   (1.1038)    (0.7829) 
        
Panel D Raw returns  Carhart alphas 
Idio RS Winner Loser W-L  Winner Loser W-L 
1 0.0269 0.0271 -0.0003  0.0398 0.0451 -0.0052 
   (-0.0200)    (-0.8219) 
2 0.0338 0.0243 0.0094  0.0386 0.0532 -0.0146** 
   (0.5925)    (-1.6336) 
3 0.0273 0.0278 -0.0005  0.0416 0.0451 -0.0036 
   (-0.0341)    (-0.5169) 
4 0.0267 0.0269 -0.0002  0.0579 0.0299 0.0280*** 
   (-0.0122)    (3.8324) 
5 0.0347 0.0144 0.0203***  0.0516 0.0451 0.0066 
   (1.6979)    (0.9977) 
        
Notes: This table presents the fund performance subsequent to risk shifting in terms of the 
systematic and the idiosyncratic risks. In Column 1, funds are ranked in ascending order to form 
5 groups according to the magnitude of risk shifting. Panels A and B (C and D) report the results 
based on sorting by systematic risk (idiosyncratic risk) on a 6-6 and 7-5 basis, respectively. 
Funds are further sorted into the winner (loser) group if their performance is higher (lower) than 
the median performance of the family. The subsequent fund performance is calculated for each 
of the risk shifting groups and the corresponding winner and loser groups. The differences 
between the winner and loser groups are presented for each type of performance evaluation, 
with t statistics in brackets. All results reported are in percentage values. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Previous literature suggests that fund families may increase cross-sectional volatility of 
funds returns to increase the probability of creating star funds. Given the spillover 
effects of fund flows and the disproportionate response of cash inflows to funds’ 
historical performance, fund families have incentives to encourage risk taking in 
family tournaments. This requires us to further examine the performance consequences 
with respect to the efforts by the fund family to promote risk taking. 
 
Table 3.17 documents a strong relation between the performance improvement and the 
increase in cross-sectional risks within the fund family. Specifically, dog families are 
found to significantly increase their cross-sectional total risks to improve performance 
ranking of their underlying funds. For example, the coefficients on  are 
4.174, 2.391, 4.005 and 3.225 when fund performance is estimated by the mean returns, 
CAPM alphas, FF alphas and Carhart alphas, respectively. All of them are significant 
and the performance consequences respond positively. These results suggest that 
families with extremely underperforming funds are strongly motivated to promote risk 
taking of their underlying funds. Moreover, we also find some evidence to support a 
close relation between the increase of cross-sectional idiosyncratic risks and the 
probability of funds in the dog families being promoted, i.e.  has a 
coefficient equal to 1.189 when mean returns are considered for ranking, and this 
increases to 1.264 and 1.260 when FF alphas or Carhart alphas are used. Dog families 
contain funds that are ranked in the bottom 10% of the segment and none of their 
members have top performance. Therefore, they are motivated to undertake various 
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strategies to create stars. Despite this, our results in Table 3.17 imply that dog families 
improve performance of a certain member by sacrificing the profits of others. In 
addition to funds’ total risk, changes in cross-sectional idiosyncratic risk can also be a 
channel to improve performance. Thus, fund families may increase industrial 
concentration in the holdings of a certain fund and diversify the holdings of others to 
bet on the market.  
 
However, we find only weak evidence to suggest such a strategy in the star families. 
For example, the coefficients on  are in lower values, equalling to 1.351 
when raw returns are used and 1.321 when Carhart alphas are used for measurement of 
the performance, and only significant at the 10% significance level. It is plausible that 
the star funds are already rewarded with increased cash inflows, which can also benefit 
other peer funds for their performance enhancement.  
 
Table 3.17 also documents a significant relation between performance improvement 
and the shifting funds’ idiosyncratic risk, which is consistent with previous results. But 
it seems to have lesser power in explaining the aggregated rank promotion compared 
with the contribution made by the changes in cross-sectional risk. Moreover, no 
conclusive evidence can be found that shifting of the systematic risk exposure is related 
to the increases in the aggregate performance ranks. 
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Table 3.17 Aggregate family ranks analysis 
Odds ratio Raw returns CAPM alphas FF alphas Carhart alphas 
 0.5823** 0.8432** 0.7879** 0.6332* 
(-2.01) (-2.14) (-2.33) (-1.72) 
 1.3513* 1.3000* 1.4057* 1.3210* 
(1.64) (1.61) (1.72) (1.61) 
 4.1746*** 2.3906** 4.0048*** 3.2247** 
(3.08) (2.01) (2.94) (2.52) 
 0.8541 0.9473 0.8273 0.8463 
(-0.91) (-0.32) (-1.04) (-0.92) 
 1.0000 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 
(-0.06) (-0.54) (-0.70) (-0.82) 
 0.9999 0.9999 1.0000 0.9999 
(-1.18) (-0.72) (-0.40) (-0.53) 
 1.0000 1.0013 1.0000 1.0000 
(0.87) (0.67) (0.17) (0.43) 
 1.0026 0.9847 0.9979 1.0213 
(0.04) (-0.21) (-0.02) (0.28) 
 1.1889* 1.1846* 1.2642*** 1.2100** 
(1.89) (1.86) (2.64) (2.20) 
 0.9141 0.9428 0.9844 0.9908 
(-1.21) (-0.85) (-0.24) (-0.13) 
     
 26.90 14.61 25.29 21.22 
Obs. 534 534 534 534 
Notes: This table presents the odds ratios from the post-ranking performance analysis of 
model (3.2). Fund families are ranked according to performance changes of the underlying 
members. Fund performance is estimated by four evaluation measures: the raw total returns, 
the CAPM alphas, the Fama French alphas and the Carhart alphas. ,  and  
are the cross sectional risk difference on funds’ total risk, the systematic risk and the 
idiosyncratic risk between the ranking and post-ranking period, respectively.  is the 
family rank that measures the level of risk shifting for individual funds within the family.  
( ) is equal to 1(0) when the family is a star (dog) family.  is equal to 1 if the 
family has both star and dog funds and 0 otherwise. The model is fitted by the ordinal logistic 
model. The z statistics are shown in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10%. 
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3.5.5 Cross-fund subsidisation in family tournament  
In this section, we examine the fund family’s strategy of cross-fund subsidisation. 
The above research documents that mid-year winners outperform the losers in the 
risk-adjusted returns by increasing their risk exposure, but the situation reverses when 
it turns to observed returns. We argue that it might be due to managers’ intention to 
signal the fund family about their superior skills in order to gain additional resource 
from the fund family. Gaspar et al. (2006) suggests an empirical method to test the 
strategy of family’s cross-fund subsidisation which can be considered as the major 
channel for the family to promote their favourite funds. To address our concerns 
regarding to the family favouritism as the reward of higher risk-adjusted returns, we 
modify their method to rank funds according to their Carhart alphas for each month. 
Funds ranked above the 25th and 75th percentile are formed as the Low and High 
value group, respectively. We then construct two sets of High/Low value pairs. In the 
actual pair, each of the funds in the High value group is matched with a fund within 
the same family but in the Low value group. In the second set of the High/Low value 
pairs, the matching pairs, each of the low value funds in the actual pairs is replaced 
by a random selected fund within the same ranking percentile as the original low 
value fund but from a different fund family. The return differences between the High 
and Low value funds for each pair then act as the dependant variable. The empirical 
model can be shown as following:  
                      (3.5)                                      
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where  and  are the dummy variables that takes the value of 1 when 
funds within the pair belong to the same family or the same investment style, 
respectively. If the family does subsidise the managers with superior skill, we expect 
that the same-family dummy is positively related with the return differences.  
 
The results from model (3.5) are reported in Table 3.18. It is suggested that fund 
family conduct significant cross-fund subsidisation by shifting performance from 
high alpha funds to low alpha funds after the mid-year. For example, in Panel A the 
coefficient of the family dummy suggests that the return difference between the 
High/Low value funds of the same family is on average 0.82% higher than funds in 
matching pairs. However, we find opposite results when turning to the first half of the 
year in Panel A. In Panel C we further examine the cross-fund subsidisation on a 
monthly basis. We find that the family subsidisation is more pronounced in the 
second half of the year when most of the coefficients of the same-family dummy is 
positive and significant from 0.  
 
The above findings support our view regarding the motivation of managers’ risk 
taking in the family tournament. Specifically, funds with high risk-adjusted returns 
gain benefits through the cross-fund subsidisation which can drive managers’ 
intention of active trading. The results also indicate that the fund family consider 
managers’ skill as the major criteria in judging which fund to be promoted.  
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Table 3.18 Cross-fund subsidisation 
Panel A (1st half year)  Intercept   
Coeff.  0.1027*** -0.0325*** 0.0438*** 
t-Stat.  (22.62) (-6.01) (7.85) 
Adjusted   0.16   
Panel B (2nd half year)  Intercept   
Coeff.  0.0082*** 0.0082** -0.0090** 
t-Stat.  (2.20) (1.99) (-2.00) 
Adjusted   0.09   
Panel C (Monthly)  Intercept   
Feb.  0.1137*** -0.0170* 0.0515*** 
  (14.85) (-1.87) (5.58) 
Mar.  0.1721*** -0.1437*** 0.0279* 
  (15.67) (-10.57) (1.93) 
Apr.  0.0405*** -0.0184 0.0520*** 
  (3.41) (-1.29) (3.52) 
May  0.0621*** 0.0341*** 0.0450*** 
  (9.94) (4.69) (6.05) 
Jun.  0.0068 0.0557*** -0.0270*** 
  (0.97) (6.84) (-3.27) 
Jul.  -0.1491*** 0.1536*** -0.0462*** 
  (-16.30) (13.78) (-4.04) 
Aug.  -0.0749*** -0.0161 0.0215** 
  (-9.94) (-1.74) (2.26) 
Sep.  0.2225*** -0.2045*** 0.0224* 
  (19.29) (-15.23) (1.64) 
Oct.  -0.0140* 0.0315*** 0.0230** 
  (-1.78) (3.29) (2.31) 
Nov.  -0.0184** 0.0268*** -0.0359*** 
  (-2.52) (3.29) (-4.40) 
Dec.  0.0137* 0.0368*** 0.0107 
  (1.64) (3.61) (0.98) 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from the test of cross-fund subsidisation. For each 
month, we rank all the funds in ascending orders according to their Carhart alphas, and funds within 
the 25th percentile (75th percentile) are formed to be the Low (High) value fund groups. The 
comparison peer group is all the funds in the same style. We then construct two sets of High/Low 
value pairs, namely, the actual pair and the matching pair. In the actual pair, each of the funds in the 
High value group is matched with a fund of the same family but in the Low value group. In the 
matching pair, each of the Low value funds in the actual pair is substituted with a fund taken from 
the same ranking percentile but within a different fund family. The return difference is then computed 
in the month following the ranking month.  is the dummy variable which equals to 1 when 
the paired funds are in the same fund family.  is the same style dummy that takes a value of 1 
when the paired funds are within the same investment style. Panel A reports the results when we only 
consider the subsidisation in the first half of the year while Panel B reports the results from the 
second half of the year. In Panel C we report the results from the monthly regression. Funds’ daily 
returns from 3 UK IMA segments, UK All Companies, UK Equity Income and UK Small 
Companies, are examined for the sample years between 2001 and 2010. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
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3.6 Conclusions  
In this research, we analyse the risk taking behaviour in fund family tournaments, and 
the performance consequences. Using the data from UK unit trusts, our research 
documents a significant risk taking behaviour in the family tournaments. The 
half-year winning funds in the family are likely to take more risks than their peers in 
the same family. On the other hand, winning managers would consider adopting 
similar risk taking strategies as the losers, since they have competitive advantages 
over the losers, such as more capital injection and family favouritism. We further 
examine the relation between the half-year performance and changes in funds’ taking 
of other types of risk. The results show that the winning funds tend to increase their 
systematic risk in the second half of the year. We argue that this is because those 
winners want to retain their positions by maintaining or increasing their holdings of 
high value and index linked equities to mimic the market.  
 
We also analyse that how risk shifting is related to different incentive. By classifying 
the sampled years into bear and bull market condition, we find a positive relation 
better risk taking and previous performance in the bear market when mid-year losers 
are more concerned about their jobs rather than compensation. And such a correlation 
is more pronounced than the situation in bull market when compensation incentive is 
dominant. 
 
We then conduct further analysis on the performance consequences of risk shifting. 
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Results show a strong relation between risk taking and performance changes. Our 
results regarding to the observed returns are consistent with the previous research in 
which increasing risk is accompanied with performance drop. But when turning to the 
risk-adjusted performance, risk shifting is positively correlated to funds’ performance. 
Given that the half-year winners will increase their taking of systematic risk, the 
deterioration in funds’ observed returns seems due to the mean revision of high value 
equities in portfolio holdings. When risk-adjusted performance is considered, the 
winning funds outperform the losing ones in the post-ranking period. We argue this is 
due to managers’ intention to show off their skills in order to gain further 
subsidisation from the fund family. Our empirical results from the test of families’ 
cross-fund subsidisation support this view. In addition, no evidence is found that the 
increasing of the systematic risk or the idiosyncratic risk can lead to a strong 
performance improvement. 
 
Our analysis shows that the families that have extremely poor performing funds in 
their groups would manage to promote segment ranks of most of their underlying 
funds by increasing the cross-sectional volatility in both total and idiosyncratic risks. 
This implies that the fund family may sacrifice the profits of certain members to 
benefit the others, given the disproportionate responses in cash inflows and the 
spillover effect. Our research thus provides empirical evidence on effects of family 
tournaments and performance shifting. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
INVESTORS LEARNING AND MUTUAL 
FUND FAMILY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Information from the fund family can provide additional insight when evaluating the 
performance of its underlying funds. It is often the case that funds affiliated to the 
same fund family share the same investment adviser. Fund family and the fund 
manager combined contribute to returns gained by a certain fund. The family can 
influence the performance of the individual funds not only from the administration 
perspective, but also in terms of the quality of analysis and information flows (Baks, 
2003). Meanwhile, the fund family conducts various investment strategies to affect 
the performance of its underlying funds, for example by increasing the cross-sectional 
variability to create star funds (Nanda, Wang and Zheng, 2004); engaging in family 
tournament by encouraging funds to significantly shift their risk exposure (Kempf 
and Ruenzi, 2008); or transferring performance within the family by cross-fund 
subsidisation (Gaspar, Massa and Matos, 2006). However, standard performance 
138 
 
Chapter 4 Investor learning and mutual fund family 
evaluation literature usually examines the fund performance independently, 
neglecting the return information provided by the other parties. This research aims to 
conduct the performance evaluation procedure giving consideration to information 
provided by other funds as well as the fund family. 
 
The Bayesian framework provides the opportunity to include information other than 
funds’ historical data in the performance evaluation. Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) 
(PS hereafter) consider a seemingly unrelated model with the Bayesian estimation to 
include the correlation between the pricing factors and the other non-benchmark 
portfolios. Busse and Irvine (2006) further apply such a method in the persistence 
analysis to offer more accurate prediction of funds’ alphas. Jones and Shanken (2005) 
(JS hereafter) are the first to include return information from other funds in estimating 
funds’ alphas, by implementing a dependent prior belief in the Bayesian updating 
which is defined as cross-fund learning. They argue that in addition to the observed 
returns, significant randomness of managers’ skill also resides in the performance of a 
certain fund. Therefore, funds’ alphas can be measured as the combination of both 
historical returns and a general view on the skill of the entire group of managers in 
the fund industry. However, their research does not take into consideration 
information given by other factors in the pricing model, for example the systematic 
risk and the idiosyncratic risk taken by other funds. 
 
Bayesian alpha is a pricing model based estimation in which prior information can be 
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included by adding another level to the model. In the seminal work by Lindley and 
Smith (1972), a general solution to the two level linear model is derived in a Bayesian 
system, while Smith (1973) extends it to solve a general multilevel linear model. The 
major problem encountered lies in adding proper prior information on the covariance 
matrix of all the factors in the model. In CAPM, only a general prior distribution, i.e. 
an inverse Wishart prior, is applied to represent all the additional information 
regarding both the alpha and the market beta. However, given that the degree of 
freedom is the only variable used to define the distribution, it is therefore far from the 
situation in reality to use the inverse Wishart as the prior belief in the estimation of 
Bayesian alphas.  
 
We construct a linear hierarchical model to consider the learning across funds within 
the fund family during the performance evaluation. In order to overcome the 
restriction noted above and to include return information from the other pricing 
factors, we apply a separation strategy suggested by several statistical studies to 
decompose the covariance matrix into the production of the diagonal matrix with 
variance of each factor, and the correlation matrix of all the factors in the pricing 
model (see for example Barnard, McCulloch and Meng, 2000; O’Malley and 
Zaslavsky, 2008). By deploying the separation strategy we can define the prior 
information on each of the pricing factors as well as the between-factor correlation.   
 
Our results from the simulation suggest that the separation strategy powered 
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performance evaluation better addresses the learning issue. Firstly, we find that given 
a less dispersed prior belief on managers’ inferior ability, the posterior mean on  of 
each of the underlying funds converges faster than when using the method suggested 
by JS. Our findings suggest that returns from peer funds within the same fund family 
can significantly affect investors’ updating on fund alphas. Secondly, our method 
provides a full Bayesian treatment on each of the pricing factors to grasp the specific 
prior information on all the factors. Our simulation shows that it can improve the 
level of shrinkage to offer more precise evaluation results if the prior belief is 
reasonably accurate. One may argue that the results might be sensitive to the selection 
of prior belief. However, since the Bayesian estimation provides a compromise 
between the prior belief and the real data, the posterior estimation also contains 
information from the reality. Thirdly, after decomposing the individual fund  into 
the combination of the family mean and the idiosyncratic contribution from the 
manager, we find that the fund manager contributes positively to the overall fund 
performance whenever prior belief is applied.  
 
Our research is closely related to the method suggested by JS. However, our method 
differs from theirs in the following aspects. Firstly, our research has a different scope. 
JS consider the cross-fund learning from the general fund population while our 
research set to consider the learning across peer funds within the same fund family. 
We decompose individual fund’s alpha into a mean performance and the contribution 
from managers’ idiosyncratic strategy. Secondly, we provide Bayesian treatment on 
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each of the variable considered in the pricing model in addition to the alpha, i.e. the 
systematic risk; the factor loadings on the size, book to market and the momentum 
portfolio in order to better address the learning behaviour. By including information 
given by all pricing factors we manage to find out that from the investors’ perspective 
how beliefs on other issue from the pricing model affect the updating of individual 
fund alpha. Thirdly, we place no restriction on the correlation matrix of different 
pricing factors in the pricing model. That is to say we also include prior information 
to allow cross-factor learning which is often impossible in the conventional OLS 
estimated alphas.   
           
The rest of the research is organised as follows: We discuss the related literature in 
the following section. The learning model is derived in section 4.3. We also show the 
model given by JS which can be regarded as a special case of our model. Section 4.4 
discusses the model simulation results by using the hypothetical data as well as the 
real fund data. The conclusion and implication of this research is summarised in the 
final section.    
 
 
4.2 Related literature 
Our research regarding the learning across the fund families is related to four strands 
of literature: the Bayesian based performance evaluation procedure; cross-sectional 
learning among financial vehicles; performance prediction and persistence analysis, 
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and the covariance separation method used in solving the multilevel linear model. We 
discuss each of these issues in the following sections. 
 
4.2.1 Bayesian fund performance evaluation 
Alpha, or the risk-adjusted return, is widely recognised as the excess performance of 
a certain mutual fund relative to the returns of the market benchmark. Conventionally, 
as described by Jensen (1968), it is calculated by applying the OLS estimation on the 
intercept of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner 
(1965). This performance evaluation has evolved with the development of the asset 
pricing theory to incorporate additional benchmark portfolios, i.e. the size and book 
to market effect by Fama and French (1993), the momentum effect by Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) and Carhart (1997), and the multiple benchmarks by Elton, Gruber and 
Blake (1996). Despite the effort of seeking the valid market benchmark in building a 
solid pricing model, other researches adopt alternative techniques to understand 
funds’ abnormal performance. For example, studies by Kosowski, Timmermann, 
Wermers and White (2006) and Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and O’Sullivan (2008) apply a 
bootstrapping method to distinguish alphas that can be attributed to managers’ 
genuine stock selecting skills from those resulting from sample variation. 
 
Although a large body of literature devotes much effort to designing a proper model 
to estimate funds’ alphas, the method used focuses only on the conventional OLS 
technique with objective statistical settings. More recently, a growing number of 
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studies have shifted their interest to the additional information provided by 
non-benchmark pricing factors, investors’ opinion and returns from other funds. For 
instance, Baks, Metrick and Wachter (2001) find that certain prior beliefs on 
managers’ skill might justify the investment decision. Busse and Irvine (2006) find 
evidence to support short-term persistence in funds’ performance in a Bayesian 
setting. 
 
The approach considered by PS provides a Bayesian view in the performance 
evaluation procedure. Given the fact that most of the mutual funds in the market have 
much shorter lifetimes than do equities, estimation based on limited data might be 
biased. Meanwhile, alphas generated from different pricing models are sensitive to 
the selection of market benchmarks. The market portfolio(s) ignored in a certain 
pricing model might be related to the benchmark portfolio(s) included in the current 
model. Therefore, they calculate the funds’ alphas in a Bayesian system with the prior 
belief on the returns of the benchmark (considered in the current pricing model), and 
the non-benchmark portfolios (ignored in the current pricing model) precede the 
mutual fund returns. Since the benchmark (non-benchmark) assets have longer return 
history, such Bayesian settings not only overcome the limited datasets in the 
estimation, but improve understanding of how the so-called seemingly unrelated 
assets affect the performance evaluation of a certain fund. 
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4.2.2 Learning across funds 
The dependent nature of the variability of funds’ alphas can be modelled in a 
hierarchical setting in which a dependent prior is designated on the cross-sectional 
mean. JS first consider a multilevel structure in the performance evaluation with a 
dependent prior. They suggest that the alpha of a fund can be drawn from a common 
population distribution which is defined to describe the general belief on the 
cross-sectional performance. A prior can then be assigned to represent the investors’ 
opinion on the mean of the distribution, since its posterior mean is the weighted 
average of the information from both the prior and the data. They find that the 
posterior mean shrinks toward the prior mean when the number of funds included 
increases; that is, investors are more likely to believe that the manager of a certain 
fund is unskilful if more funds in the industry give them the same impression. 
Moreover, if the investors tend to have more homogeneous belief on the absence of 
fund managers’ skill, i.e. the variance of the prior decreases, the shrinkage is also 
enhanced. In their research, JS call this the performance with learning across funds. 
 
The empirical results from JS also show a large difference in funds’ performance 
between the learning prior and no learning. An individual fund’s alpha shrinks toward 
the prior mean substantially when a less spread prior variance is considered under the 
no learning prior. When a learning prior is considered, the degree of shrinkage is 
much lower, since the posterior alpha for a given learning prior is a precision 
weighted average of not only the individual fund’s returns, but the overall view of the 
145 
 
Chapter 4 Investor learning and mutual fund family 
entire industry. Therefore, given the consideration that a certain alpha is a random 
draw from a common population, the alpha based on a fund’s own return is more 
likely to be overvalued (undervalued) if the investor has strong (weak) confidence in 
the skill of that fund’s manager. In this case, a learning prior provides a compromise 
between the fund’s own returns and the cross-sectional performance in the entire 
industry. 
 
However, since their research only considers the dependent nature of the prior belief 
on alpha, the evaluation model can be regarded as a special case of the hierarchical 
varying intercept and varying slope model. In reality, investors may also have 
heterogeneous belief on the pricing power of the certain factor model used in the 
performance evaluation, or on the risk exposure to a particular market benchmark. 
These concerns make it necessary to conduct a general case multilevel model. 
 
4.2.3 Covariance separation strategy 
The difficulties with modelling the variance and covariance matrix of a hierarchical 
model can be resolved through separation; that is, the covariance matrix can be 
decomposed into a product of diagonal matrix of standard deviations and correlation 
matrix. In a seminal work by Barnard, McCulloch and Meng (2000), the separation 
strategy is introduced to improve the convergence and to relax the dimensionality 
constraint. The technique is to separate the covariance matrix into the diagonal matrix 
with standard deviations of all parameters at the group level and a correlation matrix 
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which describes the co-movement among those parameters. Thus, in a Bayesian 
system the prior belief can be applied on each of the parameters at the group level as 
well as the joint prior distribution of the correlation matrix. In their simulation, they 
consider a prior belief with log-normal distribution on the regression parameters with 
a beta distribution on the marginal distribution of the correlation coefficients. The 
simulation results show a significant degree of shrinkage on the posterior mean when 
the dispersion of the group means’ prior decreases, but such shrinkage is mitigated 
dramatically when the dispersion reaches a ridiculously high level. In other words, 
the posterior means converge to their OLS estimations when a diffuse prior is 
considered. However, the prior on the correlation coefficients remains 
non-informative due to the absence of prior information. 
 
An important feature of the separation technique is its consideration of specific prior 
beliefs on certain parameters of interest, i.e. the ability to strengthen the informative 
level on particular parameters and weaken others. Barnard et al. (2000) designate 
different priors on the intercepts and market betas in the simulation by using CAPM 
to mimic the distinct response to the return shifting of market portfolio from different 
companies within the same industrial sector. The separation technique, therefore, 
enables the model to capture both the common and distinct features. Furthermore, 
recent studies introduce a modified separation technique which not only maintains the 
original key feature, but also improves its efficiency (see Gelman and Hill, 2007; 
O’Malley and Zaslavsky, 2008). A scaled inverse Wishart distribution is denoted as 
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the prior on the covariance matrix through over-parameterisation, the use of which 
enhances the convergence substantially. 
 
4.2.4 Persistence in fund performance 
From the academic point of view, test results on performance persistence have crucial 
implications for the validity of the efficient market hypothesis. Evidence of 
significant persistence would reject its semi-strong form. Meanwhile, the persistence 
test can also be used to examine the prediction power of a particular pricing model. 
Thus, it is always worth analysing whether funds’ superior performance would 
persist. 
 
Studies of evaluating managerial ability can be divided into two groups, i.e. the 
measurements based on stock selection ability and those based on market timing 
ability. Stock selection ability is reflected in the returns of individual stock predicated 
by the managers, while market timing refers to the predication of a wide range of 
financial assets in the whole market. In most of the previous literature, little evidence 
has been found to support the existence of positive abnormal returns over longer 
horizons. For example, Jensen (1968) and Elton et al. (1996) use the stock selection 
measurement in their persistence analysis, while Henriksson (1984) utilises the 
market timing measurement. Nevertheless, some studies have found persistence over 
a short horizon to be significant; for example, Brown and Goetzmann (1995), 
Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995), Gruber (1996), Carhart (1997), Daniel, 
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Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) and Wermers (1999). In all of the above 
research, however, negative excess returns have been found over a period less than 
one year. On the other hand, based on the finding by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), 
some researchers suggest that momentum effect makes the major contribution to the 
superior performance of top funds (see Grinblatt et al., 1995, Carhart, 1997). Carhart 
(1997) finds that 4.6% of the contributions to short-term persistence come from the 
momentum stocks trading, while about 1% is from other common factors. The 
investment expenses explain much of the persistence. The research also concludes 
that there is no significant evidence that supports the contribution of skilled or 
informed fund managers. However, the finding is not robust to different model 
misspecifications. More recently, Bollen and Busse (2005) use a coexistent model 
that includes both stock picking and market timing methods in the evaluation of fund 
performance persistence, and also simulates the investors changing strategies in their 
portfolio, which makes the research more practical. After applying such a method to 
daily returns of 230 US equity based funds, they find that performance persistence 
exists over quarters in top performing funds as well as in poor ones. However, 
different types of returns used in the research exhibit significant discrepancies when 
the analysis is applied to both raw returns and risk-adjusted returns. 
 
Busse and Irvine (2006) analyse the funds’ performance persistence based on the 
seemingly unrelated estimation (SURE, hereafter) with the Bayesian learning 
suggested by PS, which incorporates the idea that non-benchmark portfolio and 
149 
 
Chapter 4 Investor learning and mutual fund family 
returns with longer history provide additional information on the pricing model 
(Stambaugh, 1997). As indicated above, Bayesian alphas not only increase the 
accuracy of the measurement, but exhibit significant explanation power to predict 
future performance. Adopting the SURE model, they consider skill variance ranging 
from 10-13 to 10-3 and mispricing variance from 10-11 to 10-4 to address the prior belief 
on managers’ skill and the pricing ability of a certain factor model, respectively. Then 
the averaged spearman correlation is computed to test the performance persistence. 
Their results indicate that higher predication power of the SURE model is more likely 
to be associated with the diffuse skill prior. In other words, funds’ abnormal 
performance is found to persist over a short horizon given the condition of 
heterogeneous belief on managers’ ability. Meanwhile, the results from different 
pricing models with various mispricing variance suggest that CAPM provides more 
accurate prediction of funds’ alphas when sceptical prior belief is taken on the pricing 
power of the market factors. The Bayesian SURE model applied in this research can 
be viewed as a general approach of the factor models, assuming non-benchmark 
assets provide additional information in the performance evaluation. It takes the 
additional information provided by the non-benchmark assets into consideration and 
constructs the persistence test using high frequency data to increase accuracy. 
However, the independent prior associated with the SURE still raises the issue of 
ignorance about cross-sectional influences, which, as mentioned in the previous 
section, may affect the evaluation procedure. 
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4.3 The performance evaluation model 
In order to address the cross-sectional learning among funds, we consider fund 
companies’ evaluation procedure though a hierarchical Bayesian inference, which is 
described in the following sections. Section 4.3.1 explains the derivation of the 
Bayesian performance evaluation model. In section 4.3.2, we discuss how evaluation 
models considered in the prior research can be regarded as a special form of our 
general learning model. Then, in section 4.3.3, we explain the elicitation of the prior 
belief applied in the simulation studies. 
 
4.3.1 The general learning model 
The learning process considered in this section is similar to the settings of JS, but in a 
more general framework. We adapt the Bayesian treatment for each of the pricing 
benchmarks in the factor model. In our evaluation model no restriction is applied on 
the correlation of different pricing factors, thus the co-movements can be viewed as 
an unknown variable which is decided by the information mixture of the prior belief 
and the true data, whereas the conventional OLS estimations might suffer substantial 
imprecision due to multicollinearity between different regressors. Another important 
feature of the general learning model is that the dependent prior on the pricing factors 
enables the model to explain the heterogeneous opinion on the pricing power of a 
particular factor model. Different prior beliefs on the pricing benchmarks can then be 
included to address the sensitivity issue of how funds’ alphas respond to divergent 
views on the pricing power of benchmark portfolios. Thus the evaluation model of JS 
151 
 
Chapter 4 Investor learning and mutual fund family 
can be regarded as a special case of the general learning model. Meanwhile, instead 
of gaining information from the entirety of cross-sectional funds in the evaluation, we 
sort funds into different fund families, since funds within the same family often share 
the same investment adviser, and they are more likely to set a similar market 
benchmark to compete with. In addition, fund companies often adopt various family 
strategies, such as reallocating capital or increasing cross-sectional variance, to 
achieve better performance for their underlying funds or entire fund families. 
Therefore, we construct the learning model from a family perspective to incorporate 
additional return information offered by funds within the same fund family.7 
 
A hierarchical linear structure is applied to assess the manager’s ability when 
performance is assumed to vary across the funds managed by the same fund company. 
To facilitate the estimation of the variables in the multilevel structure a Bayesian 
system is constructed to conduct the distribution of each variable as a weighted 
average of both prior belief and real data. We assume in our model that the abnormal 
performance (alpha) can be attributed to the fund family, the manager and the fund’s 
idiosyncratic risk exposure, which are all assumed to be unknown to both the fund 
company and the investors. Consider a fund family with a single fund: we assume 
that the fund’s observable performance  is the combination of , the mean 
performance for fund j, and , the idiosyncratic risk level for fund j. To address the 
7 Our model can be easily adapted to the research context of JS, where a diffuse prior is designated to 
each of the pricing factors. Meanwhile, the prior belief can be set to represent the opinion on the 
performance of the entirety of cross-sectional funds  
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dependence of the prior we further assume that  is a random draw from the 
unknown distribution  and  is defined to follow , where  
can be viewed as the deviation from the mean performance of fund j. We also 
consider the similar setting for the other pricing factors in the evaluation model. The 
prior distribution on , , describes the prior belief of the combined mean 
performance of both fund manager and fund family. The prior distribution on  is 
then used to represent the between-variability of  for all the funds within the same 
family. 
 
The posterior distribution is generated through Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm 
(MCMC, hereafter). We derive the Gibbs sampler and the Metropolis-Hastings 
algorithm for each of the unknown variables in the Bayesian hierarchical linear model 
described above given a fund family with M funds, since the posterior distribution of 
all the variables can be written in a closed form except that for the within variability 
in fund family. Gibbs sampler can update each variable directly at a time when its 
posterior distribution can be derived in a closed form, while a proposed distribution is 
needed for the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to act as a reference for drawing. The 
notation of the variables is as follows: , individual fund’s factor loadings, , the 
individual fund’s performance measurement error, , the family mean performance, 
and , the between variation within the fund family. 
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4.3.1.1 Likelihood function 
We now consider the evaluation method of funds’ abnormal performance delivered 
by a certain fund family with M funds. A factor model is adopted to evaluate the 
performance for each of the funds in a fund family. The likelihood function can be 
stated as follows:  
                               (4.1) 
where  is a  dimensional vector of fund’s excess returns and  is a  
matrix of the excess returns from  market benchmark portfolio(s), of which 
the first column is all 1.  is  dimensional factor loadings. We assume that 
, in which  is assumed to be homoscedastic and independent of each 
other. 
 
The family level likelihood function can also be shown to have the following form:  
                                  (4.2) 
where  is a  matrix of family level predictors, . As 
suggested in the following simulation study, we assume that  equals to 1 for all j. 
Additional factors can also be incorporated as family level predictors, i.e. the 
non-benchmark assets in the SURE model.  is the mean 
performance, which describes the combined performance attributed to fund manager 
as well as the fund family. The prior beliefs on  and  are given by 
 and , respectively. 
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We further consider a separation strategy to define the prior on funds’ between 
variation, , in which the family level covariance matrix is decomposed into a 
combination of diagonal scaled matrix and an unscaled matrix that can describe the 
correlation of factor loadings among different funds within the same fund family, i.e. 
, where  is a diagonal scaled matrix and  is the unscaled matrix.8 
Given Eq(4.1), let , ,  
and ; then we can rewrite Eq(4.1) for M funds as  
                                      (4.3) 
where  and . The family level likelihood function 
for M funds can also been given by letting ,  
and , where  is the covariance matrix for all the factor loadings, . 
The family level likelihood function for M funds then can be written as  
                                      (4.4) 
where  is a  vector of  factor loadings for each of the M funds.  
represents the mean value which remains the same across M funds, while  is the 
manager’s selection of the risk level for fund j. For M funds,  is assumed to follow 
a normal distribution with the covariance matrix, . The prior on  can then be 
regarded as the magnitude of how factor loadings of an individual fund deviate from 
8 Gelman and Hill (2007) argue that such over parameterisation not only enables the control of the 
dispersion level for the factor loadings within the same group, since  is close to uniform, it also 
increases the convergence of the chain. See for example Barnard et al. (2000) and O’Malley and 
Zaslavsky (2008) for further discussion on the separation strategy and the scaled inverse Wishart 
distribution. 
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its group mean. Thus, a prior on fund’s alpha with a higher variance suggests a higher 
cross-sectional variability on alpha within the fund family. We also consider that the 
prior of the mean value, , follows , which represents the beliefs on the 
family’s mean. 
 
4.3.1.2 Posterior distribution of  
In this section we derive the posterior distribution of the factor loadings for M funds 
conditional on ,  and . Assume that ,  and  are all updated,  and  
are the prior belief on . The posterior belief of  can be derived as 
 
So the posterior belief on the fund’s factor loadings follows a  dimensional 
multivariate normal distribution,  
                                        (4.5) 
where  
     
and . 
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The posterior mean, , of  is a weighted average of the true return data and the 
prior belief on . We can further extend  as 
  
Thus, when and , the posterior mean of  becomes 
; that is, the posterior mean of  reduces to its OLS 
estimates given a diffuse prior on both the cross-sectional variability and the variance 
of the family level mean. 
 
4.3.1.3 Posterior distribution of  
Given ,  and , we have 
  
 
By assumption we have a homoscedastic error term for each fund j, which we can 
write as . The posterior belief can then be shown as  
  
Therefore, we have the posterior distribution for  as  
                       (4.6) 
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where ,  and . 
 
4.3.1.4 Posterior distribution of  
When  and  are both updated by the distribution described in the previous two 
sections, the posterior belief on  can then be derived in a similar fashion given the 
information of prior distribution , 
 
Thus  can be shown to follow a  dimensional multivariate normal distribution:  
                                          (4.7) 
where  
       
        
 
The posterior mean of  has a similar form as those defined for  in the previous 
section. However, if , the posterior mean of  equals to 
, where the prior mean  has 
little effect and the true data dominate the estimation of . 
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4.3.1.5 Posterior distribution of  
The family level covariance matrix for M funds can be written as . Only 
 and  are related to the variation of , and the covariance  can be written as a 
combination of the diagonal matrix of standard deviations and a matrix of correlation, 
i.e. . Thus the joint distribution of  and  can be stated as 
  
 
We firstly derive the posterior distribution of the unscaled matrix that determines the 
correlation, given the prior is , 
  
Therefore, we can show that  
              (4.8) 
where . For  factor in the learning model, its 
variance is , where  is the  value on the diagonal of . The posterior 
distribution on  can be estimated by using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm since 
the distribution function is not in a convenient form. Given , its 
conditional posterior distribution function can be written as  
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where9 
  
and the prior on  is given by . We then use a log-normal 
distribution as the proposed distribution to simulate the target distribution with the 
acceptance rate over 44%.10 
 
4.3.2 The non-learning and partial learning models 
After deriving the general learning model, we then look at the difference between the 
non-learning model, the partial learning model and the general learning model. The 
non-learning model can be regarded as an evaluation model with independent prior 
belief, while the partial learning model considers dependent prior only on the fund 
alphas. Given the likelihood function Eq(4.1), we can derive the non-learning model 
for fund j as 
  
 
Then we can draw  given ,  and , assuming  is drawn from another 
procedure. The posterior belief then follows: 
9 Since  is a  matrix, thus  indicates a matrix without the  element. 
10 Similar argument can be found in, for example, Gelman and Hill (2007) and O’Malley and Zaslavsky 
(2008). 
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where 
  
and assuming that  follows a prior belief, , for fund j. Thus, each of 
the M funds in the fund family is denoted with independent prior beliefs. In the 
simulation of the non-learning model we denote a non-informative prior on the 
variance parameter of , thus its posterior distribution is the OLS estimation. For the 
prior distribution on , we denote prior beliefs independent of each other. Therefore, 
the non-learning model can be regarded as the no pooling model, with specific prior on 
each of the funds.  
 
JS applies a hierarchical model with dependent prior on individual funds’ . Their 
model can therefore be regarded as a varying intercept model while the factor loadings 
of other market benchmarks are left without Bayesian treatment. Given the same 
likelihood function Eq(4.1), the prior belief of  states 
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The posterior mean of  can be derived in the same fashion as the non-learning 
model: 
   
where 
  
For the mean performance , we denote prior belief as ; thus the 
posterior belief of  is given by 
  
and we have , where 
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In the model derived above, for each fund i, a common prior belief is applied to all the 
M funds in the same fund family. Thus, the common prior can be viewed as the 
additional information on the mean performance of the entire fund family. In the 
simulation, we include a diffuse prior on , i.e. apply a large value on  to eliminate 
the influence from . The precision parameter  is given a prior belief following 
inverse  distribution. Since JS include no prior information on other pricing factors 
in addition to , a diffuse prior is then denoted to each of the factor loadings to let 
them converge to the OLS estimations, which is similar with the settings considered by 
JS.11 
 
4.3.3 Prior beliefs 
In this section we discuss the prior distribution we use for drawing from the posterior 
distribution of the parameters in the learning model. Although there are several 
possible choices of prior beliefs on all unknown variables, we concentrate on the 
family level variance, , since it is closely related to the cross-sectional variability 
within the fund family. In particular, a diffuse prior would allow the data to dominate 
11 JS rearrange Eq (1) to have , and  is obtained directly from the OLS 
regression. 
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the posterior distribution, while contracted prior leads to a high degree of shrinkage. 
 
We consider three log normal distributions as the prior belief on . Figure 4.1 shows 
our first choice, . The prior mean is then centred at around 0.25 
suggesting  has a variance over 0.0625, which is far beyond the actual value 
observed in the data. This highly informative prior maintains the degree of shrinkage 
at a low level for the reason shown in section 4.3.1.2, where extremely diffuse 
variance drives the posterior mean to approach the OLS estimation. Thus, prior belief 
provides no information in this case. 
 
The second and third choices of prior belief are illustrated in Figure 4.2. The dashed 
line given by  is centred at 0.003, that is  for variance. 
This prior is chosen to represent a plausible actual prior of alphas across funds within 
the fund family, since it is close to the highest cross-sectional variance among alphas 
given by the data. But its long right tail also enables the prior to provide sufficient 
deviation from the mean. The third choice of prior is given by the solid line in Figure 
4.2. It is centred at , which can match the lowest between variability 
suggested by the data. Such a prior is expected to substantially increase the shrinkage 
toward the prior mean in order to address the situation where information is heavily 
shared within the fund family. 
 
We also designate prior distribution to other parameters in the learning model. The 
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prior on  is centred at zero, as we assume that no manager is found to have 
superior stock selection ability. This is consistent with the settings given by PS and 
JS. The prior on the correlation matrix  is given by an inverse Wishart distribution 
with a degree of freedom that is higher than the dimension of its scale matrix. This 
setting allows  to have a uniform prior distribution on the correlation parameters, 
since information regarding the correlation among family-level predictors is normally 
  
Figure 4.1 Prior distribution on  for  
    This figure illustrates the choice of the prior distribution considered for the 
cross-sectional variability parameter, . Its logarithm value has a normal 
distribution with mean as -1 and variance as 1. 
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unknown by assumption. Moreover, the prior settings for the correlation matrix and 
the standard deviation for the  pricing factor considered in our research are 
different from those discussed in Barnard et al. (2000), where the group-level 
covariance matrix is decomposed into product of the correlation matrix and the 
diagonal matrix of standard deviations. Then a certain prior can be allocated on the 
particular predictor with a marginal uniform prior on the correlation parameters. But 
our technique can achieve the same objective with simpler computation and faster 
convergence. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Prior distribution on  for  and   
 
This figure illustrates the choice of the prior distribution considered for the 
cross-sectional variability parameter, . The dashed line represents the distribution of 
, while the solid line is for . 
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4.4 Simulation analysis 
4.4.1 Simulation with returns of hypothetical fund family 
In this section we report the simulation results of the learning models under the 
various prior beliefs chosen in section 4.3.3. We conduct the simulations based on 
hypothetical returns generated by different compositions of the benchmark. For the 
CAPM model, the abnormal performance  is assumed to have a normal distribution 
with mean of  and standard deviation of ; and  has a 
normal distribution with a mean value of 0.979 and standard deviation of 0.087. The 
standard deviation of the error term follows . The 
3-factor model  follows a normal distribution with a mean of 0.0767% and 
standard deviation of 0.226, and  follows , while  
and  follow  and , respectively. The 
residual standard deviation has . For the 4-factor model, 
 is drawn from a normal distribution with mean of 0.0806% and standard deviation 
of 0.231%, and  is assumed to follow .  
 
The other pricing factors are drawn independently from the following distribution: 
, , . 
The standard deviation of the error term  is drawn from the log-normal 
distributed with . The returns and pricing factors are then drawn 
independently of each other to form returns for a particular fund. 
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Table 4.1 reports the posterior simulations from three types of learning model under 
the chosen prior beliefs using hypothetical fund returns. All the three types of 
learning model exhibit a substantial degree of shrinkage with a rapid decrease in 
dispersion of the cross-sectional variability in funds’ ; that is,  declines sharply 
under the chosen prior beliefs. The results from the general learning model seem to 
have the highest degree of shrinkage, since the  in Panel C is lower than those in 
Panel A by over 60 basis points and lower than the partial learning model by almost 
90 basis points under the high scepticism prior. It is also worth noting that the degree 
of shrinkage decreases considerably across the prior beliefs when using both the 
partial learning model and the non-learning model. Specifically,  from the CAPM 
model drops by almost 1000 basis points in Panel B, from 0.1234 to 0.0101, while it 
behaves more stably in Panel C with only an 80-basis point change. The general 
learning model incorporates the prior belief on the variance from both the pricing 
factors and it also works as the scale factor in the denominator of the posterior mean, 
thus the prior belief is more likely to have significant influence on the cross-sectional 
variability of fund alphas. 
 
Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 provide further evidence to confirm the shrinkage. Figure 4.3 
illustrates the boxplot of the posterior mean of the  for the 5 hypothetical funds. 
The value is quite dispersed when  has a diffuse prior, and the median of each 
’s posterior distribution is close to the OLS estimates since a highly close-diffuse 
prior would mitigate the influence from the prior mean. The dispersion on  reduces 
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significantly when turning to a less diffuse prior. In the extreme case where  
has the high scepticism prior, the funds’  converges to a common mean which is 
close to zero. There is also some evidence supporting the notion that the shrinkage is 
sensitive to the evaluation model chosen. The boxplot shown in Figure 4.4 suggests 
that the  estimated by the 3-factor model has a low degree of shrinkage under all 
three prior beliefs compared to those from the CAPM. Similar results can also be 
found in Figure 4.5 where the 4-factor model is considered. 
 
Table 4.1 also reports the results of the mean performance for a particular fund family, 
. As shown in Section 4.2.1.4, the posterior mean of  is weighted by both the 
OLS estimates and prior information. Since we apply no predictors at the family level 
likelihood, Eq(4.2),  is assumed to be an identity matrix for all M funds. Thus 
Eq(4.2) is by design a sum of family’s mean performance and the fund’s idiosyncratic 
performance. In the case where  has diffuse prior beliefs on its diagonal, each of 
the elements in  should converge to its OLS estimates. On the other hand, when a 
least dispersed prior is considered for ,  should reduce to its mean, . We 
therefore expect the factor loadings and the  within the same family to converge to 
a common mean which can be attributed as the mean performance of the fund family. 
One may argue that the fund manager can also contribute to the mean performance; 
thus a feasible extension to the general learning model is to further decompose the 
mean value  and to designate particular predictors representing the difference 
between the contribution from the manager and that from the fund family. 
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Table 4.1 Simulation of learning within fund family 
 CAPM   3-factor model  4-factor model 
Prior Beliefs Diffuse Low High Diffuse Low High Diffuse Low High 
Panel A  Non-learning model 
 
  0.0969   0.0574   0.0092   0.0858   0.0411   0.0077   0.0927   0.0529   0.0079  
  0.0157   0.0157   0.0159   0.0194   0.0194   0.0194   0.0168   0.0168   0.0169  
Panel B  Partial learning model 
 
  0.1234   0.0631   0.0101   0.1117   0.0434   0.0076   0.1169   0.0515   0.0079  
  0.0003   0.0001   0.0000   0.0007   0.0008   0.0008   0.0017   0.0017   0.0015  
  0.0157   0.0157   0.0159   0.0194   0.0194   0.0194   0.0167   0.0168   0.0168  
Panel C  General learning model  
 
  0.0082   0.0034   0.0001   0.0058   0.0012   0.0001   0.0069   0.0017   0.0001  
  0.0001   0.0001   0.0002   0.0007   0.0008   0.0004   0.0017   0.0017   0.0008  
  0.0157   0.0157   0.0159   0.0194   0.0194   0.0194   0.0168   0.0168   0.0169  
Notes: This table presents the simulation results from three evaluation models: the non-learning model, the partial learning model 
and the general learning model. The posterior mean of the variables, i.e. the in-family variability , the family level mean 
performance , and the fund’s individual risk level , are reported. We control the prior belief on the scaled parameter of the 
cross-sectional variability in ,  to be three distinct distributions, i.e. diffuse prior, ; low scepticism, 
 and high scepticism, . The prior belief on the mean value of the  pricing factor, , 
is centred at zero with a diffuse variance. The scaled parameter of  is also assumed to have a diffuse distribution. Panels A, B 
and C report the simulation results from the CAPM, Fama French 3-factor model and the 4-factor model. The posterior 
distributions of the variables considered are simulated by the MCMC technique by using hypothetical returns from 5 funds. The 
fund returns are generated through Eq(4.1), in which the factor loadings and the market benchmarks are drawn independently 
across funds. The distribution parameters are chosen to match the empirical results. 
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The posterior mean of  reported in Table 4.1 seems to be very close to zero across 
all the learning models considered. The results document some weak support for a 
decreasing pattern of the value of  with a diminishing dispersion on the prior 
variance, i.e. it reduces from 0.17% to 0.08% when the general learning model based 
on the 4-factor model is considered. The value is even lower when using a CAPM 
based partial learning model. This may be explained with the aid of Figure 4.3, in 
which the posterior  of each fund is more concentrated around zero and the 
extreme values at both ends offset each other. The distribution of each fund’s  in 
Figure 4.4 has a more extreme value at the positive end, implying a more positive  
in a 3-factor based learning model. A similar situation can be found in Figure 4.5, 
where the 4-factor based learning model is considered, i.e. the median of the posterior 
 is further from zero compared to the others. Consequently,  provides additional 
information on the common performance across funds within the same fund family. 
Our simulation results suggest that the abnormal performance can be attributed 
mainly to funds’ idiosyncratic behaviour, since the common mean reduces to zero 
under the least dispersed prior. 
 
Figure 4.6 illustrates the posterior mean of market beta in the general learning model. 
Since we put non-informative prior on , its posterior mean is expected to converge 
to the OLS estimates. The boxplot in Figure 4.6 shows a steady shrinkage across the 
chosen prior beliefs. We further extend the simulation to incorporate the influence of 
informative prior beliefs on other pricing factors. Table 4.3 shows the results. 
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Figure 4.3 Boxplot of Posterior Draws of CAPM   
Notes: This figure illustrates 6000 posterior draws from 5 hypothetical funds’  given the decreasingly dispersed prior 
beliefs on  in the CAPM formed general learning model. 
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Figure 4.4 Boxplot of Posterior Draws of 3-factor model  
Notes: This figure illustrates 6000 posterior draws from the 5 hypothetical funds’  given the decreasingly dispersed prior 
beliefs on  in the 3-factor based general learning model. 
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Figure 4.5 Boxplot of Posterior Draws of 4-factor model  
Notes: This figure illustrates 6000 posterior draws from 5 hypothetical funds’  given the decreasingly dispersed prior 
beliefs on  in the 4-factor based general learning model. 
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Figure 4.6 Boxplot of Posterior Draws of CAPM  
Notes: This figure illustrates 6000 posterior draws from 5 hypothetical fund’s  given the decreasingly dispersed prior 
beliefs on  in the CAPM formed general learning model. 
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4.4.2 Simulation with returns of hypothetical funds universe 
We consider a more extreme case where, instead of considering a hypothetical family 
with 5 funds, we enlarge the sample size to incorporate 200 funds to analyse the 
degree of shrinkage of funds’ . Results are reported in Table 4.2. The posterior 
mean of  suggests that of the three models, the general learning model exhibits the 
highest degree of shrinkage of funds’ , which is consistent with the results reported 
in Table 4.1. The posterior means of  given by the non-learning and the partial 
learning models have a similar value under the same prior. Moreover, compared to 
the results in Table 4.1, simulations with a larger group of funds produces smaller 
value of  for a given prior, indicating that it becomes easier to converge to the 
common mean when they are able to gain information from more funds. However, 
there is only weak evidence to support the declining pattern of  with less 
dispersed prior beliefs. This is because the growing sample size may lead to more 
heterogeneous beliefs among individual funds’ , which therefore slows down the 
efficiency of the convergence process. 
 
The posterior means of  reported in Panels A and B are higher than those in Table 
4.1. Meanwhile, we find that funds’ idiosyncratic performance seems to have limited 
impact on the overall mean performance, since  remains almost unchanged across 
different prior beliefs from both the partial learning and the general learning models. 
This implies that managers’ superior (inferior) performances offset each other in a 
large funds population, and such mean performance is also independent of the prior 
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information. The steady nature of  documented in Panel B is apparently different 
from that discovered by JS. This is because we only incorporate prior beliefs in the 
cross-sectional variability, and leave the prior on  non-informative, whereas JS put 
decreasingly dispersed prior on the group mean, and find that the posterior mean is 
driven toward zero. 
 
Figure 4.7 plots the density of the posterior mean of the 200 funds’  with respect to 
the chosen prior beliefs. Not surprisingly, the solid line, which indicates the density 
of  given a close-diffuse prior, has the lowest degree of kurtosis among the three 
densities, while the dashed line has more values around its mean. However, Figure 
4.7 shows there is a limited margin on the shrinkage level between different prior 
beliefs, which is consistent with the results found in  in Table 4.2. Furthermore, it 
seems that more funds are found to have a positive  given a left skewed density no 
matter which prior belief is chosen. Our results in relation to the simulation of returns 
of hypothetical fund universe suggest a low degree of shrinkage of the cross-sectional 
 compared to that found in fund families. But a steady mean performance, , 
implies a feasible estimate of the mean performance for the fund universe through the 
general learning model. 
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     Table 4.2 Simulation of learning across funds universe 
 CAPM   3-factor model  4-factor model 
Prior Beliefs Diffuse Low High Diffuse Low High Diffuse Low High 
Panel A  Non- learning model 
 
  0.0502   0.0496   0.0488   0.0495   0.0489   0.0482   0.0519   0.0514   0.0506  
  0.0211   0.0211   0.0211   0.0189   0.0189   0.0189   0.0186   0.0186   0.0186  
Panel B  Partial learning model 
 
  0.0500   0.0493   0.0484   0.0479   0.0473   0.0466   0.0498   0.0492   0.0484  
  0.0004   0.0004   0.0004   0.0009   0.0009   0.0009   0.0011   0.0011   0.0011  
  0.0211   0.0211   0.0211   0.0189   0.0189   0.0189   0.0186   0.0186   0.0186  
Panel C  General learning model  
 
  0.0025   0.0024   0.0024   0.0023   0.0022   0.0022   0.0025   0.0024   0.0024  
  0.0004   0.0004   0.0004   0.0009   0.0009   0.0009   0.0011   0.0011   0.0011  
  0.0211   0.0211   0.0211   0.0189   0.0189   0.0189   0.0186   0.0186   0.0186  
Notes: This table presents the simulation results from three evaluation models: the non-learning model, the partial learning model and the 
general learning model. The posterior mean of the variables, i.e. the in-family variability , the family level mean performance , and the 
fund’s individual risk level  are reported. We control the prior beliefs on the scaled parameter of the cross-sectional variability in , and 
assume three distinct distributions for , i.e. diffuse prior, ; low scepticism,  and high scepticism, 
. The prior beliefs in the mean value of the  pricing factor, , are centred at zero with a diffuse variance. The scaled 
parameter of  is also assumed to have a diffuse distribution. Panels A, B and C report the simulation results from the CAPM, the 3-factor and 
the 4-factor models. The posterior distributions of the variables considered are simulated using the MCMC technique based on hypothetical 
returns of 200 funds. The fund returns are generated through Eq(4.1), in which the factor loadings and the market benchmarks are drawn 
independently across funds. The distribution parameters are chosen to match the empirical results. 
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Figure 4.7 Density of the posterior draws of CAPM  
This figure illustrates 6000 posterior draws from the CAPM  by applying the general learning model to the hypothetical 
fund population with decreasingly dispersed prior beliefs on . 
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The general learning model enables us to consider specific prior beliefs on factor 
loadings. Using this property, we further extend our simulation to allocate 
information on all of the elements in  in addition to . In other words, the factor 
loadings of each market benchmark in a particular pricing model are assumed with 
informative prior beliefs before undertaking the estimation. Table 4.3 reports the 
results. 
 
We find that the chosen prior belief on other pricing factors can influence the 
posterior dispersion of . For example, the posterior mean of  increases from 
0.035% to 0.118% when the prior belief on  pricing factors turns to a dispersed 
one. This finding is also consistent when different pricing model is considered. From 
the fund family’s perspective, if investors are only certain that funds in the same 
family have similar risk exposure to the market benchmarks, they may choose more 
concentrated prior beliefs on the corresponding factor loadings. On the other hand, 
investors might have limited knowledge on the overall skill of the fund family, and 
hence they choose a more dispersed prior belief on . Such a situation can be 
represented by column 3 of Table 4.3 under the settings of CAPM. The results imply 
a slightly lower degree of shrinkage of  relative to those reported in Panel C of 
Table 4.1, indicating that adding prior information from other pricing benchmarks can 
improve the shrinkage of the  value. In other words, if the prior information 
considered happens to be correct, the general learning model can provide a more 
precise estimation of the cross-sectional mean performance of the family. Intuitively, 
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the situation discussed above could be a more common case in reality. Since fund 
companies publish their top holdings frequently, investors are more likely to form 
their own opinions on the co-movements between the fund and the market portfolio. 
Hence, a less dispersed prior can be used to represent the investors’ belief before 
seeing the data. However, it is often the case that the manager’s stock selection skill 
is unknown to the investors. Therefore a diffuse prior on  could be a reasonable 
setting.  
 
Moreover, we consider another extreme situation, in which investors are more 
convinced that the fund family contains no skilled managers, but they are also unsure 
that the market benchmark can completely price the fund return. Therefore, a highly 
concentrated prior is defined on both the  and the market beta. Such a scenario is 
considered in the second column of the CAPM settings. The result shows a 
significant degree of shrinkage of the cross-sectional market beta as  decreases 
with less dispersed priors than that in the fourth column. However, compared with the 
results on  given by Panel C of Table 4.1, where market beta has a diffuse prior, 
we find that  increases by over 10 bps. This is because the general learning model 
provides a compromise estimation of  between the real data and the prior belief, 
since the hypothetical returns still contain evidence to support the existence of skilful 
managers. Thus, the posterior cross-sectional variability on  increases to signal 
such concerns.12   
12 Unlike the hypothetical returns generated by JS, in which the abnormal return has been centered to have a 
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In Table 4.4, we look further into the non-equal prior problem by computing the 
posterior correlation coefficients of the parameters considered in Table 4.3. In general 
the correlation between the different pricing factors and the abnormal returns remains 
at a low level. However, this does not contradict the results found in Table 4.3, since 
we place only a diffuse prior on the correlation matrix of all the pricing factors. It is 
not only the correlation coefficient but also the cross-sectional variability of a certain 
pricing factor that can decide the learning outcome. Therefore, such low correlation 
coefficient can suggest a low level of cross-fund learning only in the correlation itself. 
Our method provides a way to define an informative prior on the correlation matrix. 
However, the construction of an efficient prior remains an open question in the 
statistics literature.   
 
 
 
 
zero mean, we draw the abnormal returns from , which matches the general empirical 
findings in the real fund industry. 
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Table 4.3 Simulation of learning across funds with non-equal prior 
 CAPM  3-factor model  4-factor model 
 prior            
 prior            
            
 0.0012 0.0078 0.0004  0.0009 0.0055 0.0002  0.0006 0.0060 0.0002 
 0.0926 0.0861 0.0981  0.0313 0.0268 0.0562  0.1465 0.1425 0.1531 
 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000  -0.0005 0.0006 0.0002  0.0010 0.0016 0.0010 
 0.9803 0.9804 0.9839  1.0161 1.0037 1.0085  1.1009 1.0938 1.0972 
 - - -  0.0235 0.0473 0.0525  0.0021 0.0009 0.0223 
 - - -  0.1116 0.1081 0.1045  0.0547 0.0319 0.0630 
 - - -  -0.0456 -0.0639 -0.1376  -0.0015 0.0002 -0.0152 
 - - -  0.0287 0.0870 0.0925  0.0488 0.0643 0.0681 
 - - -  - - -  0.0010 0.0007 0.0080 
 - - -  - - -  0.0012 -0.0002 -0.0025 
         
Notes: This table presents the simulation results from the general learning model. The posterior mean of the variables, i.e. the 
in-family variability on all the pricing factors, , and the mean performance of all the pricing factors, , are reported. We control the 
prior belief on the scaled parameters of the cross-sectional variability in factor loadings, . The prior beliefs on the mean value of the 
 pricing factor, , are centred at 1 with various prior beliefs. We report results based on three pricing models: CAPM, the 3-factor 
and the 4-factor models. The posterior distributions of the variables considered are simulated by the MCMC technique by using 
hypothetical returns of 5 funds. The fund returns are generated through equation 1, in which the factor loadings and the market 
benchmarks are drawn independently across funds. The distribution parameters are chosen to match the empirical results. 
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   Table 4.4 Posterior correlation coefficients 
 CAPM 3-factor model 4-factor model 
 prior          
 prior          
          
 0.1924 0.2578 0.1700 0.0113 -0.0637 0.0224 -0.0764 -0.0936 -0.0236 
 - - - 0.0807 0.0685 -0.0795 -0.0108 0.0113 -0.0727 
 - - - 0.1000 0.1711 -0.0902 0.0863 0.0673 0.0366 
 - - - - - - 0.1111 0.0334 0.0427 
          
Notes: This table reports the posterior correlation coefficients from the general learning model. We control the prior belief on the 
scaled parameters of the cross-sectional variability in factor loadings, . The prior beliefs on the mean value of the  pricing 
factor, , are centred at 1 with various prior beliefs. We report results based on three pricing models: CAPM, the 3-factor and the 
4-factor models. The posterior distributions of the variables considered are simulated by the MCMC technique by using 
hypothetical returns of 5 funds. The fund returns are generated through equation 1, in which the factor loadings and the market 
benchmarks are drawn independently across funds. The distribution parameters are chosen to match the empirical results. 
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4.4.3 Simulation with the universe of real funds 
In this section, we consider the simulation using the returns from the actual mutual 
funds. We select monthly returns of 220 unit trusts from 47 fund families in the UK 
fund industry from 2001 to 2010. All the sampled funds are UK equity unit trusts. We 
screen out the non-equity funds and the mixed funds since our performance evaluation 
focuses only on fund managers' stock selection skill. Within each of the fund families, 
we also screen out the new funds due to splitting and keep funds with longest return 
history for each share class. To focus solely on the domestic funds, the funds in our 
sample are all UK domicile equity funds, indicating that most of their capital should be 
invested in UK companies. Meanwhile, the UK domicile funds share the similar 
market benchmarks, which facilitate estimation of the funds’ alphas by the factor 
models.   
 
We employ three sets of benchmark returns to form the baseline performance 
evaluation model. We choose the FTSE All Shares as the excess market return factor 
motivated by CAPM. The returns of the additional size and book to market factors in 
the Fama French 3-factor model are computed by two pairs of market portfolios: the 
size factor is generated by the difference between the FTSE 100 index and the FTSE 
small capital index; the book to market factor is calculated by taking the difference 
between the MSCI UK Growth index and the MSCI UK Value index. The returns of 
the additional momentum factor in the 4-factor model are generated by using the 1-year 
high return portfolio minus the low return portfolio.  
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Firstly, in Table 4.5 we consider the situation in which informative prior beliefs are 
only given to the within variability of the cross-sectional alphas, . In other words, 
the investors are presumed to have prior information on how individual alphas 
deviate from each other within the same fund family, which is similar with the 
settings considered in the fake data simulation. We include the simulation results 
given by the non-learning model with independent prior beliefs, the partial learning 
model with dependent prior beliefs only on funds’ alphas, and the general learning 
model, which we design to provide a full Bayesian treatment on each of the pricing 
factors. For each type of learning model, we conduct the simulation through three 
different baseline evaluation models, i.e. CAPM, 3-factor model and 4-factor model. 
The prior beliefs selected for  are the same as those implemented in the fake data 
simulation. In addition, since no information is given on the mean performance of the 
fund family or on the family mean value of other pricing factors, we apply a diffuse 
prior distribution on the prior variance of , , ,  and , and the 
prior means are centred at 0. The scale parameters on each of the pricing factors, 
except those on , all have diffuse priors.  
 
The posterior mean of , which indicates how individual funds deviate from the 
family mean, decrease rapidly with the increase in scepticism on both the skill level 
and the within variation. Compared with the value of  from the non-learning and 
partial learning models, the general learning model seems to be more sensitive to the 
priors chosen.  in the partial learning model is about 20 basis points higher than 
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that from the general learning model under the low scepticism prior. The difference is 
even larger under the diffuse prior, but they all turn to zero when a high scepticism 
prior is given. The results in Table 4.5 also suggest that such a decreasing pattern is 
not sensitive to the model specification, since the difference in magnitude is robust in 
all the types of baseline evaluation models.  
 
The posterior mean of the family mean performance , and individual funds’ alphas 
reported by Panels B and C of Table 4.5, also experience a decrease in value with the 
increasing scepticism in the prior beliefs, indicating that the prior information on 
family’s mean performance would alter investors’ view of individual funds’ 
performance. Particularly, the funds’ alphas reduce to  when the high scepticism 
prior belief is applied, because  approaches 0 under the least dispersed variance 
and the cross-sectional variation among alphas is almost eliminated within the same 
fund family. Although the prior mean of  is centred at 0, its diffuse prior variance 
mitigates the influence from the prior mean and allows the real data to dominate the 
posterior distribution of . Meanwhile, Table 4.5 also provides some evidence to 
support the presence of managers’ skill. By the assumption of the general learning 
model, the difference between  and alphas under the diffuse and low scepticism 
priors can be regarded as the gain from funds’ cross-sectional variation. Panels B and 
C both document that the funds’ average alphas exceed  for more than 20 basis 
points under the diffuse and low scepticism priors for all types of baseline evaluation 
model. However, since we provide no further decomposition on the family mean 
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performance, we presume that apart from the fund families,  might still 
incorporate a contribution by individual fund managers. But such a portion in  
should be limited, since for each fund family we keep only one fund for each share 
class, in order to maintain the variety of funds with distinct investment objectives in a 
fund family. One may argue that  should maintain a stable value instead of 
decreasing with the scepticism prior. Since Eq(4.7) suggests that the posterior belief 
of  is a weighted average of prior information and the real data, the posterior mean 
of  is conditional only on the posterior distribution of the in-family covariance 
matrix  when . Thus, the posterior mean of  may also shift with the 
changing value of the prior belief. However, given a high scepticism prior the prior 
variance approaches zero, and can hardly affect , which drives the average alpha to 
.             
 
Baks (2003) provides an alternative way to extract the family contribution out of 
funds’ individual alphas through a Cobb-Douglas production function by denoting 
arbitrary weights on the performance of managers and fund organisations, 
respectively. The performance attribution is therefore sensitive to the weights chosen. 
Moreover, we are not surprised to see that the posterior means of  and  
documented in Table 4.5 remain almost unchanged, since no informative prior beliefs 
are applied to both  and  throughout the simulation.     
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We further investigate how prior information from other pricing factors affects the 
posterior distribution of the cross-sectional alphas and , by placing prior beliefs 
simultaneously on  and the family mean and the scale parameters of all the other 
pricing factors. This is also an important feature of the general learning model, given 
that it enables us to denote specific prior beliefs on each of the pricing factors in the 
baseline evaluation model. The priors on the scale parameters are similar to those 
discussed in Table 4.5. The family mean value of each of the pricing factors 
(including ) are also assigned with prior beliefs to address the learning issue, i.e. 
the  element in vector  is set to have  as the diffuse prior; for the 
low scepticism prior we set ; for the high scepticism prior we have 
. Table 6 reports the posterior results of the parameters of interest.        
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      Table 4.5 Simulation of learning within fund family 
 CAPM   3-factor model  4-factor model 
Prior belief Diffuse Low High Diffuse Low High Diffuse Low High 
Panel A  Non-learning model 
 
 0.7821 0.5121 -0.0404 0.8539 0.5921 -0.0379 0.9035 0.6369 -0.0354 
 0.9768 0.9768 0.9772 1.0252 1.0248 1.0246 1.0254 1.0251 1.0253 
 0.1422 0.0500 0.0077 0.1422 0.0500 0.0082 0.1421 0.0500 0.0081 
Panel B Partial learning model 
 
 0.8384 0.8351 0.1557 0.9134 0.9091 -0.0500 0.9613 0.9609 0.2225 
 0.9768 0.9774 0.9713 1.0252 1.0254 1.0253 1.0245 1.0254 1.0213 
 0.6182 0.5193 0.1557 0.6575 0.5065 -0.0501 0.9826 0.9633 0.2225 
 0.2101 0.0515 0.0077 0.2111 0.0526 0.0081 0.2113 0.0532 0.0075 
Panel C General learning model 
 
 0.8446 0.8367 0.4947 0.9134 0.9043 0.4075 0.9665 0.9731 0.5032 
 0.9772 0.9771 0.9769 1.0248 1.0254 1.0252 1.0248 1.0247 1.0247 
 0.7042 0.6363 0.4953 0.6712 0.5381 0.4081 0.7657 0.6736 0.5011 
 0.0226 0.0021 0.0000 0.0243 0.0016 0.0000 0.0244 0.0022 0.0000 
 0.9752 0.9772 0.9771 1.0244 1.0128 1.0226 1.0252 1.0234 1.0254 
 0.1169 0.1163 0.1331 0.1336 0.1477 0.1315 0.1379 0.1378 0.1357 
Notes: This table presents the simulation results from three evaluation models: the non-learning model, the partial learning model 
and the general learning model. The posterior mean of the variables, i.e. the in-family variability, , the family level annualised 
mean performance, , and the cross-sectional averaged annualised alpha, are reported. We control the prior belief on the scaled 
parameter of the cross-sectional variability in ,  and priors on  to be three distinct distributions, i.e. a diffuse prior has 
; the low scepticism has ; the high scepticism has . ,  and the 
scaled parameter of  is assumed to have diffuse prior distribution. Panels A, B and C report the simulation results from the 
CAPM, 3-factor model and 4-factor model. The posterior distributions are generated by applying the MCMC method on monthly 
returns from 220 UK unit trusts (47 fund families).
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We find a similar decreasing pattern in  with the increasing level of scepticism in 
the prior beliefs. Such a pattern is also robust throughout different baseline evaluation 
models. However, the in-family variation on  seems to increase with the prior 
belief, e.g.  of CAPM equals to 0.117 under the diffuse prior and it increases to 
0.692 given the high scepticism prior. A possible reason is that the prior beliefs we 
apply are far below the real in-family variance of the market beta, which makes the 
MCMC simulation hard to converge. Because of the power in place of the extreme 
priors, most of the posterior  shrinks towards the prior mean, leaving several 
outliers which enlarge the posterior in-family variance. However, the posterior 
correlations between each pair of the pricing factors in Table 4.7 are too low to affect 
the convergence of other pricing factors. 
 
The averaged alpha and beta both experience a decrease with the increasing level of 
scepticism on a larger scale than those reported in Table 4.5, for the reason that prior 
information is included on both the family mean and the in-family variation. For 
instance, alpha equals to 0.495% in Panel C of Table 4.5 given a high scepticism 
prior, while it is 0.366% when prior belief on  is included. This finding is robust 
in all the types of baseline evaluation models we consider. Our simulation in Table 
4.6 validates that performance evaluation of individual funds can be affected by 
including information on the prior view of the mean performance from the family as a 
whole, as well as the variation of performance among funds within the fund family. 
Given the situation that the sets of prior beliefs on the pricing factors do provide 
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additional information regarding the population of returns for a particular fund family, 
i.e. risk shifting in different market condition, adjustment in investment strategy when 
facing new information or engaging in tournament among fund managers within the 
family, the general learning model can incorporate this information so as to provide a 
more precise evaluation result.  
 
However, we find no strong evidence to support the presence of cross-factor learning 
in the general learning model during the simulation. The averaged posterior 
correlations between alphas and market betas under the three sets of prior beliefs are 
reported in Table 4.7. The posterior correlation,  remains at a very low level at 
all times, indicating that the prior information of other pricing factors has no 
substantial impact on the changes of the posterior family mean performance. But such 
a low correlation does not affect the outcome of learning, since as mentioned 
previously, the posterior mean of  is conditional on the covariance matrix, which 
includes the prior information on the in-family variation and family mean value of all 
pricing factors. Therefore, if correlation among the mean value of different pricing 
factors can be omitted, the prior information can be applied to family mean value 
directly, which can significantly speed up the convergence of the Markov chain, but 
bears the loss of the co-movements of the pricing factors. On the other hand, we place 
no informative prior on the correlation matrix in the simulation, i.e. an inverse 
Wishart distribution, , is applied on the correlation matrix to 
represent a uniform prior on the correlation. It would certainly be possible to include 
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an informative prior on the correlation matrix to address the dependence issue of the 
pricing factors if necessary. However, such a setting might involve denoting specific 
correlation among different market portfolios, which is beyond the scope of this 
research.        
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    Table 4.6 Simulation of learning on all pricing factors 
 CAPM   3-factor model  4-factor model 
 prior Diffuse Low High Diffuse Low High Diffuse Low High 
  General learning model  
 
 0.8447 0.7263 0.3664 0.9126 0.8147 0.4917 0.9669 0.8589 0.6271 
 0.9769 0.9735 0.7357 1.0249 1.0163 0.9329 1.0247 1.0164 0.9633 
 0.7043 0.5111 0.0000 0.6709 0.4122 0.0000 0.7631 0.3743 0.0000 
 0.0232 0.0023 0.0013 0.0238 0.0021 0.0011 0.0243 0.0021 0.0007 
 0.9757 0.7570 0.0000 1.0243 0.7059 0.0000 1.0252 0.7449 0.0000 
 0.1174 0.3211 0.6919 0.1344 0.3913 0.8738 0.1377 0.3631 0.9021 
Notes: This table presents the simulation results from the general learning model. The posterior mean of the variables, i.e. the 
cross-sectional annualised averaged alpha, the cross-sectional averaged , the annualised mean performance of alpha ( ), the 
mean performance of ( ) and the in-family variability ( ) are reported. We control the prior belief on the scaled parameters of 
the cross-sectional variability in factor loadings, . The prior beliefs on the mean value of the  pricing factor, , are 
centred at zero with a diffuse variance. The scaled parameter of  is also assumed to have a diffuse prior. Panels A, B and C 
report the simulation results from the CAPM, the 3-factor and the 4-factor models. The posterior distributions of the variables 
considered are simulated by the MCMC technique by using monthly returns from 220 UK unit trusts. 
194 
 
Chapter 4 Investor learning and mutual fund family 
 
 
  Table 4.7 Posterior correlation coefficients 
 CAPM   3-factor model  4-factor model 
Panel A          
 prior Diffuse Low High Diffuse Low High Diffuse Low High 
 -0.0253 -0.0453 -0.0046 0.0184 0.0300 0.0068 0.0253 0.0411 0.0114 
Panel B          
Prior beliefs  Diffuse Low High Diffuse Low High Diffuse Low High 
 -0.0252 0.0111 0.0647 0.0182 0.0781 0.0382 0.0249 0.0891 0.2010 
Notes: This table presents the simulation results from three evaluation models: the non-learning model, the partial learning model 
and the general learning model. The posterior mean of the variables, i.e. the in-family variability , the family level mean 
performance , and the fund’s individual risk level , are reported. We control the prior belief on the scaled parameter of the 
cross-sectional variability in ,  to be three distinct distributions, i.e. ,  and 
. The prior belief on the mean value of the  pricing factor, , is centred at zero with a diffuse variance. 
The scaled parameter of  is also assumed to have a diffuse distribution. Panels A, B and C report the simulation results from the 
CAPM, Fama French 3-factor model and the 4-factor model. The posterior distributions of the variables considered are simulated 
by the MCMC technique by using monthly returns from 220 UK unit trusts. 
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4.5 Conclusions 
In this research, we devote our attention to analysis of how returns from other 
parallel funds affect the alpha of particular funds within the same fund family. We 
consider a general learning model in a Bayesian framework to incorporate the 
additional information given by other funds in the prior beliefs. We decompose 
the Jensen alpha as well as the loadings of each market portfolio in the factor 
pricing model into the combination of a family mean value and fund’s 
idiosyncratic variation. The family mean value represents the investors’ opinion 
on the cross-sectional mean of both alpha and factor loadings, while the in-family 
variation addresses how parameters from the individual fund deviate from the 
family mean.  
 
To simulate this general learning model we construct the combined Gibbs 
samplers with the Metropolitan Hastings algorithm by using monthly NAV from 
220 UK domicile equity based unit trusts belonging to 47 fund families. We also 
conduct a simulation based on fake returns generated by drawing from the real 
dataset, to validate the learning process addressed by our evaluation. In addition, 
to estimate the Jensen alpha we apply the general learning model to three types of 
factor pricing model, i.e. the CAPM, the Fama French 3-factor and the Carhart 
4-factor model. We also incorporate three sets of prior belief to simulate the 
possible prior information on the family mean of each pricing factor and their 
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in-family deviation, namely, diffuse prior (no information given by the prior 
belief); low scepticism prior (small value of in-family deviation); high scepticism 
prior (high value of in-family deviation).   
  
The fake data simulation suggests that the posterior mean of in-family variation 
decreases given a less dispersed prior belief, indicating that individual funds’ 
alphas might concentrate around their family means if prior information implies a 
serious lack of skilful managers. Moreover, the fake data simulation also suggests 
that the general learning model is more sensitive to the chosen prior belief, 
compared to the non-learning and the partial learning model discussed by JS. This 
is because the posterior mean of in-family variance is conditional on the 
covariance of different pricing factors. The general learning model can provide a 
compromise of performance evaluation between the actual returns delivered by 
the fund and the additional information on how other funds behave in the same 
fund family. Since the general learning model provides a full Bayesian treatment 
on each of the pricing factors, it is more likely to gain benefits from this 
cross-sectional learning.  
 
The simulation on the real fund returns draws the same results about the posterior 
shrinkage in individual fund alphas within the same family as does the simulation 
on the fake data. In addition, we find that averaged annual cross-sectional alpha 
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exceeds the family mean alpha under all the chosen prior beliefs. This implies that 
the idiosyncratic risk of individual funds provides a positive contribution to their 
overall performance. Since we keep only one representative fund for each share 
class within the fund family, the positive residual can therefore be seen as the 
benefits from idiosyncratic investment strategies, which are often decided by fund 
managers. 
 
The contribution of this research is to provide an evaluation method of individual 
funds by incorporating return information given by other funds within the same 
fund family. Because of the full Bayesian treatment on all the pricing factors, the 
general learning model addresses the process of investors’ rational updating in 
performance evaluation. In general, our empirical results suggest that the returns 
of peer funds within the same family have significant impact on the investors’ 
opinion of fund’s alpha. Compared with the previous method, the higher level of 
shrinkage from our model can better present the idea of learning across funds.  
 
Furthermore, from the empirical Bayes perspective, if the prior beliefs are elicited 
by using the historical cross-sectional information, the general learning model is 
likely to provide more accurate evaluation results when facing the situation that 
fund families might engage in different family strategies to improve the 
performance. Since most of the family strategies would involve allocating more 
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capital to certain funds or encouraging fund managers to compete with each other, 
which may lead to an increase of the cross-sectional variability among alphas, the 
prior beliefs can be used to simulate these strategies or to capture the pattern of 
in-family risk shifting during managers’ tournament implied by the historical data.  
 
Consequently, the above additional information can be included in the evaluation 
process to better utilise the historical fund returns provided by all the funds within 
the same fund family. Finally, the general learning model provides a baseline 
model to distinguish managers’ skill from family contribution. Non-equal weight 
can be applied to both  and  to address the inequality in skill, and the 
zero-mean assumption in  can also be relaxed to indicate a specific drift of 
managers’ ability.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1 Research overview and implications 
5.1.1 Managers’ turnover  
In Chapter 2, we analyse the interplay between fund performance, managerial 
replacement and portfolio characteristics using the data from the UK fund industry. 
We deploy a bootstrapping simulation to separate the managers whose performance 
is driven by sample variation ('luck') from those with genuine stock selection skills 
in order to further test the efficacy of the governance mechanism in the UK fund 
industry. Our results suggest that managers’ replacement can be predicted by their 
underperformance. We also show that managers with sample-variation-driven 
performance are more likely to be dismissed by the fund companies than are 
‘unlucky’ managers whose inferior performance is generated by ‘bad luck’. Thus, 
the internal monitoring system is effective to identify managers with ‘fake’ skill. 
Conversely however, the probability of replacing those managers with genuinely 
poor skills is quite low, which indicates that additional factors, e.g. fund flows, 
might have more weights in fund companies’ decision on managerial replacement. 
While it is found that the fund management companies are capable of identifying 
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the skilful managers, their tolerance of managers’ poor skill significantly increases 
the external monitoring costs to the fund investors.  
 
5.1.2 Risk taking in fund family tournament  
In Chapter 3, we analyse the risk taking behaviour in the family tournaments, and 
the performance consequences thereof. Our empirical investigation documents 
that the half-year winning funds in the family are more likely to take more risks 
than their peers in the same family. In terms of the risk characteristics, our results 
show that the winning funds tend to increase their systematic risk in the second 
half of the year, indicating the winners’ temptation to retain their positions by 
holding high value and index-linked equities to mimic the market. In the analysis 
of performance consequences, we find that maintaining a low level of risk shifting 
drives the winners to outperform the losers. This result persists among various 
benchmarks, i.e. the observed returns, and the alphas obtained from estimating the 
CAPM, 3 factor and 4 factor models. However, after taking more risk funds in the 
winning group also show significantly higher alphas than the losing funds. In 
general, our results are supportive of the findings in previous studies that better 
performance comes with more stable levels of risk, but the research highlights that 
risk taking may not necessarily be an indication of inferior performance. Instead, 
it can be regarded as reflecting the managers’ intention to win the tournament. 
From the fund family perspective our findings show that fund families may 
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sacrifice the profits of certain members to benefit the others, as our results 
document a positive connection between cross-sectional variability of fund 
performance and aggregate changes in fund ranks within the family. 
 
Our findings in Chapter 3 provide empirical evidence to support the essential role 
played by the fund family in fund operation. We find that fund managers value the 
importance of family rankings more highly than their relative performance in the 
segment, in order to obtain benefits from the family. Also, our results suggest that 
risk-adjusted returns could be the major criterion by which the fund family judges 
managers’ skill. Since the previous literature gives little attention to the 
alpha-based compensation scheme, our findings shape the understanding of the 
motivation behind managers’ risk taking and provide additional insights into the 
managerial incentives to engage in family tournament. From the investors’ 
perspective, although we generally agree with previous findings in which a higher 
risk level leads to lower returns, our results still indicate that increasing risk 
exposure can be regarded as indicating managers’ intention towards active trading. 
Thus, a more comprehensive evaluation process is necessary to incorporate this 
eventuality.   
 
5.1.3 Bayesian learning and fund performance  
In Chapter 4 we devote our attention to analysing how returns from parallel funds 
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affect the alphas of particular funds within the same fund family. To achieve this 
objective, we propose a general learning model in a Bayesian framework to 
incorporate the additional information on prior beliefs. We decompose the 
individual fund alphas as well as the factor loadings of each market portfolio into 
the combination of a family mean value, which represents the cross-sectional 
mean, and the idiosyncratic disturbance, which addresses how parameters of 
individual funds deviate from the family mean. To simulate the model we 
construct a combined Gibbs sampler and the Metropolitan Hastings sampler with 
the acceptance rate no less than 44%. 
 
The simulation results suggest that our method better addresses the learning 
process. The posterior variance of alpha decreases dramatically with less 
dispersed prior beliefs, indicating that investors’ updating on fund alpha is more 
likely to be influenced by the performance of peer funds in the same fund family. 
Since the general learning model provides a full Bayesian treatment of each of the 
factor loadings as well as the Jensen alpha, it is more likely to gain benefits from 
this cross-sectional learning. We also find that the averaged cross-sectional alpha 
exceeds the family mean alpha under all the chosen prior beliefs. This implies that 
the idiosyncratic risk of individual funds provides a positive contribution to their 
overall performance.  
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Chapter 4 provides an evaluation method of individual funds by incorporating 
returns information given by other funds within the same fund family. The 
method offers an approach to adjust the estimation of fund alphas by investors’ 
arbitrary beliefs on the overall skill level of the fund family. If the prior beliefs 
elicited refer to the historical evidence of family strategies, i.e. shifting 
performance within the family or reallocating resources to certain funds, the 
method is likely to provide more accurate results. Moreover, from an empirical 
Bayes perspective, our method can be used as the baseline model to conduct a 
recursive analysis which updates prior beliefs by using the newly simulated 
posterior beliefs to better capture the randomness of fund alpha. Finally, by 
allowing specific prior belief to be placed on each of the pricing factors, our 
method can improve our understanding of the implementation of trading strategies 
adopted by both individual funds and the fund family. 
 
This research provides a comprehensive analysis on both the performance shifting 
and the evaluation technique in the context of the UK fund industry. The two 
empirical chapters, Chapter 2 and 3, discuss the major factors that have substantial 
impact on funds’ performance. In Chapter 3, our results suggest that the 
underperforming managers are less likely to increase their overall risk exposure 
more than the overperforming ones due to increasing uncertainty of the future 
performance and their anxious career concern. This is therefore consistent with 
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the findings discussed in Chapter 2 where fund companies are found to be capable 
of identifying and replacing non-skilful managers, particularly when the superior 
performance is achieved by sample variation. Meanwhile, the performance 
consequence suggests that taking extra risk brings no benefits to the 
underperformers, which even increases the chance of being replaced by the fund 
companies.  
 
In addition, the family tournament phenomenon documented in Chapter 3 implies 
a potential interplay among fund managers within the same fund family. The fund 
companies also undertake various family strategies to improve the performance of 
a certain fund, which further emphasizes the crucial role played by the fund 
families. Therefore, the evaluation method proposed by Chapter 4 extends the 
conventional method by incorporating additional information provided by the peer 
funds as well as the fund family to offer more precious evaluation results. Hence, 
our simulation results in Chapter 4 further validate the conjecture of the 
cross-fund learning in the fund performance evaluation.            
 
 
5.2 Limitations and future research 
This research makes a critical contribution to a better understanding of fund 
managers’ turnover, fund family tournament and investors’ Bayesian learning by 
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way of a case study of the UK unit trust funds. Despite the new insights it sheds 
on fund performance and its evaluation, several limitations do exists, which call 
for further research in the future.  
 
First, the Bayesian learning model we propose in Chapter 4 can be extended by 
incorporating additional explanatory variables. We assume in the current study 
that the mean performance and the idiosyncratic performance contribute equally 
to the evaluation. However, to be more accurate, specific weights as well as prior 
information should be designed at the family-level modelling to better address the 
learning process. 
 
Second, although it is beyond the scope of this research to provide specific 
information on the prior beliefs of the correlation matrix, it is nevertheless worth 
noting that it could obtain important insights by further analysing the 
co-movements among different factors in the pricing model. Bayesian estimation 
can be applied further to provide an approach to extend understanding of the 
rational learning in the field of asset pricing.  
 
Finally, despite the popularity of using observed returns to estimate fund volatility, 
the returns of the holding equities from the fund can also be considered as an 
alternative to the description of fund managers’ instant strategy switching. 
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However, no existing data provider offers access to high frequency datasets on 
detailed fund holdings. With improved data availability, high frequency data 
analysis could prove to be a very fruitful research area in the future.  
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